City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2-2021

Burden-Sharing, Security, and the International Protection of
Displaced Persons: The United States and Italy as Case Studies
Paul Celentano
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4127
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

BURDEN-SHARING, SECURITY, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF DISPLACED
PERSONS: THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY AS
CASE STUDIES

by

PAUL CELENTANO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2021

© 2020
Paul Celentano
All Rights Reserved
ii

Burden-Sharing, Security, and the International Protection of Displaced Persons:
The United States and Italy as Case Studies
by
Paul Celentano

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_________________
Date

______________________________________
Thomas G. Weiss
Chair of Examining Committee

_________________
Date

______________________________________
Alyson Cole
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Thomas G. Weiss
Peter Romaniuk
Stephanie Golob

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
iii

ABSTRACT
Burden-Sharing, Security, and the International Protection of Displaced Persons: The United
States and Italy as Case Studies
by
Paul Celentano
Advisor: Thomas G. Weiss
Less than 5 percent of those displaced by war and persecution receive permanent
sanctuary. This is because the states tasked with protecting them are wary of the
“burdens” that they pose, framing them as threats to national economies, budgets,
and public safety. Consequently, states seek to share these burdens with other states
in order to minimize their own international protection obligations. While the
modern norm of “burden-sharing” has existed since at least the mid-twentieth century,
it is vague and, therefore, permissive of a wide range of state behavior. When viewed
through the lens of “securitization,” states utilize alarmist rhetoric and co-opt the
norm of burden-sharing to justify restrictive migration measures. However, the
evidence presented from two case-studies—the United States and Italy—suggests
that displaced persons are not, in fact, particularly burdensome for states. This
dissertation asks three questions: (1) what is burden-sharing, where does it come
from, and how has it evolved over time?; (2) To what extent and how is
international protection a burden to developed states?; and (3) how and why do
states such as the United States and Italy practice burden-sharing? The dissertation
evaluates the claim that providing international protection to displaced persons is
contrary to the public, economic and labor, and fiscal security interests of
developed states by examining the cases of the United States and Italy. Given the
dearth of evidence to support the conception of international protection as a security
burden, the dissertation proposes an alternative explanation for why states might
engage in burden-sharing behavior—the social construction of international
protection as a threat to state security interests. It concludes that ultimately what is
needed to improve international protection is not better burden-sharing, but rather
the de-securitization of displaced persons. Such de-securitization would help to
take the focus off of burden-sharing for states and ultimately pave the way for more
practical reforms intended to enhance the accessibility of international protection
for displaced persons.
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INTRODUCTION
Displaced persons represent nearly one percent of the global population. For decades
there has been a clear upward trend in global forced displacement (see Figure 0.1), and by the
year 2018 over 44,400 people were forced to flee their homes every day—a rate of one person
every two seconds.1 Yet relatively few displaced persons receive permanent protection from
states after fleeing their countries. Instead, states have viewed those in need of asylum as
potential threats to their national security and have constructed barriers to impede their arrival.
That is not to say that states are entirely unwilling to give assistance to those who are forcibly
displaced. However, it is apparent that states’ principal concern is not helping the greatest
possible number of human beings, but rather ensuring that the burden of doing so is dispersed
among their global neighbors to the greatest extent possible. Displaced persons, by definition, do
not voluntarily flee their homes. Therefore, any policy designed to dissuade them from resettling
within a state’s borders constitutes an attempt to share that supposed “burden” with other states.

Global Forced Displacements, Figure 0.12
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UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017 (2018), p. 2.
Chart statistics obtained from “UNHCR Statistics: The World in Numbers,” http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview.
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The historical development of international protection institutions reflects this hesitance
on the part of states to guarantee protections for displaced persons. Consequently, despite
centuries of progress on enhancing protections for displaced persons in theory, the world has
made surprisingly little progress on ensuring that they actually receive any protection at all in
practice. Ironically, while it was a refugee crisis in the twentieth century that helped spur states
to adopt the 1951 Refugee Convention, repeated refugee crises throughout the twenty-first
century have served as justification for states to subvert the Refugee Convention rather than to
apply it. One ideational undercurrent in particular has served to inhibit international efforts to
protect displaced persons: burden-sharing.
The modern norm of burden-sharing has its origins in mid-twentieth century debates
regarding refugee protection following the Second World War. The concept evolved over the
proceeding decades and today refers to a state’s concern with its share of responsibility for
asylum seekers and displaced persons. When states engage in burden-sharing behavior, they seek
to reduce their international protection responsibilities. In practice, burden-sharing initiatives
pursued by states can take many forms, including international agreements or domestic
administrative, legal, or procedural reforms. Regardless of the method used, burden-sharing
initiatives pursued by states always have as their objective to decrease the state’s accessibility to
displaced persons, thereby encouraging them to seek protection elsewhere.
In order to clarify the meaning and relevance of burden-sharing to the topic of
international protection, the first research question that the dissertation seeks to answer in
Chapter 1 is: what is “burden-sharing,” where does it come from, and how has it evolved over
time? While the modern norm of burden-sharing has been around since at least the mid-twentieth
century, it is vague and, therefore, permissive of a wide range of state behavior. Thus, what
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exactly it means and how it has been inculcated into the international protection debate over time
bears some explanation and serves to inform understandings of modern state burden-sharing
initiatives.
Despite appeals for states to act in accordance with their international legal obligations,
those in the developed world have largely eschewed such responsibilities even as those in the
developing world are sometimes given little choice due to the proximity of conflict zones.3 The
narrative surrounding state burden-sharing efforts, particularly in developed countries, has
predominantly been one regarding security, broadly defined. Displaced persons are framed as
threats to states’ budgets, jobs, and the safety of their populations. Thus, states often claim that it
is too expensive, too disruptive its labor markets, or too dangerous for them to admit every
displaced person in need of protection. It is from this perspective that states engage each other to
share the fiscal, labor, and public security “burdens” of international protection and, in so doing,
misappropriate the norm of burden-sharing for their own purposes.
This gives rise to the second research question that the dissertation introduces briefly in
Chapter 1 and seeks to answer in Chapters 3 and 4 is: to what extent and how is international
protection a burden to developed states? While there is some debate regarding how to measure
displaced persons’ impact on state security, upon closer examination this dissertation finds that
they aren’t much of a burden at all. Even when examining the issue from multiple security
perspectives, including the impact on states’ fiscal well-being and public safety, the empirical
evidence does not suggest that displaced persons actually represent a “burden” to states at all.
This casts doubt on conventional interpretations explaining state burden-sharing initiatives as a
function of the security burdens posed to states by displaced persons.

Ben Herzog, “Between Nationalism and Humanitarianism: the Glocal Discourse on Refugees,” Nations and
Nationalism 15, no. 2 (2009): 185-205.
3
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This dissertation suggests an alternative argument for why states persist in engaging in
burden-sharing behavior despite the dearth of evidence to justify doing so: that states construct
displaced persons as a security threat in order to minimize their share of the international
protection burden. Given that displaced persons do not substantially impact the security of
developed states according to the metrics used in this dissertation, it would be difficult to argue
that international protection inherently represents a security threat to them. Thus, this dissertation
presents the process of “securitization” as a useful framework for understanding state burdensharing behavior.
Securitization involves the reshaping of an issue not previously articulated primarily in
the context of security and conveying it as an existential security threat.4 That issue may be
formulated as a threat to any number of societal sectors, including the public safety, economy or
labor market, and fiscal security of a state. Regardless of the referent object under consideration,
securitization simply requires that an issue is conveyed in a security context and that that
characterization is accepted as such by the receiving audience.5 In the case of international
protection, the securitization process may involve the introduction of displaced persons as
terrorist or criminal threats, threats to citizens’ jobs or economic well-being, or threats to already
strained state budgets.6 This conception of displaced persons is then politically translated into

Thierry Balzacq, “The ‘Essence’ of Securitization: Theory, Ideal Type, and a Sociological Science of Security,”
International Relations 29, no. 1 (2015): 103-113; see also, Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization:
Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201.
5
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1998), pp. 21-48.
6
Thomas Faist, “The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and Security,” in Migration, Citizenship
and Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America, eds, Y. Michal Bodemann
and Gökce Yurdakul (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 105–120.
4
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government policy as officials attempt to “protect” the state and its people by countering the
perceived security threat.7
The cases of the United States and Italy serve to demonstrate the efficacy of these
securitization processes, and so the third research question that this dissertation seeks to answer
in Chapters 3 and 4 is: how and why do states such as the United States and Italy practice
burden-sharing? As these chapters discuss, neither country has a historical association between
protecting displaced persons and negative effects on state security. Nonetheless, both states have
historically expressed their discontent with the manner in which the burdens of international
protection are shared while maintaining that protecting displaced persons represents a prohibitive
threat to their respective security.
They have also articulated, instituted, and maintained a variety of policy initiatives
indicating a desire to engage in burden-sharing on the basis of the presumed security threat posed
by displaced persons. Thus, while each state engages with the norm of burden-sharing, they do
not necessarily do so principally to share the presumed burden of international protection more
equitably with other states. Rather, the norm itself is so broad that it is prone to being co-opted
by states to suit their own particular purposes. Therefore, as the cases of the United States and
Italy serve to demonstrate, in practice burden-sharing is essentially code for attempts to minimize
international protection efforts and responsibility.
The securitization of international protection in the cases of the United States and Italy is
consistent with the growing literature on migration securitization.8 It is hoped that by improving

Fiona Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International Security 31, no.
1 (2006): 165-99.
8
Krzysztof Jaskulowski, “The Securitisation of Migration: Its Limits and Consequences,” International Political
Science Review 40, no. 5 (2019): 710-720; see also, Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration A Study of
Movement and Order (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-29.
7

5

the understanding of international protection’s securitization this dissertation may contribute to
discovering a roadmap to the issue’s de-securitization. In the fullness of time, de-securitizing
international protection may empower states to shift their attention away from burden-sharing in
favor of focusing squarely on the protection of human beings.

Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 is titled “The Origins and Evolution of Burden-Sharing.” This chapter
addresses the conceptual origins and evolution of burden-sharing. This includes a discussion of
the institutions and procedures that have been established to support state burden-sharing efforts,
and how burden-sharing represents a structural element of how international protection is
administered globally. It also distinguishes between the international protection duties of states
versus those of global institutions, such as UNHCR.
Chapter 2 is titled “Theory and Methods.” It begins by discussing the logical and
theoretical assumptions implicit in this dissertation’s argument and empirical analysis.
Specifically, the chapter discusses securitization theory, which serves as the principal logic for
understanding the “intersubjective” construction of states’ security interests in regard to
international protection. The chapter specifically refers to the growing body of securitization
literature related to migration.
The chapter then turns to the methods utilized in the dissertation for analyzing state
behavior regarding burden-sharing. These include fiscal impact analysis, which is used to
determine the impact of displaced persons on fiscal security, and process tracing, which is used
to identify and analyze the association between international protection and states’ perceived
security interests. The chapter also discusses congruence analysis as an element of the research
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design. Congruence analysis provides a framework for drawing comparisons between the case
studies utilized in Chapters 3 and 4 in an effort to gauge the potential generalizability of the
dissertation’s findings. The chapter concludes by describing the case selection criteria and data
sources utilized for evaluating the dissertation’s arguments.
Chapters 3 and 4 are titled “The United States” and “Italy” respectively. They examine
the dissertation’s thesis using the United States and Italy as case studies. These chapters present
evidence contradicting the presumption that international protection presents a serious security
burden to either state. They also describe the increasingly restrictive burden-sharing initiatives
pursued by each state despite this lack of empirical evidence to suggest that displaced persons
actually constitute a burden. Given these findings, the chapters suggest that state security
interests related to the provision of international protection are socially constructed in accordance
with the securitization framework presented theoretically in Chapter 2. Thus, each chapter
concludes, securitization serves as a compelling framework for understanding burden-sharing
behavior.

7

CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF BURDEN-SHARING
The concept of “burden-sharing” as it relates to displaced persons has a history that dates back at
least to the 1950s, when the term was used to describe the need for shared responsibility for
protecting refugees. Indeed, the preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention states that
international cooperation is needed regarding the grant of protection to those in need of asylum
because doing so “may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries.”9 Ultimately, such
burden-sharing took at least three general forms.
The first was financial assistance for developing countries tasked with housing large
numbers of displaced persons in refugee camps. The second was a kind of logistical assistance,
giving aid to states without highly developed bodies of law relating to the grant of asylum to
adjudicate asylum seeker applications. The third was the physical relocation and equitable
distribution of refugees among states, which gave birth to the “resettlement” approach.10
Financial and logistical assistance efforts are indirectly supported collectively by states through
their budgetary contributions to UNHCR, which spends nearly 40 percent of its annual budget on
pursuing these activities to meet displaced persons’ basic needs and help states to provide them
with essential services.11
However, refugee resettlement has been adopted by states on an entirely voluntary and ad
hoc basis by states in coordination with UNHCR. The nature of resettlement is such that
UNHCR, in partnership with the International Organization for Migration, must physically
relocate refugees from the sovereign territory of one state to that of another. Thus, it is only

9

1951 Refugee Convention, Preamble.
Kathleen Newland, Cooperative Arrangements to Share Burdens and Responsibilities in Refugee Situations Short
of Mass Influx, Discussion Paper prepared for a UNHCR Expert Meeting on International Cooperation to Share
Burdens and Responsibilities in Amman, Jordan, 27-28 June 2011, p. 2, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/4ef332d29.pdf.
11
UNHCR, Global Report 2019, p. 21, https://www.unhcr.org/globalreport2019/.
10

8

when states voluntarily allow the admittance of refugees into their borders that such relocation
can function. Yet states have not generally been forthcoming with their voluntary participation in
resettlement programs. Even among states offering assistance there are notable disparities in the
scale of contributions. For example, while the United States created its refugee resettlement
program in 1980 and has since resettled over 3 million refugees, Italy only began resettling
refugees in 2009 and has resettled only a few thousand refugees over the proceeding decade.12
Even still, its history notwithstanding, the United States dramatically reduced its annual cap on
the number of refugees it is willing to resettle on an annual basis in the late-2010s over burdensharing concerns.13
Burden-sharing debates began to emerge in earnest in Europe following the founding of
the European Union (EU) with the conclusion of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Important
institutional innovations that followed included the development of a system for the dispersion of
temporary protection seekers in 1994 and the establishment of the European Refugee Fund in
1997 to provide financial assistance to EU states receiving large influxes of asylum seekers and
displaced persons. A commitment to burden-sharing was also codified specifically as a goal of
the EU in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.14 However, refugee crises stemming from a series of
conflicts throughout the twenty-first century in Kosovo, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria,

US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, “History,”
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/history; see also: European Resettlement Network, “Italy,”
https://www.resettlement.eu/country/italy.
13
UNHCR, “UNHCR Troubled by Latest U.S. Refugee Resettlement Cut,” Press Release, 2 November 2019,
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/11/5dbd87337/unhcr-troubled-latest-refugee-resettlementcut.html#_ga=2.216582998.1107525727.1597782092-1694261045.1595626649.
14
Christina Boswell, Migration Policy Institute, “Burden-Sharing in the New Age of Immigration,” 1 November
2003, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/burden-sharing-new-ageimmigration#:~:text=The%20notion%20of%20%22burden%2Dsharing,solidarity%20among%20states%20receivin
g%20refugees.&text=Indeed%2C%20the%20concept%20has%20been,as%20to%20almost%20lose%20coherence..
12
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among others, have continually reignited debate regarding burden-sharing among the EU
countries as well as globally.
To understand what burden-sharing is and why it has played such a pivotal role in global
international protection efforts, it is necessary to clarify where the concept and practice of burden
sharing originated and the influence it has exerted over time in shaping key debates and
institutions meant to facilitate the protection of displaced persons. The following sections
attempt to do this by discussing the evolution of burden-sharing over time and its importance as a
structural element of international protection institutions.

Burden-Sharing as a Concept and Its Evolution
The conceptualization of displaced persons as “burdens” needing to be shared among
states dates back to at least 1951, when Paragraph 4 of the Refugee Convention implicitly
advised as much. That said, neither the 1951 Convention nor its travaux préparatoires contain a
direct reference to “burden-sharing” as a concept.15 Rather, the term “burden-sharing” only
emerged in UNHCR parlance in the context of the Indochina Refugee Crisis, first in a 1979
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion on refugees in need of asylum and again in a 1980
Conclusion on temporary refuge.16
By the twenty-first century, the term became a regular facet of international instruments
and executive discussions on international protection.17 In 2010 and 2011, UNHCR’s then-High

Claire Inder, “The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime,” International
Journal of Refugee Law 29, no. 4 (2017): 528-529.
16
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No 15 (XXX) — Refugees without an Asylum Country (1979), para. f;
and UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No 19 (XXXI) — Temporary Refuge (1980), para. g,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/578371524.pdf.
17
See, e.g., UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 108 (LIX) — General Conclusion on International
Protection (2008); and UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 109 (LX) — Conclusion on Protracted
Refugee Situations (2009), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/578371524.pdf.
15
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Commissioner Antonio Guterres even called for a “new deal on burden sharing” on multiple
occasions, emphasizing the need to relocate displaced persons from states neighboring conflict
zones—which were overwhelmed—to those that could ensure their protection more effectively.18
Multiple expert meetings were subsequently convened to discuss how international cooperation
could more effectively facilitate burden-sharing to meet the needs of refugees and asylum
seekers, especially those in distress at sea.19
The term “burden-sharing” itself is now most often used by countries hosting large
numbers of displaced persons and asylum seekers. It is meant to emphasize “the perceived and
real inequalities in the distribution of direct and indirect costs that accrue when dealing with
refugees both in situations of mass influx and in long-standing refugee situations.”20 Instances in
which states, especially in the developing world, experience mass-influx and semi-permanent
refugee camps hosting tens of thousands undoubtedly cause myriad security, economic,
administrative, and other problems with very real costs.21 However, the significance of such
costs is more uncertain in the case of developed states accepting displaced persons on a largely

UNHCR, High Commissioner’s Opening Remarks: 2010 Dialogue on Protection Gaps and Responses, 8
December 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4cff875e13.html; UNHCR, High Commissioner’s Closing Remarks: 2010
Dialogue on Protection Gaps and Responses, 9 December 2010, http://www. unhcr.org/4d0732389.html; and
UNHCR, Statement by Mr. Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Intergovernmental
Meeting at Ministerial Level to mark the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 7 December 2011,
http://www.unhcr.org/4ecd0cde9.html.
19
UNHCR, Expert Meeting on International Cooperation to Share Burdens and Responsibilities in Amman, Jordan,
June 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d22f95f6.html; and UNHCR, Expert Meeting on Refugees and AsylumSeekers in Distress at Sea in Djibouti, November 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d22f95f6.html.
20
Martin Gottwald, “Burden Sharing and Refugee Protection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced
Migration Studies, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 525-537.
21
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No 100 (LV) — Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden
and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations (2004), Preamble, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/578371524.pdf.
18
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voluntary basis given the comparative ease with which they can be integrated as contributing
members of society.
Uncertainty regarding the magnitude of costs notwithstanding, the type of burden
displaced persons represented and how their associated costs should be shared among states
evolved considerably. In 1951, the Refugee Convention appeared to take for granted that
displaced persons—specifically refugees—would be protected by states, and that it was just a
matter of figuring out how best to distribute them in a more equitable manner. However, the
Convention appears to have underestimated states’ willingness to implement policies actively
deterring displaced persons from seeking protection within their borders in service of reducing
their own share of the burden. By the 1980s increasingly restrictive asylum policies began to take
shape.22 Several prominent scholars on refugees and burden-sharing have attributed such
restrictive policies to the precipitous rise in refugee movements combined with economic
recessions and the election of conservative governments in many of the world’s most significant
refugee-receiving countries.23 The post-9/11 world similarly led to more restrictive asylum
policies, but on the basis of security-consciousness.24
Thus, the modern burden-sharing concept is wrapped up in multifaceted views of the
effects of admitting displaced persons on state security. Notably, however, what is implied by
burden-sharing differs somewhat in usage between high-income, developed countries and lowor middle-income countries in the Global South. For developed countries, burden-sharing refers

Martin Gottwald, “Burden Sharing and Refugee Protection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced
Migration Studies, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 526.
23
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to a concern with their share of responsibility for adjudicating the applications of and providing
protection to displaced persons. Since developed countries tend not to border the countries of
origin from which most displaced persons flee, burden-sharing in this context also refers to
apportioning responsibility for resettling refugees. This intent is observable through regional
accords such as various so-called “safe-third country” agreements in the Americas and the
burden-sharing mechanisms available to Italy as part of the EU’s Common European Asylum
System.25
For developing countries, especially those bordering major asylum seeker countries of
origin, burden-sharing is more akin to a plea for assistance from the developed world. Such
requested assistance may be financial to address both the immediate burden posed by the mass
influx of displaced persons from neighboring regions given the hugely disproportionate share of
refugees living in developing countries and their frequent status of country of first arrival. For
example, in 2001 the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook recognized that 72 percent of refugees lived
in developing countries.26 By 2016, the percentage of refugees housed in developing countries
increased to more than 84 percent.27 Burden-sharing requests by developing countries may also
be logistical or technical, such as aiding in the processing of asylum applications, or take the
form of requests for resettlement or economic support.28 For example, in 2016 the EU and Jordan
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came to an agreement that included trade preferences, financial assistance, and assistance with
integrating refugee populations into the labor force in Jordan.29
Importantly, this dissertation focuses on the burden-sharing concept as it is used and
intended by developed states. This is particularly important in the following chapters, which
discuss burden-sharing in the context of national and global institutions for the protection of
displaced persons. Utilizing the developing country definition, such an analysis would imply
examining the ways in which institutions were designed in order to promote the provision of
financial, logistical, and technical support to developing countries with large relative shares of
the world’s refugee population.
The following section instead examines how even while constructing the fundamental
infrastructure for facilitating the protection of displaced persons, the developed countries who
primarily dictated the terms of such institutions imbedded within them elements allowing for
their own responsibility avoidance. Usually this has taken the form of treaties or compacts
lacking robust enforcement mechanisms or lacking specificity regarding states’ responsibilities.
Regardless, the focus is on states’ reluctance to provide assistance even while nominally
expanding human rights protections.

International Protection Institutions and Burden-Sharing
While a person’s state of citizenship is the entity primarily responsible for ensuring their
protection, when states are unable or unwilling to provide such protection—or when a person is

29

Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union Position within the Association Council Set Up
by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing An Association Between the European Communities and their
Member States, of the One Part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of The Other Part, With Regard to the
Adoption of EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and Annexed Compact, Brussels, 19.9.2016 JOIN(2016) 41 final,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf.

14

“stateless”—they become displaced and seek protection internationally. The modern legal
framework for how and under which conditions displaced persons are granted international
protection is built upon more than a century of international human rights and humanitarian law
as well as state practice and more specialized areas of law, such as international refugee law.
However, despite its centuries of development, the legal and institutional framework for
international protection remained dogged by state concerns regarding burden-sharing.
The flexibility that states possess allowing them to engage in burden-sharing when they
so choose is integrated into the fabric of international and national institutional design. It is
especially observable insofar as states’ legal responsibilities toward those seeking protection
remain remarkably open to interpretation, allowing much room to negotiate a more equitable
share of burdens on an ad hoc basis rather than being bound by rigidly defined responsibilities.
Even regarding basic questions, such as how to define a displaced person, what the process
should be for determining eligibility for protection, and which state is responsible for protecting
any given displaced person, there remains little consensus. While addressing asylum seeker
claims within their own borders, states have generally been content to outsource much asylum
seeker responsibility globally to institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), with themselves only participating when they choose to do so voluntarily.
UNHCR has a tripartite strategy for achieving “durable solutions” for recognized
refugees who are under its temporary protection in host countries—integration, repatriation, and
resettlement.30 UNHCR has also proposed guidelines for states on the temporary protection of
displaced persons.31 More generally, however, there are essentially four strategies that states
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have historically been employed for addressing forced displacement, as Peter Schuck notes:
addressing root causes, immediate voluntary repatriation, temporary (or “complementary”)
protection, and permanent resettlement.32 While addressing root causes and voluntarily
repatriation would undoubtedly be the preferred strategies for most states, given the minimal
level of national responsibility that they entail, in practice the former fails to address the
immediate needs of those who are displaced and the latter is largely impracticable.
Consequently, as a practical matter permanent resettlement or temporary protection are generally
required to meet the basic needs of displaced persons.
Yet no temporary or permanent sanctuary is possible without the cooperation of states
since, ultimately, it is within the sovereign borders of states that displaced persons must be
housed. The general tenor of international protection is therefore heavily conditioned by states’
focus on ensuring that the putative burdens of providing such protection are at best equitably
shared (and at worst avoided entirely). Despite international protection’s philosophical and
seemingly altruistic origins, nowhere is such conditioning more evident than in the construction
of the modern global and national institutions associated with the processing and protection of
asylum seekers and displaced persons respectively. An examination of the origins of such
institutions does, however, give some needed context by helping to explain how the burdensharing concept has been inculcated throughout the modern evolution and current state of the
global framework for international protection.
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International Protection and Burden-Sharing: A Very Brief History
In 1646, Hugo Grotius argued that the world should actively protect any person subject to
“such treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting.”33 By the nineteenth century, such behavior
prompted a series of transitory global partnerships for the protection of religious minority groups
in North Africa and the Middle East. Thus, the movement to protect displaced persons on a
global scale began with efforts to protect religious minorities during and after conflicts. For
example, when more than 100,000 Christian refugees were displaced by violence during the
1860 Mount Lebanon Civil War, France partnered with the Ottoman Empire in quelling the
unrest while the British Empire accepted Maronite refugees in Malta.34 Less than two decades
later, the 1878 Treaty of Berlin granted equal civil, political, and religious rights to religious
minorities in Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania,35 many of whom were either refugees recently
transplanted by the Russo-Turkish conflict that the treaty was concluding or Muslim minorities
formerly protected by Ottoman rule but now ruled Christian governments.
While the protections for minorities and foreign nationals set out in the 1878 Treaty of
Berlin were not readily enforced, they served as a model for the series of bilateral Minority
Treaties concluded between the League of Nations and a number of defeated and newly formed
states after World War I.36 The efficacy of these minority treaties themselves was short-lived, as
evidenced by the ensuing Holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s, but the ideas they espoused were
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incorporated not only into some of the foundational legal instruments of the modern international
protection framework, but also into the ethos of international protection itself.
Among the fundamental ideas incorporated into international protection as a concept was
the principle that people forced to abandon their homes should be allowed to make new lives for
themselves in the countries to which they fled and be protected from forced repatriation.
Notwithstanding its other purposes (such as defining the population of a re-formed state), the
Minorities Treaty signed between the Allies and Poland following World War I serves as an
embryonic reinforcement of this principle. Article 2 of the Minorities Treaty stated that Poland
was to “assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without
distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.”37 Going a step further, the treaty also
guaranteed Polish citizenship to all German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Russian nationals present
within Polish borders at the conclusion of the war “ipso facto and without the requirement of any
formality.”38
In fact, the Minority Treaties served as a foundation for the minority rights protection
system established by the United Nations following World War II as part of the Plan for the
Future Government of Palestine in order to address the issue of Jewish refugees.39 Such a system
was necessitated, however, by state burden-sharing behavior before, during, and after the war.
That is, despite more than 300,000 requests by Jewish refugees to be admitted to the United
States, between 1934 and 1943 the United States accepted only 21,000 refugees from Europe due
to the implementation of visa quotas.40 One particularly notable instance of refugee refusal was

37

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, 28 June 1919, Article 2.
Ibid., Article 3.
39
UN General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine, (A/RES/181(II)), 29 November
1947, Chapter 2.
40
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Holocaust Encyclopedia, Refugees,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/refugees.
38

18

the attempted arrival of the SS St. Louis in Florida in May 1939 carrying 936 Jewish refugees.
The boat was refused the right to offload its passengers under the US Immigration Act of 1924
and in the face of intense opposition by the American public. The boat then returned to Europe,
where it offloaded its passengers, more than 60 percent of whom subsequently died in the
Holocaust.41
Following the war, the United States and British governments engaged in one of the
largest early operationalizations of burden-sharing efforts in the post-war era by negotiating
where to resettle large numbers of Holocaust survivors. A unanimous agreement by the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry established to address this issue allowed for the immediate
resettlement of over 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine.42 Notably, the
Committee did recognize that “our governments together, and in association with other countries,
should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such ‘displaced persons,’ irrespective of
creed or nationality, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken.”
However, the Committee also noted that despite recommending finding new homes for displaced
persons, no country should be asked to make a permanent change to its immigration policy in
order to facilitate this humanitarian outcome.43 Palestine, therefore, which was not directly
represented at the negotiations, was made to accept 100,000 refugees, but no other state was
required to make any firm commitment to take even one. Burden-sharing is easiest when those
made to bear burdens are not even a party to the discussion.
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Nonetheless, an acknowledgment of the global responsibility to protect all refugees
without discrimination, even those sharing a nationality with a state’s defeated enemies, was
concretized first in Article 44 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949 and subsequently in
Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Specifically, the Geneva Convention states that an
individual’s de jur nationality does not obviate the need to ensure their protection since they lack
the protection of their own government.44 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness extended these state
obligations to include those lacking any government at all.45 The 1951 Refugee Convention
expanded these protections markedly by guaranteeing protections for refugees “without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”46
The 1951 Refugee Convention also includes the “non-refoulement” provision in Article
33, which prevents the deportation of refugees if doing so would endanger their human rights.
Non-refoulement has since been recognized as a fundamental principle of international refugee
law that also protects asylum-seekers, since they too may be refugees despite not yet having been
formally recognized as such.47 There is not, however, an international agreement that is global in
scope codifying “complementary” forms of protection for displaced persons—i.e. those who are
displaced but do not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967
Protocol.48 While there are some regional agreements that standardize select forms of
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complementary protection, as in the EU, even these are far from comprehensive, which is why
UNHCR has long advocated for a more global consensus.49
The Refugee Convention and Protocol do, however, provide the foundational framework
of protections for those recognized or seeking to be recognized as displaced persons.
Additionally, there are a series of regional standards and agreements on international protection,
particularly in Europe and the Americas, that serve to bolster those protections. In all cases,
however, the specter of burden-sharing has colored the scope and shape that those protections
have taken both in theory and in practice.

The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
The 1951 Refugee Convention is the foundation of international refugee law. It was the
first document to define authoritatively what a refugee is in Article 1:
The term "refugee" shall apply to any person who…owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.50
Beyond defining the criteria for an individual to qualify as a refugee, the 1951 Refugee
Convention establishes the peremptory norm of non-refoulement. Its Article 33 states that
refugees and asylum seekers ought not to be forcibly transferred to a country in which they are
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liable to be subjected to persecution. The Convention also sets out the responsibilities that
refugees have as well as the duties that states have toward them.51
Article 2 of the Convention obliges refugees to abide by the national laws of their host
state, provided that that state is a Convention signatory. At the same time, state parties to the
Convention must respect the personal rights of refugees such as their right to marry (Article 12),
provide them with documents and access to government services and institutions (Articles 16,
25, 27-28), and give them the opportunity to become naturalized citizens (Article 34). States are
also prohibited from discriminating against refugees (Article 3 and 8), assessing taxes or fines
based on their status as refugees (Article 29), expelling or forcibly “refouling” them (Article 32
and 33), or penalizing them for illegal entry while seeking asylum (Article 31).
Moreover, the Convention also outlines various areas in which refugees ought to be
treated no differently from a country’s own citizens—such as in regard to freedom of religion
(Article 4), elementary education (Article 22), and social welfare programs (Article 23-24).
Nonetheless, the convention also states that refugees ought to be treated instead like other
resident non-citizens in regard to eligibility for union membership (Article 15), employment
(Article 17 and 18), housing (Article 21), secondary and post-secondary education (Article 22),
and freedom of movement (Article 26).
Notably, while the Convention is legally-binding, it does not create an institution with the
explicit authority to monitor compliance with its provisions or “enforce” it per se. The
Convention assigned supervisory responsibilities to UNHCR, but it does not outline a formal
procedure by which states may lodge formal complaints alleging violation by other state parties.
While Article 38 of the Convention does note that complaints can be referred to the International
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Court of Justice (ICJ), no state party has ever done so. The Convention’s Travaux Préparatoires
notes that during the negotiation process of the Convention, Belgium recommended allowing
UNHCR the authority to bring complaints before the ICJ directly rather than waiting for states to
take the initiative to do so. Ultimately, however, this recommendation was never included in the
Convention’s final text.52
Although the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are
separate treaties, the Protocol merely seeks to apply the Convention’s Articles 2-34 to a wider
range of refugees than those defined in Article 1. This is necessary because the Convention
contains a temporal and geographic restriction circumscribing who may apply for refugee status,
making it almost exclusively available to Europeans displaced due to events occurring prior to
January 1, 1951. The Protocol removes that restriction on who may be defined as a refugee by
altering the language in Article 1 to allow for greater inclusiveness.53 With the exception of
Madagascar and Saint Kitts and Nevis, all states that are parties to the 1951 Convention have
also ratified the 1967 Protocol. In addition, Cape Verde, Venezuela, and the United States have
ratified only the Protocol, essentially meaning that they have acceded to the most expansive
interpretation of Refugee Conventions substantive articles regarding the protection of refugees.
As of the ratification of both treaties by Nauru in June 2011, there are 145 parties to the 1951
Convention and 146 parties to the 1967 Protocol.
Despite the wide reach of the Convention and Protocol, there are gaps in the legal
framework of international protection that limit protections for displaced persons. A particularly
salient point, given the ongoing refugee crisis, is that one country—Turkey—has opted to ratify
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the 1967 Protocol but at the same time retain the restrictive definition of a refugee it declared in
1962 when it ratified the Refugee Convention. Consequently, Turkey defines a refugee as an
individual fleeing specifically as a result of “events occurring in Europe.” The country was
therefore permitted to retain its declared interpretation of who it recognizes as a refugee by the
Protocol when it acceded to that treaty in 1968.54
Thus, non-Europeans have never been eligible for recognition as refugees in Turkey.55 In
fact, until the Turkish parliament passed its first ever asylum law—the “Law on Foreigners and
International Protection”—in April 2013 and established the country’s Directorate General of
Migration Management, the country did not have a formal legal means for anyone to be granted
asylum.56 Moreover, it remains uncertain whether Turkey is now obligated to refrain from
refouling displaced persons since only refugees or potential refugees can technically be refouled.
Since Turkey doesn’t subscribe to the 1967 Protocol definition of a refugee, none of the asylum
seekers currently in its country could possibly be “refugees” according to the Turkish definition.
Such legal ambiguities stem from the decentralized nature of standards on international
protection, with each state free to exercise its own sovereign authority to implement unique laws
regarding asylum seekers and displaced persons. This creates significant protection gaps that
endanger displaced persons, as illustrated by the practical consequences of Turkey’s restrictive
refugee definition. The 4 million displaced persons hosted by Turkey as of 2019 due to the
Syrian Civil War (and the thousands returned from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey
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Statement)57 were generally ineligible for formal recognition as refugees by Turkey.58 Instead,
they were protected on only a temporary basis under the country’s 2014 Temporary Protection
Regulation.59 Turkey even issued statements suggesting that it intended to forcibly repatriate 2-3
million Syrian refugees to putative “safe zones” in their country of origin despite the ongoing
conflict.60 Therefore, while burden-sharing efforts by the EU via the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement
essentially allowed the EU to return asylum seekers arriving in Greece by boat to Turkey, the
deal itself was based on the “untrue, but willfully ignored, premise that Turkey is a safe country
for refugees and asylum-seekers.”61
Thus, despite the existence of international agreements such as the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1976 Protocol, the international legal framework for international protection is,
even at its most basic level, far from being a single, homogenous system with clearly articulated
rules and standards. There remain significant differences between the legal standards for the
protection and status recognition of displaced persons. The lack of common global standards and
institutions for refugee protections, complementary and temporary protections, and status
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determination causes states to make decisions for themselves regarding who should receive
international protection and the type of protection to which they are entitled.62

Regional Standards and Agreements on International Protection
Beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, there have been a host of pacts
supplementing protections for refugees at the regional level. However, the types of legal
protections granted to displaced persons and asylum seekers on the basis of regional agreements
and subsequent national legal codification vary in both content and robustness. While there has
been modest regional coordination in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as somewhat
more development on this front in the Americas, the European Union’s Common European
Asylum System constitutes by far the most sophisticated and substantial set of regional
standards. The EU’s extensive regional asylum standards also are the most consequential for the
international protection applications of displaced persons. Briefly reviewing the history of these
regional arrangements helps to give context to and shed light on burden-sharing since they are
the context within which states engage in such behavior.
Among the first regional agreement following the passage of the 1967 protocol was the
1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa.63 Aside from solidifying 1951 Refugee Convention as modified by
the 1967 Protocol as the “the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees,”64
the 1969 OAU Convention is also the only binding legal instrument concerning the protection of
refugees in the developing world, with 46 of the African Union’s 55 members having ratified the
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document. The states that have acceded to the 1969 OAU Convention even include Libya and
Mauritius, although Mauritius has yet to ratify the agreement. However, neither of these states
have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol.
The OAU Convention also expands the definition of a refugee in two specific ways. First,
it does not implicitly require that an expatriate with a “place of habitual residence” outside of the
country of which they are a national first seek assistance from their country of citizenship.65 This
differs from the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, since these agreements require
that a bona fide refugee be unable or unwilling, owing to fear of persecution, to seek protection
solely from “the country of his nationality.”66 Second, the 1969 OAU Convention adds to the
existing 1951 Convention definition of a refugee those who are compelled to flee “owing to
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.”67 This expanded refugee
definition is significant given that such individuals affected by theoretically temporary events,
such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, are conveyed rights as refugees under the 1969 OAU
Convention, whereas throughout much of the rest of the world such individuals would be eligible
only for some kind of complementary or temporary status that would expire when conditions
normalized in the country of origin.
The 1969 OAU Convention is also significant in two additional respects. First, it was the
first major international agreement codifying the concept of “voluntary repatriation,”68 which is
today recognized as one of the major “durable solutions” pursued by UNHCR. Second, it
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addresses directly the topic of burden sharing regarding the granting of asylum and the
recognition of refugee status. Whereas the 1951 Refugee Convention simply notes in its
preamble that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and
that a satisfactory solution…cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation,”69
the 1969 OAU Convention goes a step farther, stating that if an African Union member state
“finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees” the other OAU member states are
obliged to “take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting
asylum.”70 Thus, the 1969 OAU Convention was, at the time of its ratification, the first regional
agreement on international protection that explicitly expresses a commitment to burden sharing
among regional organization member states.
Aside from the regional instruments clarifying and guaranteeing certain parameters of
international protection, there are also a number of human rights treaties signed among African
states that have a residual impact on ensuring protections for refugees by guaranteeing minimum
human rights protection standards for all people. These include the 1981 African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights71 and its 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,72 the
1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,73 and the 2006 Great Lakes
Protocol on Property Rights of Returning Persons.74 The 1981 African Charter serves to
reinforce human rights protections for individuals in the region that echo the human rights
contained in similar global instruments. The 2003 Protocol and 1990 Charter clarify these
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protections as they relate to groups particularly vulnerable to human rights violation. Finally, the
2006 Great Lakes Protocol seeks to protect those who have voluntarily repatriated after fleeing
the Great Lakes region—a region of Africa which has been particularly prone to conflict in the
20th and 21st centuries—and seeking international protection abroad.
Asia and the Middle East have a less robust set of regional instruments regarding
international protection since none of the agreements that have been concluded are considered
legally binding on their signatories. The 1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of
Refugees in the Arab Countries was signed by member states of the League of Arab States,
known more popularly as the “Arab League.”75 However, to date it has still not garnered
sufficient ratifications to enter into force. If the Arab Convention does ever enter into force, it
would establish the refugee definition utilized in the 1969 OAU Convention in the Middle East
region. It would also expand that definition to include explicitly those fleeing “natural disasters
or grave events resulting in major disruption of public order.”76
The non-binding 2012 Ashgabat Declaration was adopted by the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, which has 57 member states across four continents. This declaration acknowledged
that the granting of refuge to displaced persons was “deeply ingrained in Islamic faith, heritage
and tradition” and espoused the need to live up to the aspirations outlined in the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol.77 Similarly, the non-binding 2001 Bangkok Principles on the
Status and Treatment of Refugees adopted by the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Organization, which is a body that advises 47 member states on matters of international law,
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describe a similar definition to the 1969 OAU Convention of who is considered a refugee.78 The
Bangkok Principles also stress the need for international cooperation on “burden sharing,”
stating that “the principle of international solidarity and burden sharing needs to be applied
progressively to facilitate the process of durable solutions for refugees.”79
There are also a number of human rights agreements in the Middle East and North Africa
regions that have more robust language that more effectively contributes to legal protections for
displaced persons. These include the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights,80 the 2005 Rabat
Declaration on Child’s Issues in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Member
States,81 the 2005 OIC Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam,82 and the 1990 OIC Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.83
There is a less robust set of regional human rights instruments guaranteeing protections
for displaced persons in South and Southeast Asia. Two agreements have, however, indicated
more of an interest in improving such protections, even if indirectly. The 2004 Social Charter
drafted by the South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation84 and the 2012 ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration85 outline a number of human rights that should be guaranteed to all
persons. However, the latter agreement in particular has proven controversial. For example,
Human Rights Watch has labelled the 2012 Declaration as a “declaration of government powers
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disguised as a declaration of human rights,” noting that it “fails to include several key basic
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to freedom of association and the right to be
free from enforced disappearance.”86 Similar concerns have been raised by UNHCR.87 Thus, it is
not clear how much of an added layer of protection regional human rights treaties add for
refugees in South and Southeast Asia.
Regional efforts to formalize common standards on international protections in the
Americas actually pre-date even the 1951 Refugee Convention. At the Sixth International
Conference of American States in Havana, Cuba, the 1928 Convention on Asylum was signed by
five states—the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela—with 16 other states
later acceding to it. The 1928 Convention was created for the expressed purpose of allowing the
governments of the Americas to standardize “the rules they must observe for the granting of
asylum.”88 The 1928 Convention consists of only four articles, and its intent appears more to
ensure that asylum is not used as a shield from prosecution for fugitives than to protect the
human rights of those granted asylum. In fact, it contains no clauses stating explicit protections
for beneficiaries of asylum. Instead, it restricts the types of behavior that they may engage in
while also limiting when, where, and by whom asylum may be granted to a foreign national.
Its many shortcomings notwithstanding, the 1928 Convention represented a first step in
establishing the legal validity of conducting status determinations and providing sanctuary to
displaced persons in the Americas. In fact, only four years after it entered into force, the 1928
Convention was repeatedly modified and added to by subsequent treaties to codify more robust
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protections. The first was the 1933 Convention on Political Asylum, which defined “political
asylum” as “an institution of humanitarian character” and stated that “any man may resort to its
protection, whatever his nationality.”89
Second, the 1939 Treaty on Asylum and Political Refuge was the first regional treaty in
the Americas to define explicitly who was eligible for asylum (previous treaties had focused
primarily on who was not eligible to be granted asylum). The 1939 Treaty held that asylum could
be granted “exclusively to persons pursued for political reasons or offenses, or under
circumstances involving concurrent political offenses, which do not legally permit of
extradition.”90 Third, the 1954 Convention on Territorial Asylum that was concluded by member
states of the Organization of American States granted explicit protections for “persons
persecuted for political reasons or offenses” as well as refugees and specifically protected such
individuals from extradition.91
Finally, the most recent major regional agreement in the Americas was the adoption of
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which expanded the definition of a refugee beyond
even that codified by the 1969 OAU Convention. It extended refugee status to those “who have
fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”92 UNHCR’s expert roundtable
concerning the interpretation of the extended refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration concluded in 2013 that while the Cartagena refugee definition is not intended to be
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all-encompassing, it covers those subject to even the indirect effects of “poverty, economic
decline, inflation, violence, disease, food insecurity and malnourishment and displacement.”93
The signatories to the 1984 Cartagena Declaration meet every 10 years, and have concluded
agreements on specific issue areas each time, including the 1994 San José Declaration, the 2004
Mexico Declaration and the 2014 Brazil Declaration.94
Notably, however, since the 1928 Convention—which, again, offered virtually no
protections for displaced persons or asylum seekers at all—the United States has generally been
absent from these regional instruments, and consequently it has not committed itself to any of the
standards set forth by other states in the region on issues of international protection. Upon the
approval of the 1933 Convention on Political Asylum—which the United States also did not
sign—it entered a declaration expressly denouncing the legitimacy of asylum as a legal
obligation: “Since the United States of America does not recognize or subscribe to, as part of
international law, the doctrine of asylum, the delegation of the United States of America refrains
from signing the present Convention on Political Asylum.”95 The United States also did not sign
the 1939 Treaty on Asylum and Political Refuge, the 1954 Convention on Territorial Asylum, or
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. Thus, for example, it continues to define a refugee in terms of
the 1967 Protocol definition, rather than the more expansive definition offered in the 1984
Cartagena Declaration. While states throughout Latin America have continued to develop
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standards on various issue areas of international protection with the drafting of the three
successor declarations—1994 San José Declaration, the 2004 Mexico Declaration and the 2014
Brazil Declaration—the United States has refrained from participation in these efforts despite its
history of imploring countries in Latin America to do more on international protection.
Importantly, however, there are a number of regional human rights instruments that,
although they are not concerned primarily with international protection and refugees, are
nonetheless important given the residual protections that they offer to refugees. These include the
1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,96 the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights97 and its 1999 Additional Protocol on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,98
and the Inter-American Conventions on Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994),99 to Prevent
and Punish Torture (1987),100 on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women (1995),101 and on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with
Disabilities (1999).102 However, while these agreements have been ratified by a number of Latin
American states, the United States has not ratified any of these agreements.
The various regional instruments throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the
Americas serve to further clarify the definition of a refugee and echo aspirational calls for
regional or global solidarity, burden-sharing, and the rights of displaced persons. However, it is
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only in Europe that there are binding regional instruments that specify practical rules and
methods by which to coordinate regional efforts on international protection. The EU has
developed and revised binding directives on common refugee qualification criteria,103 asylum
procedures,104 and reception condition standards,105 as well as regulations seeking to facilitate
some degree of burden redistribution106 and information-sharing.107 Collectively, these
documents are referred to as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and compliance
with them is monitored by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which was established
in 2010.108 They outline the process by which a person seeking international protection in the
European Union may receive it (see Figure 1.1). The fact that this collection of regional legal
instruments in Europe has thus far had only limited success in homogenizing international
protection in the European region doesn’t take away from the fact that Europe has by far the
most highly developed regional legal framework for international protection.
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Common European Asylum System, Figure 1.1109
The EU’s 2011 Qualification Directive outlines the practical criteria along which those
conducting refugee status determinations in EU countries should assess whether an individual
applying for international protection is eligible to receive it. The general criteria identified in the
Qualification Directive include an assessment of the facts and circumstances made available
through the applicant’s statements and “all documentation at the applicant’s disposal.”110 This
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assessment is carried out in order to determine if an individual qualifies for international protection
in the European Union on the basis of: (1) their status as a refugee;111 (2) their eligibility for
subsidiary protection status, which entails that “serious harm,” or the threat of serious harm, will
occur absent such protection, and they are not excluded from protection due to one of the
conditions listed in Article 17 of the Directive;112 and (3) “more favourable [sic] provisions” than
those outlined in the Qualification Directive that are applied “on a discretionary basis on
compassionate or humanitarian grounds” based on criteria set by member states individually.113
Thus, while an individual may qualify for international protection in the EU on the basis of their
status as a refugee, they may also qualify for “lesser” complementary forms of protection, such as
“subsidiary protection” or “humanitarian protection.”
The Directive also outlines various guidelines for determining whether an individual meets
the criteria international protection qualification. It requires that those determining protection
eligibility consider: “all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a
decision on the application…the relevant statements and documentation presented by the
applicant…the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant…[and] whether the
applicant’s activities since leaving the country…would expose the applicant to persecution or
serious harm if returned to that country.”114 Various European legal instruments also collectively
identify criteria for the assessment of qualification for international protection that conforms to
criteria identified by UNHCR (see Figure 1.2).115
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2013,
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28,

UNHCR-Identified
Principles
1. Shared-Duty
2. Individual
Assessments
3. Objective/Impartial
Assessment

4. Evidence-based
Assessment
5. Focus on Material
Facts
6. Opportunity for
Applicants to
Comment on
Potentially Adverse
Credibility Findings
7. Credibility
Assessments based on
the Totality of
Evidence

Brief Description of the Principle
The adjudicator and applicant share the duty to
ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts.
The assessment of an application for
international protection must be carried out on
an individual basis.
Applications for international protection must
be examined and decisions taken objectively
and impartially.
Credibility findings have to be explained and
supported by the evidence. Where the
determining authority finds a lack of
credibility, there must be a basis or foundation
in the evidence.
Credibility findings should be focused upon
relevant and material facts that are serious and
significant in nature.

Main Legal Basis in the EU
Qualification Directive, Article 4
Qualification Directive, Article
4(3); Procedures Directive,
Article 2(a)
Procedures Directive, Article
8(2)(a)

Procedures Directive, Article 8(2)
European Asylum Curriculum
Module 7; national caselaw

The applicant has the right to be heard before
any individual measure would be taken that
affects him or her adversely based on a
Qualification Directive, Article
negative finding of credibility.
4(1)
Credibility assessment must be based on the
European Court of Human Rights
entirety of the available relevant evidence as
Jurisprudence; the Convention
submitted by the applicant and gathered by the Against Torture, Articles 3 and
determining authority by its own means.
22.
The assessment of the credibility of the
European Convention on Human
8. Close/Rigorous
asserted material facts must be carried out
Rights, Articles 2, 3, and 13;
Scrutiny
through close and rigorous scrutiny.
ECHR Jurisprudence
Since it is hardly possible for an asylum seeker
to ‘prove’ every part of his or her case, it is
frequently necessary to give the applicant the
Qualification Directive, Article
9. Benefit of the Doubt benefit of the doubt.
4(5)
Adjudicators must reach clear and
unambiguous findings on the credibility of the
10.Clear/Unambiguous identified material facts and explicitly state
Procedures Directive, Article
Findings & Structured whether the asserted material fact is accepted
9(2); EU Charter of Fundamental
Approach
as credible or rejected.
Rights, Articles 41(2), 47, and 48
UNHCR-Identified Principles in European Legal Instruments, Figure 1.2116
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Notably, the Qualification Directive restricts eligibility for international protection to those
who cannot seek international protection from a country of which they are a national, unlike the
less restrictive criteria that have proliferated in regional instruments throughout Africa, the
Americas (with the exception of the United States), Asia, and the Middle East. The Directive notes
that the crux of eligibility for international protection in EU countries is a determination of
“whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the protection
of another country where he or she could assert citizenship.”117
The EU has also addressed the issue of burden-sharing in its regional agreements, although
it would perhaps be more accurate to describe the effort as “responsibility apportionment.” That
is, the aim of the Dublin Regulation,118 which serves as the cornerstone of the Dublin System, is
to “make it possible to determine rapidly the Member State responsible, so as to guarantee effective
access to the procedures for granting international protection and not to compromise the objective
of the rapid processing of applications for international protection.”119
Thus under the Dublin System, EU member states and other states that have agreed to
participate in the mechanism are guaranteed the right to deport asylum seekers to their first country
of entry into the EU.120 In practice, however, the Dublin System has suffered from the reality that
most asylum seekers enter the EU via the borders of only a handful of EU member states.
Consequently, states such as Italy and Greece have been granted exemptions from Dublin System
transfers on the basis of the need for emergency relief under Article 78(3) of the 2007 Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, which states that “in the event of one or more Member
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States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals
of third countries, the Council…may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member
State(s) concerned.”121 These exemptions were solidified in two EU Council decisions, the second
of which was passed just one week after the first due to the rapid influx of asylum seekers.122
In order to facilitate the process of monitoring the entry of asylum seekers into the EU as
well as their secondary movements thereafter, the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) database
was established with the 2013 EURODAC Regulation.123 Under EURODAC, all asylum
applicants and individuals engaging in irregular border-crossings in the EU over 14 years of age
are fingerprinted and have their fingerprint records checked against the existing database of
fingerprints held at the European Commission via an automated fingerprint identification system.
Thus, EURODAC theoretically enables the functioning of the Dublin System since it enables the
authorities in the EU’s respective member states (plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland) to
determine if an asylum seeker has already entered and/or applied for asylum in another
participating state.
Beyond the directives and regulations that make up the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS), there are a number of regional human rights instruments in Europe that contribute to
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human rights protections and underpin the CEAS, especially given that many of them are binding
on all EU members by virtue of having been created by EU institutions. Such instruments include
the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms124
and its Protocols,125 the 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,126 the 2007 Convention on the Protection of Children against
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,127 the 2011 Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,128 the 1996 revised European Social Charter,129
and the 2012 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.130

Other Relevant International Protection Standards in International Law
While comprehensive overview of the various hard law with ancillary applicability to
international protection, there are some landmark agreements that are particularly salient to the
topic of this dissertation. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is perhaps the most
significant among these because, although it is a non-binding in international law, it is among the
earliest explicit statements of the right to seek asylum as a human right. Article 14 of the
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Universal Declaration states the “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.”131
The Convention Against Torture (CAT) is also particularly significant since in both the
United States and the European Union it is the basis for at least one type of temporary
international protection preventing a displaced person’s deportation. In the United States, a
displaced person at risk of being tortured in his or her country of origin is eligible for “CAT
Protection” and in the European Union such an individual would be eligible for “subsidiary
protection.”132
As among the most comprehensive binding international human rights instruments, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)133 and International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)134 serve as the basis for many of the rights and
privileges to which those applying for or granted international protection are entitled under
national laws and regional agreements. For example, the revised Qualification Directive
guarantees for all of those recognized as qualifying for international protection in EU member
states the rights to freedom of movement, education, employment, healthcare, and social welfare,
all of which are rights contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR. Beyond just these two treaties,
certain bedrock principles on which protections for refugees and those entitled to other forms of
protection are based—such as freedom from discrimination by the government—are elaborated
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on further in the agreements such as the Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination135 and Discrimination Against Women.136
Finally, international agreements that regulate the treatment of especially vulnerable
groups, such as minors and those with disabilities, are of particular relevance to status
determination procedures for those seeking international protection. The Convention on the
Rights of the Child137 has led to the development of special procedures, allowances, and
interview techniques, many of which have been outlined and advocated by UNHCR in it
Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking
Asylum.138 Similarly, other agreements regarding protections for vulnerable persons, such as the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,139 have contributed to the development of
special guidelines by the European Union for determining the status of various persons with
specific needs, including persons with disabilities, victims of human trafficking, and victims of
serious violence.140
Although the existing international legal framework relating to the protection of
displaced persons has its roots in western philosophical traditions, the post-World War II era saw
an explosion of multilateral agreements in which states mutually guaranteed the rights of
displaced persons, including refugees, temporary protection seekers, and asylum seekers
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generally. However, precious little materialized during that period regarding mechanisms to
guarantee that those right would be upheld. While the Refugee Convention and regional
agreements described above have served as a framework for global and national cooperation on
international protection, in practice state concern with burden-sharing has strained the
application of their provisions to the detriment of displaced persons. To appreciate the
importance of the dynamic between international institutions and states for enabling burdensharing behavior, the following section discusses the role of each.

The Role of Global and National Institutions
There is no global, standardized procedure or single institution tasked with enforcing the
rights afforded to asylum seekers and displaced persons. Nor does such institutional unity exist
for the operationalization of global duties toward those seeking international protection. In
practice, however, how such duties are conducted is of paramount importance, especially in
regard to determining the status of asylum seekers. It is only through a process of status
determination that states and international institutions can determine who even meets the
definition of a displaced person. This includes distinguishing between those entitled to refugee
protections, various forms of complementary protection, and no protection at all, with potentially
grave implications for inaccurate determinations. Until such a determination is made, states and
global institutions alike have only limit responsibility for asylum seekers. Most burden-sharing
behavior by states centers around whether to allow asylum seekers to submit applications at all
and, if they do, the type(s) of protection for which they qualify. Therefore, it is crucial to
understand the role of national and international institutions in regard to the standards and
practice of status determination.
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Status determinations are conducted by the entity under whose jurisdiction an asylum
seeker applies for protection. In practice, this means that an asylum seeker has their status
determination conducted by either a state or UNHCR, which is permitted to carry out status
determinations under its mandate when a state is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention
and/or has not established a fair and efficient national asylum procedure to conduct status
determinations on its own.141 Yet the type and range of protections available as well as the
specific qualifying criteria and eligibility to apply vary depending on the state or institution
under whose legal purview an asylum seeker falls.
Perhaps the greatest consequence of institutionalized burden-sharing concerns is the
enormous discretion granted to states in choosing whether to provide protection at all and what
form that protection should take. Such discretion allows for relatively rapid, drastic changes in
the operationalization of international protection at the national level as governments change and
domestic political ideologies clash. To illustrate this, the following sections will delineate the
roles of UNHCR and states.

The Role of UNHCR
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established on
January 1, 1951 by the UN General Assembly under Resolution 428 (V) for the purposes of
providing international protection to those meeting the criteria established in its mandate.142 The
criteria for individuals falling within UNHCR’s competence are very similar but not identical to
the definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention, since UNHCR is still
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bound to protect even those falling outside the Convention refugee definition due to dateline or
geographic restrictions.143 Moreover, those in countries not bound by either the 1951 Refugee
Convention or the 1967 Protocol also qualify for protection by the UNHCR under its mandate.144
In order to accomplish its mandate, UNHCR is tasked with—inter alia— the duties to
pursue the repatriation or resettlement refugees and to promote the admission of refugees to the
territories of states.145 Its mandate also calls for “co-operation between Governments and the
High Commissioner’s Office in dealing with refugee problems” as well as “the conclusion and
ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, and to supervise their
application.” Although status determination is largely undertaken as a sovereign prerogative by
states, the cooperative and supervisory functions outlined in UNHCR’s mandate form the basis
upon which UNHCR conducts refugee status determinations for asylum seekers in cases where a
state has not established a fair and efficient national asylum procedure to conduct status
determinations on its own.146 UNHCR does, however, endeavor to work with states to help them
develop suitable national asylum procedures, through such activities as issuing country-specific
policy guidance in the form of Eligibility Guidelines or International Protection Considerations
and Country of Origin Information.147
In practice, UNHCR must also provide protection to asylum seekers who have not yet
been determined to meet the definition of a refugee. When large-scale displacement occurs under
circumstances suggesting that many members of a group may be refugees, it is often highly
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impractical to conduct individual status determinations. For this reason, preliminary “group
determinations” are made without having conducted individual status determinations. In such
circumstances, each member of a group of asylum seekers is considered eligible for international
protection prima facie (i.e. accepted as such until proven otherwise).148 However, UNHCR only
has the authority to make a binary decision regarding whether an asylum seekers meets the
definition of a refugee or not; it cannot grant the various types of complementary protection
available in the national laws of states since these are not mentioned in the 1951 Refugee
Convention or 1967 Protocol and fall outside of its mandate.
When UNHCR determines that it must conduct refugee status determination under its
mandate, it provides information to asylum seekers regarding UNHCR status determination
procedures, registers them with UNHCR, and helps them to file an application for refugee status.
They are then given an asylum seeker certificate and have an interview scheduled with an
Eligibility Officer, who issues a decision usually within one month of the interview. The refugee
status determination process may be accelerated if an applicant is deemed to be particularly
vulnerable or in need of more immediate processing. Those receiving a negative decision may
file an appeal, whereas those granted refugee status are given a UNHCR Refugee Certificate and
may then have their nuclear family members and dependents apply for “derivate refugee
status.”149
After conducting a refugee status determination and concluding that an individual meets
the criteria of a refugee, UNHCR must then seek a “durable solution” for that refugee. This takes
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one of three forms—voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement. In the case of
voluntary repatriation, UNHCR must simply take measures to ensure that when a refugee makes
the choice to return, they do so voluntarily and based on objective information. Local integration
of a refugee in the country where UNHCR conducted the status determination (i.e. the so-called
“country of first asylum”) usually depends on the willingness and ability of the host country to
grant residence permits and integrate refugee populations. Finally, resettlement to a third country
is pursued by UNHCR when there are limited prospects for local integration or voluntary
repatriation and resettlement offers the best prospects for long-term protection.150 UNHCR
considers resettlement to be a vital global mechanism for refugee protection:
Resettlement can be an effective mechanism for burden sharing and
international cooperation, providing options to assist first countries
of asylum consistent with the principle of international
solidarity…Resettlement agreements can encourage coastal States
to allow for the disembarkation of refugees rescued at sea, by
differentiating responsibilities for initial reception and processing
arrangements from the provision of long-term solutions. A strategic
use of resettlement in the context of a comprehensive approach that
includes access to all three durable solutions, depending on
protection needs, also decreases the risk of resettlement becoming a
pull factor.151
Crucially, resettlement requires the consent of the country to which refugees are to be sent,
either on an ad hoc basis, or as part of an agreement allowing for the regular transfer of refugees
for resettlement. States set their own quotas and may restrict resettlement only to those who meet
their unique national definition of a refugee. For example, resettlement in the United States
requires that a person meet the US definition of a refugee pursuant to Section 101(a)(42) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Further, that person must “be among those refugees
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determined by the President to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States,” not be
resettled in any third country, and be “otherwise admissible under US law.” 152 Similarly,
resettlement in Italy requires that a person meet the Italian definition of a refugee contained in
Legislative Decrees n. 722/1954 and 251/2007.153

The Role of States
Although states have the primary right to conduct status determinations, it is not clear the
degree to which they have an obligation to do so. Article 14 of the non-binding 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides all persons the right to seek asylum, but this right has not
be transposed into any binding international instrument other than regional agreements such as
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and select state constitutions, including that of Italy.154
Perhaps more importantly, international law does not obligate states with a duty to grant asylum.
In fact, states argued strongly against the inclusion of such a duty during the negotiations
leading to the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention,155 and subsequent attempts to adopt
develop duties for states regarding territorial asylum have proven fruitless.156 Thus, while states
have the right to conduct status determinations and grant international protection, they do not do
so on the basis of an obligation to displaced persons under international law. Rather, states grant
international protection the basis of either their own national laws or their sovereign prerogative
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to regulate the admission of persons into their own territory.157 That said, states do not have the
power to redefine who constitutes a refugee for their own domestic purposes. Their recognition
of a person as a refugee is merely declaratory in nature since “a person is a refugee within the
meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he or she fulfills the criteria contained in the refugee
definition…a person does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized
because he or she is a refugee.”158
States are also bound by the principle of non-refoulement, and so states have an
international legal obligation not to return any person to a country where they would face
persecution.159 As such, asylum seekers whose status has not yet been determined benefit from
that prohibition on return until such time as they are declared not to be refugees.160 As Tom Farer
has noted, “despite the reluctance of states to commit themselves formally, in practice states have
generally admitted persons who arrive at their borders with claims to protection which are not
palpably without merit.”161
States have, however, generally held to the principle of “safe third country,” which
dictates that if a person applying for asylum has previously passed through a country in which
they could have safely remained, then they can safely be transferred to that country without fear
of refoulement. Thus, states may transfer the responsibility to conduct the status determination to
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that “safe third country.”162 However, there is no formal, widely recognized safe third country
“list.” For example, the United States has concluded agreements informally referred to as “safe
third country agreements” with countries such as Canada and select other countries in Latin
America. However, countries such as Mexico have refused to sign such accords for fear that the
United States would use it as an excuse to refuse admission to any asylum seekers entering from
along the Mexican border, leaving Mexico (which could not be considered a “safe third country”
by most conventional definitions) to evaluate their applications for protection.163 The European
Union does have an organization-wide definition of what constitutes a “safe third country” in its
2013 Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, but the definition is somewhat open to interpretation
and there is not universal list of safe third countries.164 The European Commission did propose a
common “Safe Countries of Origin” list to which all member states would be bound in 2014,
however no such agreement has yet been concluded.165
Notably, however, the “safe third country” concept does not require that that third
country have any minimum standard of status determination procedures or logistical capabilities.
Outside of the EU’s definition, the concept also does not require that asylum seekers are
necessarily allowed access to international protection in the country to which they are
transferred. Thus, as Catherin Phuong has noted, “repeated application of this [safe third country]
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concept may produce chain deportations which could ultimately lead to refoulement.”166 In 2019,
the Trump administration’s enactment of legally-contested regulations in the United States to
designate Central American countries such as Mexico and Guatemala as safe third countries
underlines the potentiality for such “chain deportations” by reluctant host countries.167
In regard to the countries used as case studies in the following chapters specifically, the
legal and institutional frameworks for international protection differ markedly between the
United States and Italy. Nevertheless, the historical development of the burden-sharing narrative
as well as the inculcation of burden-sharing’s pursuit as a palatable feature of state behavior has
merely served to construct an institutional landscape permissive of burden-sharing. That is, the
evolution of burden-sharing described in this chapter merely makes state burden-sharing
behavior possible. It does not, however, explain why and how states engage in burden-sharing.
As noted in earlier in the chapter, burden-sharing is often couched in the language of security.
However, on what basis do states consider displaced persons to constitute a security “burden,”
and does the evidence support such a construction? If not, why do states engage in burdensharing anyway? The remainder of the dissertation focuses on attempting to provide answers to
these questions.

Conclusion
This chapter unpacks the relevance and conceptual evolution of burden-sharing in the
context of international protection. Burden-sharing’s nascent emergence as a feature of global
governance is first observed on a global scale in the Preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
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The Preamble proposes that sharing the burden of upholding refugees’ fundamental rights and
freedoms among states can help to diminish the tensions associated with doing given that “the
grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries.” While the Convention
attempts to appeal the better angels of states’ nature in “expressing the wish that all States,
recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything
within their power” to share this burden equitably, such an ideal remains elusive.168
Following its introduction, the language of burden-sharing began to gain traction
throughout the latter-twentieth century, particularly with the advent of global responses to the
Indochina Refugee Crisis.169 Burden-sharing also proliferated through the adoption of various
regional instruments throughout the globe. These include the 1969 Organization of African Unity
Convention on the African continent, the 2001 Bangkok Principles in Southeast Asia, the 2012
Ashgabat Declaration in the Middle East, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and its subsequent
revisions in the Americas, and the various agreements underpinning the EU’s Common European
Asylum System.
Overall, this chapter emphasizes that despite more than a half-century of development,
burden-sharing remains conceptually quite vague and has yielded little practical cooperation on
the protection of displaced persons among states. Rather, debates regarding burden-sharing have
been segregated between the developing world’s pleas for wealthier states to provide more
assistance and support during instances of mass influx, and the developed world’s intraregional
usage of the concept to justify existing and future restrictions on the admittance of displaced
persons on the basis that other developed states should do more to help. In sum, burden-sharing as
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it is used throughout the remainder of this dissertation refers primarily to the latter of these
conceptual formulations.

54

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND METHODS
This chapter begins by discussing the theory and literature serving as the basis for the
dissertation’s underlying assumptions. It starts with a discussion of securitization theory, which
serves as the basis for analyzing the intersubjective construction of states’ security interests.
Those security interests may include various types of security, including public security (i.e.
public safety), economic or labor security (i.e. economic growth and unemployment), and fiscal
security (i.e. state budgets). The framework provided by securitization theory for understanding
state burden-sharing behavior implies that states institute restrictive measures and utilize alarmist
rhetoric vis-à-vis displaced persons despite the fact that providing them protection is not
particularly burdensome. The evidence presented in the empirical chapters in the cases of the
United States and Italy supports this conclusion.
After discussing securitization theory, the chapter then discusses the methodologies
utilized for evaluating why states engage in burden-sharing. Specifically, the methodologies used
are “fiscal impact analysis” and “process tracing.” Fiscal impact analysis is a method for
evaluating the fiscal impact that displaced persons have on a state’s fiscal security by estimating
the tax revenues they generate and the government expenditures that they incur. Process tracing
is a method commonly used in comparative case study analyses like the one utilized in this
dissertation. It involves the evaluation of independent variables to determine if a relationship
between those variables and an outcome is substantiated. In the case of this dissertation, data
points related to public, economic and labor, and fiscal security are examined to determine if
there is any evidence of a relationship between the protection of displaced persons and perceived
negative national security outcomes.
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The chapter then briefly discusses the dissertation’s research design, which involves
“congruence analysis.” Congruence analysis involves comparing one theoretical approach to
another across multiple cases in order to gauge the relative explanatory power of each for a given
phenomenon. In the case of this dissertation, two arguments are evaluated. The first is that
displaced persons constitute security burdens to states, which explains why they engage in
burden-sharing initiatives to lessen this presumed burden. The second is that displaced persons
do not constitute security burdens to states and that state burden-sharing behavior is instead
predicated on their securitization. These two arguments are evaluated across two test cases: the
United States and Italy. By presenting how well each of these arguments explains burden-sharing
by each state and then comparing the results, it is possible to get a better idea regarding the
generalizability of the results across similar cases.
The chapter concludes by giving a description of the data sources used to evaluate state
security interests. It also discusses the case selection criteria to explain why the United States and
Italy are good candidates for this comparative analysis to examine factors impacting state
burden-sharing behavior. The section contends that the United States and Italy constitute
“similar” cases, allowing similarities between each to be observed when evaluating factors
influencing burden-sharing in each state.

Securitization Theory
Securitization refers to the process by which an issue that has already been politicized is
transformed into a matter of state security.170 Traditional conceptions of state security interests
often formulate them in strictly strategic terms, directly linking them to rationalist assessments of
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material circumstances.171 This implies that state security interests are derived objectively based
on the material circumstances of the state, rather than constructed on the basis of factors unique
to that particular state.172 Securitization theory instead conceptualizes security as a social
construction, not an objective condition.173 The analytical framework of “securitization” that this
theoretical approach utilizes describes the formation of state security interests as the outcome of
specific social processes.
The Copenhagen School is the main proponent of securitization theory. The Copenhagen
School regards an issue as becoming a matter of security concern only when a “speech act” has
designated it as such. Subsequent “post-Copenhagen” scholarship has moved beyond the “speech
act” as the definitive securitizing act in favor of theorizing securitization as an “iterative and
dynamic process rather than an isolated (speech) act or event.”174 Thus, the securitization process
may be kickstarted by a single speech act or event, but ultimately that particular action alone
does not securitize any particular issue. Rather, securitization is construed as a process that can
be traced through case studies.175
From the perspective of securitization theory, security is essentially about survival, and
an issue becomes a security issue not because it constitutes an objective threat to the state, but
rather because it is designated as such by a societal actor.176 The designation of security issues is
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thus a social and subjective process requiring only the presentation of an issue in the context of
security and acceptance by the receiving audience of this characterization.177 Moreover, the
issue’s recognition as a concern within the realm of security then conveys upon it a special status
legitimizing the usage of extraordinary measures to address it.178
For example, under such an analytical framework, one would say that it was not the
September 11 terrorist attacks that caused violent Islamic extremism to constitute a security issue
for the United States. Rather, it was CIA Director George Tenet’s announcement later that
evening naming a Salafist Islamist terrorist organization called al-Qaeda as the perpetrator that
did so. Thus, a “security issue” is not a practical reality. It is just one of any number of
alternative lenses through which one could frame the same issue.
In this sense, issues are securitized as national security threats through a process of
strategic social construction occurring as a result of rational behavior on the part of sub-national
political actors. As political actors strategically bargain, they continually reshape the contours of
what constitutes “common knowledge,” which in turn shapes political understanding as actors
continually construct and conform to norms to achieve their self-interest.179 Relating this to the
issue of burden-sharing, the strategic social construction of international protection by domestic
political actors as a security threat reshapes previously held common knowledge regarding the
nature of international protection. This newly constructed norm of international protection as a
security threat then drives state burden-sharing behavior at the international level, since the
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desire to offload the burden of international protection to the greatest extent possible is a rational
response given such a threat to national security.
The Copenhagen School also takes a more expansive view of security itself. While it
refers to security in the context of survival, just as security studies more generally traditionally
does, the state is not the only entity in reference to which an issue may be securitized. That is,
while an issue may be characterized as constituting a threat to a country’s literal existence, it
may also be constructed an existential threat to any number of societal or national sub-sectors.180
These may include threats to various categories of states security, such as public safety, the
state’s economy or labor market, or its fiscal well-being.
There is a growing literature on securitization in the context of migration and, to a
slightly lesser extent, specifically displaced persons. This literature often centers on the
construction of migrants as threats to state security through their framing as terrorists, criminals,
job-stealers, and economic and fiscal burdens. Displaced persons are generally lumped into the
same category as other migrants despite their significant qualitative differences, as describe in
this dissertation’s appendix. Occasionally, however, asylum seekers and various categories of
displaced persons are singled out specifically as security threats, especially in the context of
ongoing refugee crises.
The post-Cold War era was marked by a shift in security studies generally from
conceptualizing security strictly as the “threat, use, and control of military force”181 to a more
expansive definition. Anne Hammerstad notes that it was in the post-Cold War context that
refugees and other displaced persons were proposed as “new” causes of insecurity for states,
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albeit they were often securitized alongside other categories of migrants as well.182 In Europe,
the securitization of migration intensified as a “politics of unease” emerged in which flows of
displaced persons were not specifically characterized as threats, but rather were implicitly
associated with existing security threats—such as human trafficking—and presented as
unsustainably high in the face of rising unemployment, slowing economic growth, and everincreasing budget deficits.183 Analyses of parliamentary debates in EU states have served to
underline this preference in European discourse for indirect securitization of migration and
displaced persons as opposed to the more overt security connections drawn in the United
States.184 As Huysmans writes, “the political process of connecting migration to criminal and
terrorist abuses…does not take place in isolation. It is related to a wider politicization in which
immigrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity
and welfare provisions.”185
In the United States, there was an intense securitization of migration generally and
displaced persons specifically following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Linkages were repeatedly
drawn between inadequate immigration controls and terrorist activity, and there was a marked
increase in the usage of exclusionist Refugee Convention provisions to declare asylum seekers as
ineligible for protection.186 As Mark Maguire notes, however, while the discourse among
security experts regarding the associations between migration, crime, and terrorism purported to
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be evidence-based, “this discursive community often operates with little or poor quality evidence
to support their visions.”187
The 2008 financial crisis led to further securitization of migrants as sharp rises in
unemployment and economic recession in developed, refugee-receiving states compounded the
perception of a migration-terrorism nexus with the image of migrants as job-stealers.188 As
populist parties and figures in the United States and EU alike asked rhetorically, “how could the
state welcome refugees and offer them benefits, while ignoring their own citizens” in their time
of need?189 Indeed, opponents of granting access to displaced persons and other migrants often
pull upon the levers of problems in the labor market, lack of access to social benefits for citizens,
and other economic and welfare deficiencies in advocating to burden other states with accepting
them rather than their own societies.190
With the backdrop of such economic problems post-2008, a number of studies have also
observed consistent rhetorical assertions reinforced by government policies characterizing
displaced persons as “expensive” fiscal burdens. In the United States, the advent of the Trump
presidency in 2016 resulted in characterizations by the administration’s chief policy adviser
Stephen Miller that “continuing to welcome refugees is too costly.”191 Similarly, a 2015 UNHCR
analysis of press coverage in EU states indicated regular associations of displaced persons with
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“the budgetary pressures that result from providing care to an ever growing number of people in
need.”192
Such securitization only worsened following the outbreak of civil wars in Libya and
Syria in 2011 and the waves of boat migration to southern Europe that accompanied them. The
image of irregular boat migration as an invading force was reinforced by prominent EU
politicians warning of “a Biblical exodus”193 and “a tidal wave of refugees and illegal
immigrants pouring into Europe.”194 Meanwhile, as a UNHCR Libya commissioned study of
refugee migration to Europe emphasizes, the “mixed flows” of displaced persons traveling
alongside “ordinary” migrants to seek protection using “irregular” routes has led to the equating
of displaced persons with “illegal” economic migrants in the rhetoric and policy of many EU
states.195 This is despite the fact that the manner in which displaced persons pursue escaping to
safety does not affect the legality of their right to seek and receive international protection.196
Thus, in the case of the literature on the securitization of migration displaced persons are
frequently securitized along the lines of public security, economic and labor security, and fiscal
security. There are some regional differences between how directly displaced persons are
identified as security threats, however. In the United States, more overt associations are often
drawn when characterizing displaced persons as security threats versus the tendency in the EU to
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do so indirectly by lumping displaced persons together with various categories of “illegal” or
“irregular” migrants, such as those migrating principally for economic opportunity.
Based on the theoretical and practical literature related to the securitization of migration,
one would expect such securitizing characterizations of displaced persons to be borne out by the
dissertation’s empirical analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. The securitization of international
protection has ultimately culminated in burden-sharing initiatives by states intended to address
the security threats that displaced persons are presumed to constitute. Using the examples of the
United States and Italy, Chapters 3 and 4 apply the concepts developed in the literature on the
securitization of migration and displaced persons to help contextualize the framing of
international protection as a national security threat and examine empirically how this may
contribute to states’ pursuit of burden-sharing as a remedy.

Process Tracing and Fiscal Impact Analysis
The empirical sections of this dissertation in Chapters 3 and 4 rely on “process tracing”
as the primary research method in order to test whether displaced persons constitute “burdens,”
how states’ intersubjective security interests are formed, and why burden-sharing initiatives
emerge. Process tracing is a method for tracing causal mechanisms using within-case empirical
analysis to determine how a causal process unfolds in that case.197 In doing so, process tracing
helps to give a better understanding of the causal dynamics serving to produce an outcome in a
particular historical case in hopes of “linking causes and outcomes within a population of
causally similar cases.” 198 Process tracing is only a single-case method, however. That is, it only
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sheds light on linkages between causes and outcomes within one case. Therefore, in order to
generalize the conclusions stemming from process tracing methods it is necessary to utilize
comparative methods to compare two cases in which process tracing was used.
The purpose for which process tracing is used is similar in the empirical analysis in
Chapters 3 and 4. That is, in cases of the United States and Italy it is used for the purposes of
evaluating attempts to explain burden-sharing behavior by each state in regard to international
protection and their respective security interests.199 Process tracing is used to test the
applicability of a strictly rational theoretical approach in which states pursue burden-sharing
because displaced persons represent security burdens. Implicitly, therefore, this chapter seeks to
answer the question of whether providing international protection to displaced persons serves as
a major source of deleterious effects related to state budgets, economies and labor markets, and
public safety. If the empirical evidence does not clearly demonstrate the affirmative, it would
cast doubt on the presumed association between displaced persons as security burdens and states’
pursuit of burden-sharing initiatives.
Process tracing is also used in Chapters 3 and 4 to determine whether the securitization
approach better explains states’ burden-sharing behavior. This approach holds that states’ pursuit
of burden-sharing initiatives is the result of the intersubjective construction of displaced persons
as threats to state security. This is indicated first by evidence demonstrating that displaced
persons are not, in fact, a “burden,” and second by evidence that states nonetheless introduce
restrictive measures and engage in alarmist rhetoric regarding displaced persons. This would
suggest that securitization theory better explains burden-sharing behavior by each state than does
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the assumption that states engage in burden-sharing because displaced persons actually constitute
burdens.
In order to operationalize process tracing, a supplementary method is utilized to examine
more specifically whether displaced persons are fiscally burdensome to states. This method is
referred to as “fiscal impact analysis.” While there are many studies on the effects of displaced
persons on a state’s economic and public security, few studies examine the impact that displaced
persons have specifically on states’ budgets. Even studies that attempt to do so exhibit clear bias
depending on the political proclivities of the authoring organization. The National Academy of
Sciences in the United States has noted that “understanding of the fiscal consequences of
immigration has often been clouded because much of the research is conducted by policyfocused groups that tailor the assumptions to support one position over another.”200 Thus, it is
unsurprising that organizations with a set agenda in favor of or against immigration have
historically found immigrants to be a boon or bane respectively to national fiscal well-being.201
Prominent analyses by partisan organizations (which represent the bulk of research on
the fiscal impact of refugees) serve to reflect this point. The conservative-leaning Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS) released a 2015 report that argued refugees originating from countries
in the Middle East received $64,400 in health, education, and social welfare spending over a
five-year period. However, the CIS study focused only on the costliest resettlement programs
during the first years of refugee integration while also not accounting for the taxes contributed by
those refugees during that five-year period or beyond.202
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Another study released by the more liberal-leaning Migration Policy Institute (MPI) in
2015, on the other hand, took a longer-term perspective, focusing on how refugees’ conditions
and fiscal contributions progressively increased over time as they became more well-established
in the US and better integrated into US communities.203 This study, however, did not do a
thorough accounting the government expenditures associated with protecting displaced persons.
Locally-focused studies from similar organizations have likewise found that over time, refugees
have a net positive fiscal impact on state and municipal communities in the United States,
although these studies have generally included harder-to-estimate secondary economic impacts
of refugees, such as job creation.204
Even governments, which have a fiscal interest in finding the truth of the matter, are not
immune to such confirmation bias. As Rufus Miles observed, “where you stand depends on
where you sit.”205 This is evident from the fact that publicly released national fiscal impact
studies have been primarily ordered by administrations in hopes of seeking to justify increasingly
restrictive migration policies. For example, when Australia’s Department of Immigration and
Citizenship ordered such a study in 2001, it did so while simultaneously instituting its “Pacific
Solution,” a scheme under which asylum claims were processed offshore under questionable
humanitarian conditions.206 Similarly, President Trump ordered such a study in the United States
in a memorandum on March 6, 2017. This was the same day that he issued the second iteration
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of his infamous “Muslim travel ban,”207 as it was labelled by its detractors, presumably in hopes
of bolstering its legitimacy.208 Though leaked by the New York Times in September 2017, the
study was never released publicly. This is likely because it actually showed that refugees had a
positive fiscal impact on the United States in the long-term.209
In sum, to overcome the weaknesses and potential manipulation inherent in past fiscal
impact studies, this dissertation involved the independent evaluation of the effects of
international protection on the fiscal security of the United States and Italy respectively using
fiscal impact analysis. The following section describes the fiscal impact analysis method and the
manner in which it is deployed in the empirical chapters as a means of answering the second
research question described in the introduction regarding the extent to which international
protection represents a burden to developed states.

Components of Fiscal Impact Analysis
Net fiscal impact refers to the “difference between the taxes and other contributions
[recipients of international protection] make to public finances, minus the costs of the public
benefits and services they receive.”210 Fiscal impact analysis therefore measures the net costs or
benefits of providing protection to refugees and other displaced persons in landmark studies by
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Australia and the United States.211 This is the method utilized for calculating fiscal costs in this
dissertation.
Notwithstanding the partisan nature of policy debates and the motivations underlying the
ordering of fiscal impact studies, the National Academies of Sciences has argued that “careful
estimates based on defensible methodologies are possible.”212 Fiscal impact models generally
seek to measure the costs and contributions of displaced persons by comparing the tax
contributions that they produce to the government expenditures necessary to sustain them. The
research design that this dissertation adopts for the purposes of calculating the fiscal impact of
refugees is based on the principles set forth by the National Academy of Sciences in its 2017
report, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,213 although it is necessarily
adjusted for the purposes of examining the fiscal impact of refugees both in the United States
(for which the approach was originally conceived) and internationally.
In a 2017 report, the National Academy of Sciences details two general accounting
approaches for the measurement of the fiscal impact of various types of migrants. The
“dynamic” approach focuses on projecting future costs and contributions of displaced persons by
compounding costs for different age groups over multiple periods. The “static” approach instead
measures the actual fiscal costs and contributions of displaced persons over a specified time
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frame in the past. 214 Governments whose reports have been made public—such as the United
States and Australia—have generally utilized the static approach owing to the limitations of the
available data.215
The static approach has its benefits and drawbacks. As Pawel Kaczmarczyk has
described, on the one hand, the static approach has the advantage of relative conceptual
simplicity and accuracy in the sense that it looks at historical data to ascertain the fiscal impact
during prior periods rather than making projections for the future. On the other hand, because
static analysis is strictly backward-looking, it lacks the kind of prescriptive power and long-term
perspective that is generally desirable for policymakers.216
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the static approach’s backward-looking
nature is not problematic since this study does not purport to propose prescriptive policies
intended to alter the fiscal impact of displaced persons for individual governments. Instead, the
purpose of calculating the fiscal impact of displaced persons is to demonstrate the overall trend
of the net fiscal impact based on the length of time that an individual has lived in a particular
state. That is, this dissertation’s analysis merely seeks to ascertain the differences in net fiscal
impact among those arriving during different periods within each state. Therefore, so long as the
same method is applied to each temporally categorized group of displaced persons, the
drawbacks associated with the static approach should not hinder the analysis.
In cases where the survey data used to calculate fiscal impact in each state lack sufficient
granularity or breadth as to allow for precise estimates, the analysis attempts to make reasonable
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estimates based on explicit assumptions. For example, there is little reason to believe that certain
government expenditures, such as on education, differ markedly whether they are being provided
to displaced persons or any other national resident. Therefore, national average estimates can
serve as a proxy for the actual costs of education for each displaced person. Similarly, in the case
of public healthcare expenditures, in Italy displaced persons granted protection are entitled to the
same benefits as Italian citizens.217 Therefore, per capita healthcare spending may be used in lieu
of more granular data to estimate the healthcare costs associated with displaced persons. This is
especially sensible given that Italian medical studies have found that migrants are not markedly
less healthy than native-born Italian residents.218
Another crucial issue is whether to calculate only the fiscal impact of displaced persons
themselves or to include the impact associated with their nuclear family members as well. For
example, a displaced person may arrive in the United States and then subsequently have children
who are US citizens. Given that those children would not be in the US if not for the migration of
their parent, there is the question of whether or not to include the costs and contributions of that
child in the fiscal impact analysis. To the extent possible, this dissertation does not include
nuclear family members who are citizens or the children/spouses of displaced persons unless
those nuclear family members were themselves also forcibly displaced.
Finally, this dissertation’s calculation of fiscal impact ignores the effect of displaced
persons on national economic factors, which generally have important implications for a
country’s fiscal condition. These include effects on factors such as wage growth, unemployment,
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and consumer spending. However, given that displaced persons have historically represented a
relatively small proportion of most countries’ overall populations—in most cases less than 0.1
percent—it is unlikely that displaced persons would exert substantial fiscal consequences at the
national level via their secondary economic impact. Of course, displaced persons economic
impacts could undoubtedly be felt more acutely at the local level in communities where they
make up a greater share of the population. However, the analysis of the local economic impacts
of forced migrant populations falls outside the scope of the fiscal impact analysis.
Notably, a particular displaced person’s fiscal impact is not static. That is, in the year of a
displaced person’s arrival their negative fiscal impact may be greater that it will be years later,
after that individual has found a job and contributes to national revenues in the form of taxes.
Existing major fiscal impact studies suggest a gradual decrease in displaced persons’ negative
fiscal impact over years-long periods. In the 2017 US study referenced in the previous section,
the US Department of Health and Human Services noted that the net fiscal impact of refugees
varied according to their length of US residency, changing from a net negative fiscal impact in
their early years to a net positive fiscal impact in later years.219 Similarly, the study
commissioned by the Australian government also found refugees’ fiscal impact to vary based on
years of residency. In fact, the OECD has noted in a 2017 study that displaced persons in
Australia initially had a substantial negative fiscal impact but over a 20-year period appeared to
produce a net positive fiscal impact.220
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Although the specific metrics evaluated as part of the fiscal impact analysis are described
in Chapters 3 and 4, those metrics constitute displaced persons’ share of the most relevant
categories of government expenditures and tax contributions in each country. Such tax
contributions include, for example, income and wealth taxes as well as social welfare
contributions. Government expenditures, on the other hand, include items such as a displaced
person’s specific share of social welfare expenditures, educational expenses incurred by the state
on their behalf, and healthcare received at public expense, among others. The specific categories
that are considered necessarily vary from one country to another due to differing tax regimes and
government budgetary priorities. Consequently, while the categories of tax contributions and
government expenditures are kept as similar as possible between the United States and Italy for
the purposes of effective comparison, there are ultimately slight differences in how these figures
are categorized.

Non-Fiscal Security Measures
The empirical chapters of this dissertation also make use of various other metrics in order
to emphasize the securitization of international protection in the United States and Italy.
Specifically, these metrics relate to public, economic, and labor security. Correlations and basic
statistical associations are examined between the number of displaced persons given protection
by each country and outcomes regarding terrorist activity, unemployment, and economic growth.
These measures of security are intended to buttress claims regarding the securitization of
international protection along the lines of public security as well as economic and labor security.
In regard to public security, the metrics utilized specifically are: (1) number of terrorist
attacks; (2) number of injuries and fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks; and (3) number of
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terrorist attacks carried out by displaced persons accepted for protection. Indicators utilized to
emphasize the lack of labor and economic security burdens posed by displaced persons include:
(1) the unemployment rate; (2) the youth unemployment rate; (3) GDP per Capita; and (4) Net
National Income. By measuring the associations between each state’s share of the global
displaced persons population and the concomitant security effects over time, this analysis seeks
to emphasize the dearth of evidence establishing displaced persons as a burden.

Congruence Analysis
After describing the securitization processes present in each country regarding displaced
persons and using indicators to emphasize the lack of evidence to suggest they represent a
“burden” to states, the analytical results of the case studies are then compared using “congruence
analysis.” The process tracing method is used in each chapter to suggest whether the
securitization process provides a more useful framework for understanding why states engage in
burden-sharing than the assumption of displaced persons as security burdens. However,
generalizability across similar cases is not possible until it is established that there are similar
results in each case. Thus, congruence analysis is used to establish the possibility of drawing
meaningful conclusions regarding associations between states’ intersubjective security interests
and their burden-sharing initiatives.221
Congruence Analysis utilizes a small-N, case study approach that compares the empirical
evidence from those cases in order to gauge the explanatory relevance or relative strength of
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competing theoretical approaches.222 In the case of this dissertation, two cases are utilized—
those of the United States and Italy—and two theoretical approaches are tested. Congruence
analysis is used as part of the effort to “test” the applicability of securitization theory to the cases
of each country. Such comparison of the results of each case study is made in the dissertation’s
conclusion in order to evaluate the generalizability of those results across similar cases. What
exactly constitutes a “similar” case is discussed in the following section.

Case Selection: “Similar Systems” Design
In order to evaluate the nexus of international protection, security interests, and burdensharing behavior, this dissertation examines these phenomena in the cases of two countries—the
United States and Italy. This case selection is predicated on the premise that the United States
and Italy represent materially “similar” cases. It is hoped that by presenting the cases of two
similar countries the phenomena being studied can be more clearly isolated and the theories put
forth more clearly tested according to generally accepted comparative method practices.223
Although it would be ideal in any social science inquiry to utilize a random sample, when
one is analyzing individual countries a random sample is often not readily practicable. It would
be time- and cost-prohibitive to take random samplings of data from all countries in order to
study the actual effects of providing international protection on the fiscal, economic, and public
security of each state.224 For example, states have highly variable populations of displaced
persons, making it difficult to obtain a sufficiently significant sampling from among their
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respective populations as to be meaningful. Many states also generally produce displaced
persons rather than protect them.
There are also practical considerations regarding the availability of usable data since
states that have limited experience in protecting displaced persons often do not necessarily keep
reliable or meaningful statistics related to them. In order to produce a detailed comparative
analysis of the fiscal impact of displaced persons, the population of states that one may consider
is more or less limited to countries in North America, the EU, and perhaps a handful of countries
in Oceana and the South and East Asia regions. Thus, the identification of the United States and
Italy as “similar systems” should be understood in the context of this limited available global
population of candidate states.
The purposes of adopting a most similar systems design, also referred to as a
“concomitant variation” design,225 is to try to isolate a phenomenon by observing it and
comparing it among cases that are “as similar as possible with respect to as many features as
possible.”226 The idea is that if some important differences are found among these otherwise
similar countries, then those factors will have some degree of explanatory power that would be
otherwise obscured amid the myriad of significant differences that would exist for dissimilar
countries.
In this context, the United States and Italy constitute “similar systems” insofar as both
countries share a wide range of general characteristics that are common to most countries in
Western Europe and North America, including being democratic, post-industrial societies with
relatively high per capita GDP, at least minimally similar cultures, and have lengthy histories of
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being net receivers of displaced persons. Neither country has generally proven susceptible to
sudden mass influxes of displaced persons, allowing each to better exercise discretion over the
level of international protection “burden” that it is willing to accept. Both countries also have
relatively developed legal, procedural, and institutional frameworks related to the protection of
displaced persons. However, each has also engaged in manipulation of those frameworks from
time to time as well as periodically pursued policy initiatives the practical outcome of which has
been to impede the ability of displaced persons to seek asylum in their respective jurisdictions.
While other combinations of states also fit this description, the United States and Italy are also
positioned as front-line states in the sense that they are each among the most prominent
destination countries in their respective regions in terms of the number of asylum seekers and
refugees they receive on a yearly basis.
Among the countries of North America and Europe that fit many of the above criteria, the
countries that have made the greatest number of decision on displaced person applications over
the past two decade have been the United States, Germany, France, and Italy.227 While both
German and France have received more displaced persons than Italy during that period, Italy has
(like the United States) received a diversity of displaced persons that is not present in either of
those other two countries. France, for example, receives more than half of its displaced persons
from its former colonies, such as Guinea, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Nigeria, Mali, and Democratic
Republic of the Congo.228 Germany has primarily received displaced persons from the Middle
East region. Italy, on the other hand, receives a relatively heterogeneous mix of displaced
persons from the African, Asian, and South American continents that is most reminiscent of the
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diverse displaced persons population received by the United States annually. Thus, while one
could argue that many of the countries of Western Europe and North America represent
relatively “similar systems,” the most appropriate comparison for the purposes of this
dissertation is between the United States and Italy.
As Collier notes, however, a single case comparison is only a first step in the evaluation
of an argument, with further case studies needed for further substantiation.229 Thus, the
comparison of these two cases provides empirical evidence regarding the social construction of
state security interests and the influence that that may have on state burden-sharing behavior.
However, additional studies confirming this phenomenon would be required to substantiate this
dissertation’s conclusions and generalize its findings to other cases.

Data
The data regarding the number of displaced persons are drawn on two separate principal
sources depending on the country. The data source for the number of refugees and asylees
accepted by the United States during the 2000-2018 period is official figures obtained from the
US Department of Homeland Security’s Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2018.230 The data
source for the number of displaced persons accepted by Italy during the 2000-2018 period is
Eurostat, which is a Directorate-General of the European Commission in the EU tasked with
providing statistical information on EU institutions and promoting the harmonization and
standardization of statistical methods across the EU, its member states, candidates for accession,
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and European Free Trade Association countries.231 The data used is specifically drawn from the
body of asylum and Dublin statistics compiled as part of Eurostat’s Asylum and Managed
Migration dataset.232
The data used in Chapters 3 and 4 to examine the association between international
protection and terrorist activity is sourced from the Global Terrorism Databased (GTD). The
GTD is compiled on an ongoing basis by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland and documents more than 190,000
international and domestic terrorist attacks that have occurred globally since the year 1970.233
As of the year 2020, data from the years 1970-2018 were made publicly available to
individual researchers, while data from the years 2019 and 2020 were restricted to institutions.
The GTD defines terrorist attacks in the following way: “the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal
through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”234 Terrorist attack data contained in the GTD is sourced
from unclassified media articles and records more than 100 structured variables characterizing
each attack. For the purposes of this dissertation, the most salient variables recorded as part of
this dataset are: (1) information regarding perpetrators; (2) the country in which the attack
occurred; and (3) the number of injuries and fatalities resulting from the attack.
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The data used in Chapters 3 and 4 to explore the association between international
protection and economic and labor security is drawn from datasets of economic and labor
indicators compiled by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Data related to the following indicators are used: (1) the unemployment rate;235 (2) youth
unemployment rate;236 (3) GDP per Capita;237 and (4) Net National Income.238
The data used to estimate the fiscal impact of displaced persons in the United States is
drawn from data collected by the United States Census Bureau. Specifically, the data is primarily
extracted from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(CPSASEC) for the year 2019.239 The survey is nationally representative of US residents and
samples respondents from approximately 90,000 households. Refugees and Asylees made up less
than one percent of the US population in 2019, and consequently the number of sampled cases
derived from the CPSASEC was modest relative to the overall US populations.
The total CPSASEC survey had entries for 180,101 individuals. Of those surveyed,
24,754 are identified as foreign born, representing about 13.7 percent of respondents. This is
consistent with the roughly 14 percent of the US population that the Census Bureau identified as
foreign born as of 2017.240 Calculations of fiscal impact in the United States rely on 3,695
individual respondents identified as displaced persons admitted between the years 2002 and
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2019. These respondents represent the population of approximately 1,391,282 displaced persons
(specifically, refugees and asylees) admitted to the United States between 2002 and 2019.241
Refugee and asylee status could not be directly identified using the CPSASEC, but rather
it was identified based on a combination of a respondent’s place of birth, country of origin, and
year of entry into the United States. These characteristics were matched against the top 10
countries of origin for refugees and asylees admitted in each year during the period 2002-2018.
Those who arrived in the United States during a year in which their country of origin was among
the most frequent country of origin for refugees and asylees were assumed to be included in this
group. The resulting figures were then compared against US Department of Homeland Security
estimates for refugee and asylee admittance during the same period. Notably, this method does
not distinguish between refugees and asylees, although this should have little bearing on net
fiscal impact calculations given that each of these categories is distinguished only according to
procedural criteria. Tax contributions and government expenditures corresponding to each
refugee and asylee were then calculated as part of the net fiscal impact calculations, which are
further detailed in Chapter 3.
The data used to estimate the fiscal impact of refugees in Italy was obtained from the
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), which is the primary producer of official government
statistics in Italy. The European Union Income and Living Conditions Survey (EU-SILC)
studying Italian households and individuals is produced by ISTAT in coordination with the
European Statistical System. It is composed of cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional
microdata collected from the Italian population on income, poverty, social exclusion, and living
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conditions in the European Union. The raw data of this dataset is not made available to the
general public. Rather, it is made available by application only to researchers at recognized
research institutions.242
This dissertation makes use of the 2018 cross-sectional microdata (henceforth referred to
as “the Italian data”) from this dataset rather than the longitudinal microdata in order to mirror
more closely the dataset used in the study of displaced persons in the United States. The Italian
data surveyed 21,173 households and 39,969 individuals. Of those, the portion of the surveyed
population identified as foreign-born constituted 2,676 households and 3,822 individuals,
representing 12.6 percent of Italian households and 9.6 percent of individuals. These figures are
consistent with the 10.4 percent of the Italian population that was foreign-born in 2018,
according to the OECD.243 Calculations of fiscal impact in Chapter 4 rely on 162 households and
198 individuals identified as refugees in Italy admitted between the years 1999 and 2018. These
respondents represent the population of approximately 502,255 individuals granted refugee,
subsidiary protection, and humanitarian protection status who were admitted to Italy between
1999 and 2018.
Like the survey data utilized for the study of refugees in the United States, the Italian EUSILC data does not directly identify which respondents are refugees. However, even further, the
Italian data is less detailed than the US data in regard to the country of origin of respondents.
Consequently, “probable displaced persons” were identified through a stratified random
sampling process.
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The process of obtaining a stratified random sample from among the total surveyed
population was as follows. First, those survey respondents identified as foreign-born and living
in Italy in the survey were isolated from the rest of the respondents. The foreign-born population
was then divided into four subgroups according to the five-year period during which they
immigrated to Italy. Note that the survey data identified only this five-year period, rather than the
exact year of arrival. Those five-year periods were as follows: 1999-2003; 2004-2008; 20092013; 2014-2018. The percentage of displaced persons arriving in Italy relative to total
immigration was then calculated for each sub-period using data from Eurostat, although the
periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 were aggregated to reduce the impact of the incompleteness
of the available data.244 The percentage of immigrants arriving in Italy who were displaced
persons for each period were as follows: 1999-2003 (10.42 percent); 2004-2013 (7.86 percent);
and 2014-2018 (31.49 percent). From among the foreign-born survey population, this implied
that the number of households in each five-year period grouping of the survey population that
constituted displaced persons should be as follows: 56 (1999-2003); 36 (2004-2008); 26 (20092013); and 42 (2014-2018), for a total of 160 households.
A sampling of respondents in each of these subgroups was then obtained through random
number generation corresponding to the ID codes of the households in the sample. Number
generation continued until the number of respondent households identified as displaced persons
equaled 56 (1999-2003), 36 (2004-2008), 26 (2009-2013), and 42 (2014-2018) respectively. The
individual members of households identified as refugees were then identified by personal ID and
included in all relevant calculations. It was necessary to use households for tax contribution
calculations and to use individual members of those households for government expenditure
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calculations due to the method of survey data collection, which assigned tax contributions and
government expenditures in this way. The tax contributions and government expenditures
corresponding to each household and individual within that household respectively were then
aggregated to produce net fiscal impact calculations, which are further detailed in Chapter 4.
Note that all figures for the survey data from both the United States and Italy are
presented as 2018 dollars. For the US data the figures utilized were originally 2018 dollars. In
the case of the Italian data, figures were originally given in 2018 euros before being converted to
2018 dollars using the average daily exchange rate for 2018. The rate used is $1.1814 for each
€1.0000. This exchange rate figure was determined by averaging the average foreign exchange
daily reference rate (EUR/USD) identified by the US Federal Reserve ($1.1817/€1.0000)245 and
the European Central Bank ($1.1811/€1.0000).246
The following chapters utilize the above methodologies to examine international
protection and burden-sharing in the cases of United States and Italy. These chapters present
evidence contradicting the presumption that international protection presents a serious burden in
the context of either state. They also describe each states’ usage of the burden-sharing norm
despite this lack of empirical evidence to suggest that displaced persons actually constitute a
burden. Thus, these cases serve to demonstrate the efficacy of securitization processes by
investigating how and why each state utilizes burden-sharing to pursue policy initiatives
restricting the availability of protection for displaced persons.
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Conclusion
This chapter has covered the theoretical scope and methodology utilized for the purposes
of the following chapters. Securitization theory serves as the primary theoretical approach in
Chapters 3 and 4. The principal methods employed, meanwhile, are process tracing, fiscal impact
analysis, and congruence analysis.
Securitization is the basis for the alternative explanation given in Chapters 3 and 4 for
why states pursue burden-sharing policies related to displaced persons despite a dearth of factual
basis to support burden-sharing’s basic premise (i.e. that displaced persons are actually burdens).
In relating securitization theory to burden-sharing, this chapter discusses how states construct
displaced persons as a security threat and then use that putative threat to their security as
justification for instituting restrictive policies inhibiting international protection to share that
burden with other states. In other words, displaced persons are not inherently “burdensome;”
states appear simply to choose to see them that way.
In regard to the methods used, fiscal impact analysis is used to determine the impact of
displaced persons on the fiscal security of each of the case study states. Such analysis involves
comparing the tax contributions of displaced persons to the government expenditures associated
with them in order to ascertain if they represent a net positive or negative fiscal impact. A
negative fiscal impact would indicate such individuals are fiscally “burdensome” to the state
whereas a positive fiscal impact would indicate that they are, conversely, a fiscal boon to the
state.
Process tracing is used to identify and analyze the association between international
protection and states’ perceived security interests by following the chain of causality from
securitization to state-sponsored burden-sharing policies. It does this using within-case empirical
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analysis, and ultimately serves to give a better understanding of the underlying the securitization
process. Since Process tracing is only a single-case method, congruence analysis is used as an
element of the research design to draw comparisons between the case studies used in Chapters 3
and 4. This helps to gauge whether the dissertation’s finds may be generalizable to other similar
cases, e.g. other developed, displaced person-receiving states.
In sum, the following chapters make use of the above theoretical and methodological
approaches. Chapter 3 discusses these processes in regard to the United States, whereas Chapter
4 discusses these processes in the case of Italy. It is hoped that by examining each of these cases,
these chapters may illuminate the securitization processes underpinning burden-sharing behavior
by states.
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNITED STATES
This chapter begins by discussing the particular structure of international protection in the United
States as well as the general burden-sharing mechanisms available to the state. It then addresses
the second research question introduced at the outset of the dissertation: to what extent and how is
international protection a burden to developed states? To do this, it examines various metrics used
as indicators of public, economic and labor, and fiscal security in the case of the United States.
After establishing that international protection does not represent much of a burden to the
United States based on these data points, the chapter then turns to address the dissertation’s third
research question in regard to the case of the United States. It does so by answering the question
of how the United States engages in burden-sharing behavior in regard to international protection
despite the fact that displaced persons are not actually a burden. In answer to this question, the
chapter discusses the various burden-sharing initiatives that the United States has pursued by
describing the restrictive measures that it has introduced vis-à-vis displaced persons. The chapter
concludes that such measures, in combination with the sharp rhetoric concomitantly surrounding
displaced persons and the dearth of evidence to substantiate displaced persons as a burden, are in
keeping with the expectations of the securitization approach to analyzing migration phenomena.

The Structure of International Protection and Burden Sharing
In the United States there are two status determination outcomes that result in indefinite
international protection—refugee status and asylum status. While the federal government may
withdraw refugee or asylum status, the circumstances under which it may do so are statutorily
restricted. There are also at least four major forms of complementary protection available to
eligible displaced persons: (1) withholding of removal on the basis of the Refugee Convention;
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protection on the basis of the Convention Against Torture, including (2) withholding of removal;
and (3) deferral of removal; and (4) temporary protected status, which is granted on a
discretionary basis to foreign nationals designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. While
each of these categories of complementary protection offers different levels and types of
benefits, in each case an individual may apply for work authorization and live in the United
States until such time as it is safe for them to return to their country of origin. In practice, an
individual may live in the United States for many years when granted one of these protective
statuses. Therefore, they are considered alongside refugees and asylees as part of the analysis of
the securitization in this chapter as well as in regard to the question of whether displaced persons
represent a “burden” to the United States.
There are two general categories of international protection application for non-US
individuals who are physically present in the United States (note: this excludes refugees, who
apply indirectly through UNHCR while physically abroad): “affirmative” claims and “defensive”
claims. Applications for asylum as well as most complementary form of international protection
offered by the United States may be filed as either an affirmative or defensive claim depending
on the circumstances of the applicant. While affirmative claims are adjudicated through “nonadversarial” interviews with either an Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge, defensive claims
are adjudicated through “adversarial hearings” conducted by an Immigration Judge. In these
adversarial hearings, attorneys for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) present
arguments favoring removal and a decision is made on eligibility for international protection.247
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In the case of affirmative asylum claims, foreign nationals who are not in “removal
proceedings” with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (i.e. they have not received a
legal determination for their removal from the United States) submit their application for asylum
to US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and receive a non-adversarial interview
with an Asylum Officer. If they receive a positive determination, they are granted Asylum; if
they receive a negative determination, their case is referred to an Immigration Judge, who then
issues a final (but appealable) determination regarding asylum eligibility.
Defensive asylum claims, on the other hand, are made by foreign nationals seeking a
defense against removal. There are two main mechanisms for the grant of defensive claims. The
first is a “credible fear screening.” When an individual either arrives at a port of entry and is
deemed inadmissible due to fraud or misrepresentation or is apprehended within 100 air miles of
the border lacking proper entry documents less than 14 days after their illegal entry into the
United States, they are subject to “expedited removal.” The credible fear process is triggered
when an individual declares that they either wish to apply for asylum, fear persecution or torture,
or fear returning to their country following their applicants subject to expedited removal. An
Asylum Officer then reviews the claim and determines if the applicant would a “significant
possibility” of being persecuted or tortured should they be deported. Negative determinations
may be appealed, whereas positive determinations result in a referral to an Immigration Judge for
a full hearing to determine eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal (or deferral of
removal, if the applicant is ineligible for withholding of removal).248 While applicants may be
detained until their hearings, extended wait times and lack of space at detention facilities
frequently causes judges to grant them bail.
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The second mechanism for a grant of defensive asylum is a “reasonable fear screening,”
in which a non-legal permanent resident who is subject to “final administrative removal” (due to
conviction of an aggravated felony) or reinstatement of removal (due to illegal reentering the
United States after being removed or departing voluntarily while under “an order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal”). The “reasonable fear” process is triggered when an individual subject
to one of the above processes is apprehended and declares to ICE that they have a fear of
returning to the country to which they have been ordered removed. The applicant’s case is then
reviewed by a USCIS Asylum Officer, after which they may either appeal a negative decision or,
in the case of a positive decision, be referred to an Immigration Judge to determine their
eligibility for Withholding of Removal (this process is discussed further below).249
Having detailed some of the important general legal procedures underlying various forms
of international protection in the United States in this section, the following sections outline the
various forms of permanent and temporary international protection offered by the United States,
as well as the processes by which those determinations are made and the benefits to which those
granted each international protection status are entitled.

Refugee Status and Asylum
Although those recognized by the United States as being entitled to permanent forms of
international protection are all granted the same benefits, under US law there is a procedural
difference between those granted refugee status (“refugees”) versus those granted asylum status
(“asylees”). Refugee status is granted to those who meet the definition of a refugee, but who
remain outside of the United States until they are recognized as admissible for resettlement. In
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practice, refugee status is conferred following case referrals by UNHCR to the U.S. Refugee
Admission Program (USRAP), after which refugees apply for resettlement and are interviewed
by USCIS officers outside of the United States to determine their eligibility for admission.250
Refugee status may only be terminated by USCIS if there is a determination that the individual
was not entitled to refugee status at time of admission to the United States.251
Asylum status, on the other hand, is granted to those meeting the definition of a refugee
who are already in the United States or seeking admission at a port of entry. An individual is
eligible for asylum if he or she can establish past persecution or a “well-founded fear” of future
persecution on the basis of a protected characteristic under the Refugee Convention (race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion).252 Practicallyspeaking, the United States Supreme Court has defined “well-founded fear” as at least a ten
percent chance of such persecution’s occurring.253 Asylum does, however, involve certain legal
complexities for applicants that are not present for refugees.
First, there are series of “bars to applying for asylum” that make an individual ineligible
to apply for asylum. While any individual physically present in the United States may apply for
asylum (irrespective of the manner in which they arrived in the United States, whether legally or
illegally), those failing to apply within one year after their date of arrival or who have previously
been denied asylum by an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals must
demonstrate changed or extraordinary circumstances to be eligible to apply. Thus, if an applicant
fails to file for asylum status within one year of their arrival in the United States, they are
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effectively required to meet a higher burden of proof in order to be granted asylum status.
Further, an asylum seeker is ineligible to apply for asylum in the United states if they “can be
removed to a safe third country under a two-party or multi-party agreement between the United
States and other countries.”254
There are also more circumstances under which asylum status may be terminated than in
the case of refugee status. These include the asylee no longer meeting the definition of a refugee;
being a past persecutor; being convicted of a serious crime, or a serious nonpolitical crime
outside of the United States; being a danger to national security; or being able to be safely
removed from the United States to a safe third country, such as in the case of voluntary
repatriation or the acquisition of a new nationality.255
In the case of both refugee and asylum status, however, there are certain “bars” making
an individual ineligible for these forms of protection, even if they would otherwise qualify for
refugee or asylum status. Such bars include any individual who meets one of the following
criteria: an individual who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person” on account of a condition that would make their victim eligible for refugee or
asylum status; an individual who is a threat to US national safety or security; or an individual
who was already “firmly resettled” in another country prior to arriving in the United States.256
Both asylum and refugee status allow for the same benefits. These include indefinite
residence (and the ability to apply for Lawful Permanent Resident status one year after being
granted asylum or refugee status), work authorization, family reunification (i.e. the opportunity
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to bring a spouse and/or children to the United States), social security eligibility, and “assistance
and services from state and private, non-profit agencies through the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.”257

Withholding of Removal (based on the 1951 Refugee Convention)
Withholding of Removal may be granted either based on US national laws related to the
1951 Refugee Convention or to the Convention Against Torture (see the following section).
Regarding Withholding of Removal on the basis of the Refugee Convention, this standard is
essentially the United States’ statutory adaptation of the international legal principle of nonrefoulement.
Withholding of removal prohibits the deportation of individuals for whom there is a
“clear probability” (i.e. “more likely than not,” or greater than a 50 percent change) that their life
or freedom would be threatened due to their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion in the proposed country of removal.”258 Notably, the
clear probability standard applied in the case of withholding of removal is recognized in US law
as representing a higher standard of certainty than the “well-founded fear” standard that must be
established to be recognized as a refugee.259 Not all of those who face the prospect of persecution
are eligible for withholding of removal, however, since the same bars to being granted asylum or
refugee status also apply to withholding of removal on the basis of the 1951 Refugee
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Convention. While an individual granted withholding of removal does not become eligible for
lawful permanent residence or citizenship, he or she is still granted many of the same benefits as
an asylee, including the ability to apply for work authorization. Moreover, an individual may live
for many years in the United States due to the withholding of their removal.

Withholding of Removal and Deferral of Removal (based on CAT Protection)
Although the Convention Against Torture (CAT), with 166 state parties as of September
2019, sets international standards for defining torture and those eligible for protection, the
application of international protection under the CAT varies across regions. In the United States,
to be eligible for CAT protection, displaced persons must demonstrate that they are “more likely
than not” to face torture if repatriated, with torture defined in Article 1 of the CAT. The US
Board of Immigration Appeals has restricted the definition found in the CAT through
interpreting it as “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman punishment and does not extend to
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”260 Thus, for example, the
BIA has held that even acts that would be considered “cruel and unusual punishment” in
violation of an individual’s Eighth Amendment rights in the United States would not constitute
“torture” absent proof of further of treatment causing “sever pain or suffering.” 261
A person may receive CAT protection in the United States even if they are otherwise
barred from obtaining refugee or asylum status since the CAT contains no clauses conveying
bars to eligibility. Additionally, applicant do not need to prove that they fear torture specifically
on account of their “race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group,” which would otherwise be necessary regarding persecution when applying for
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asylum. However, those granted CAT protection may still be removed to safe third countries and
the protection may be terminated when there is no longer a risk of torture in the displaced
person’s country of origin. In the EU, however, protection under the CAT for displaced persons
likely to face torture in their country of origin is subsumed under “subsidiary protection” status.
There are two types of protections under the banner of CAT Protection. The first is
“withholding of removal” (formerly called “withholding of deportation”) granted under the CAT.
The second is “deferral of removal,” which may be available to those who are not eligible for
withholding of removal.262 Neither of these statuses convey the same level of benefits as refugee
status, asylum status, or withholding of removal under the Refugee Convention. As such, they
are usually only vigorously pursued by those facing a bar to receiving another international
protection status, such as due to a serious criminal conviction.
Withholding of removal status under the CAT prohibits the return of an individual to
their country of origin until such time as their case is reopened and it is proven that they no
longer face the likely prospect of torture if repatriated. Deferral of removal under the CAT, on
the other hand, is more temporary in nature since beneficiaries may have this status terminated
more easily if it is proven that they are no longer likely to face torture in their home state.
Moreover, deferral of removal under the CAT allows the US government to detain a beneficiary
if it deems them to be a threat to public safety.263 An individual receiving withholding of
removal under the CAT receives the same benefits as they would under withholding of removal
on the basis of the Refugee Convention. That is, while he or she does not become eligible for
lawful permanent residence or citizenship, he or she is still granted many of the same benefits as

US 8 C.F.R. 208.16, “Withholding of Removal Under Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and Withholding of
Removal Under the Convention Against Torture,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/208.16.
263
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17, “Deferral of Removal under the Convention Against Torture,”
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an asylee, including the ability to apply for work authorization. Moreover, an individual may live
for many years in the United States due to the withholding of their removal.

Temporary Protected Status
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States is a form of protection that is
offered to nationals from countries or parts of countries designated by the Secretary of Homeland
Security (DHS). There are three temporary conditions due to which the DHS Secretary may
designate a country for TPS: Ongoing armed conflict (such as civil war); environmental disaster
(such as earthquake or hurricane) or an epidemic; and “other extraordinary and temporary
conditions.” Ultimately, the decision to designate a country’s nationals for TPS is based on
whether conditions in that country temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely or that
country is “unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”264
Foreign nationals eligible for TPS include not only newly arriving eligible foreign
nationals, but also those nationals already in the United States and stateless persons who last
resided in designated countries. TPS beneficiaries are not removable from the United States, are
eligible for employment authorization, and can obtain travel authorization. In practice, they may
live and work in the United States for decades in some cases. For example, El Salvador was
designated for TPS in March 2001, and recipients continue to be eligible for residency and
employment authorization.
Significantly, however, the term of protection under TPS is initially designated as
between 6 and 18 months, and the decision to extend this term of protection is entirely dependent
on the decision of the DHS Secretary (and by extension, the administration in power). Thus, the

USCIS, “Temporary Protected Status,” accessed 15 June 2020, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporaryprotected-status.
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status of TPS beneficiaries in the United States is somewhat precarious. For example, former
DHS Acting Secretary Elaine Duke terminated TPS for over 150,000 beneficiaries from Haiti,
Sudan, and Nicaragua in 2017 and over 250,000 beneficiaries from El Salvador in 2018,
although there is currently an injunction preventing the removal of those beneficiaries.265

Other Forms of Complementary Protection
In the cases of victims of human trafficking and non-citizen independent juveniles, there
are also two classes of visas that the United States offers for the purposes of granting
international protection: “T” class visas and Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) visas. 266 T visas
were created in October 2000 under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act.
They are a temporary form of protection available to victims of sex or labor trafficking and their
qualifying family members provided the victims are willing to aid law enforcement in
prosecuting their traffickers (although child victims are not required to aid law enforcement as a
condition of T visa eligibility). T visas grant residency for up to four years and eligibility to
apply for permanent residence after either 3 years or the completion of the trafficking
prosecution.267
SIJ visas are available to unmarried non-citizens under 21 years of age who are present in
the United States and in need of the protection of a juvenile court due to abuse, abandonment, or
neglect by a parent. Although they are technically a temporary form of protection, SIJ visa
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eligibility requires juvenile court order based on state law. Due to variation in state laws
regarding child welfare-related court decisions, the requirements for such a court order vary from
state to state. Thus, eligibility for an SIJ visa depends in part on the applicant’s state of residence
within the United States. Like T visas, SIJ visa beneficiaries may apply for permanent residence
in the United States, although the requirements to do so are much less restrictive with respect
compared to the conditions imposed for permanent residence on T visa beneficiaries.268

Burden-Sharing
Although the United States does not have a formal burden-sharing regulatory mechanism
reminiscent of the Dublin system in the European Union, it does so on an ad hoc basis through
bilateral agreements, engagement with UNHCR, and changes to national policies, statutes, and
regulations. A prominent means by which the United States increases its share of the global
international protection burden is via ad hoc resettlement through the United States Refugee
Admission Program (USRAP). At the same time, it attempts to decrease its share of the burden
by using safe third country agreements.
The United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP), which is managed by the US
Department of State, seeks to designate a certain number of refugees for resettlement in the
United States as per the annual quota set by the executive branch. There are three “priority
groups” for refugees. The highest priority (“P-1 Referral”) goes to those referred to the United
States by either UNHCR, a US Embassy, or designated NGOs for resettlement consideration.
The second highest priority (“P-2 Groups of Special Concern”) goes to members of groups of

8 CFR § 204.11, “Special Immigrant Status for Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court (Special
Immigrant Juvenile),” https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=ddf0f07a72124a460e3bd9e945ba4c53&mc=true&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title08/8cfr204_main_02.tpl; see also:
USCIS, Policy Manual, Volume 6, Part J- Special Immigrant Juveniles.
268

97

special humanitarian concern as identified by USRAP. The lowest priority (“P-3 Family
Reunification”) goes to family reunification applications by recognized refugees in the United
States for their spouses, unmarried children under 21, and parents.269
In the case of P-3 Family Reunification, those of designated nationalities who are granted
asylum or refugee status in the United States may file an “Affidavit of Relationship” (AOR) on
behalf of their immediate family members in order to bring them to the United States via the
USRAP program. Such applicants and their family members must submit to DNA testing to
confirm their biological relationship as well as undergo an interview with USCIS in order to
demonstrate a credible family relationship with the refugee or asylee who is in the United
States.270
In the case of P-1 and P-2 refugee referrals, applicants are brought to one of the nine US
State Department Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) around the world where their case file is
prepared, and they undergo biographic security checks. USCIS then conducts a status
determination to verify the individual’s eligibility for refugee status. If there is a positive
determination, the refugee then undergoes a medical screening, a cultural orientation to prepare
them for life in the United States, and then has their travel to the United States organized by the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Upon their arrival in the United States, the
refugee undergoes additional background checks by US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and
if cleared for entry, can settle in the United States (see figure 2.1).
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United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP), Figure 2.1271

USCIS, “USRAP Flowchart,” accessed 15 June 2020,
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Each year, the United States sets refugee admission targets in coordination with UNHCR,
differentiating between admissions targets for P-1 and P-2 referrals from UNHCR and all other
P-1, P-2, and P-3 admissions. The United States has accepted roughly three-quarters of all
refugees transferred for resettlement from 1980 to 2016 while also accepting more refugees for
resettlement than the rest of the world combined in each of those years.272 However, the refugee
admission ceiling set by the executive branch has declined precipitously, falling from a high of
231,700 in 1980 to 30,000 in 2019.273 Moreover, the United States also sets regional allocation
limits, effectively capping the number of refugees that can be accepted from various regions
independent of the resettlement needs of the existing pool of the world’s refugees.
That said, virtually every other state has historically maintained much lower refugee
admission targets than the United States. For example, while the 30,000 admission cap for the
United States in 2019 is low relative to past US limits, Italy maintained a refugee admission
target of only 695 persons as of July 31, 2019.274 Viewing themselves as already overburdened
by the hundreds of thousands of asylum seeker arrivals, states see little incentive to increase their
participation in refugee resettlement. As the number of refugees in need of resettlement has
grown, the number of refugees that states are willing to accept has waned. Of course, the
relatively high share of resettled refugees accepted through the USRAP program makes it a
prime prospective lever for engaging in burden-sharing behavior through decreasing the
admission cap.
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The United States also made increasing usage of the safe third country concept to declare
asylum seeker applications ineligible under the Trump Administration. The safe third country
concept is derived from the non-refoulement provision contained in Article 33 of the 1951
Refugee Convention. That is, it is predicated on the idea that a state’s obligation toward asylum
seekers who have not yet been granted permission to enter or remain in the state is limited to the
obligation not to refoul them. Thus, if an asylum seeker passed through a country in which they
could have safely remained, the presumption is that they be transferred back to that country
without fear of facing harm.275
The United States’ earliest formal safe third country agreement was concluded with
Canada in 2002 as part of the Smart Border Action Plan for the purposes of more effectively
managing the flow of asylum seekers. This agreement is limited to returning applicants who
attempt to move from one country to another through formal ports of entry and subsequently
apply for refugee status upon their arrival.276 However, a Canadian Federal Court ruled on 22
July 2020 that this agreement was invalid since it infringes on the rights of asylum seekers,
specifically rights guaranteed under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to
“life, liberty, and security of the person.” The Court argued that the United States does not, as of
the timing of the decision, guarantee those freedoms for asylum seekers.277
The UNHCR mandate implies that a safe third country must be a signatory of the 1951
Refugee Convention and possess a fair and efficient system for determining the status of asylum
seekers. However, the Trump administration in the United States has repeatedly pushed to
Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, “The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection,”
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designate Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and other Latin American states as safe
third countries despite the lack of capacity in those countries to manage new asylum claims. For
example, Mexico’s asylum agency has an annual budget of only $1.3 million despite receiving
over 60,000 asylum applications in 2019.278 Moreover, in many cases these are the same
countries from which asylum seekers in the United States claim to have fled.
Despite the Trump Administration’s efforts to de-designate them, as of 2019 El Salvador
and Honduras are among the countries that USCIS has designated for TPS, making the Trump
Administration’s suggestion of them as safe third countries inconsistent policy at best and
patently ridiculous at worst. Nevertheless, the United States implemented the Migrant Protection
Protocols (frequently references as the “Remain in Mexico” policy) in January 2019.279 This was
followed by the Trump Administration’s usage of threats of economic sanctions to leverage
asylum deals advertised as safe third country agreements with Guatemala in July 2019280 and
Honduras281 and El Salvador282 in September 2019. However, these agreements have faced legal
challenges in each country’s court system. In sum, the United States has not made exhaustive use
of safe third country agreements historically to reduce its international protection burden.
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In practice, when asylum seekers in the United States are declared inadmissible or found
ineligible for protection, whether on the basis that they passed through a “safe” third country enroute to the United States or otherwise, the processed used for to deport them is referred to as
“expedited removal.” Expedited removal was created by the passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). However, it was not until
November 2002, when the scope of who could be subject to expedited removal was dramatically
expanded, that the credible fear procedure was introduced.283 Credible fear often acts as an initial
screening procedure to place those unlikely to be found eligible for asylum in expedited removal
proceedings swiftly. The IIRIRA also introduced the one-year filing requirement, which requires
asylum seekers generally to apply for asylum within one year of their arrival in the United States
in order to maintain their eligibility.
In sum, the ability of the United States to reset its admissions cap on refugee resettlement
through the USRAP program annually, its propensity for updating procedural provisions that
impact the admissibility, eligibility, and benefits of displaced persons, and the safe third country
agreements into which it may enter all represent important structural elements allowing the
United States to engage in burden-sharing. The specifics of US burden-sharing behavior as it
relates to the nexus of the securitization of displaced persons, restrictions on refugee
resettlement, and safe-third country agreements will be discussed after establishing whether
displaced persons are, in fact, a burden in the following section.
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Are Displaced Persons a “Burden?”
Perhaps the most direct means of assessing whether displaced persons actually constitute
a burden to the United States is to assess their efficacy as a fiscal security burden. Fiscal security
involves the soundness of a state’s budget and the balancing of tax revenues with government
expenditures. While this does not necessarily require a balanced budget, it does require keeping
budget deficits within reasonable limits as to safeguard the long-term fiscal well-being of the
state. Fiscal security is also closely linked to other types of national security insofar as high
national debt levels imperil social safety nets and other essential programs.284
To ascertain whether displaced persons represent a fiscal security burden in the context of
the United States, this section begins by investigating whether accepting displaced persons is
significantly associated with negative effects on the state’s fiscal well-being. It attempts to do so
by measuring the tax revenues and government expenditures attributable to displaced persons.
The fiscal impact analysis used for this comparison is done longitudinally during the period
2000-2018. It discusses the various categories of tax revenues and government expenditures that
constitute the components of the comparative fiscal impact analysis performed for displaced
persons in the United States. The calculation of tax revenues and government expenditures
generated as a result of refugee protection are determined based upon the most significant
sources of government revenues and expenditures generated by US residents. The tax revenues
examined generally fall into the categories of income, social welfare, property, and wealth taxes.
The government expenditures generally fall into the categories of education, healthcare, social
welfare, pension or old-age benefits, and housing assistance.
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If the tax revenues produced by displaced persons is greater than the government
expenditures spent on them, then their protection would be a net fiscal positive for the state. If,
however, the tax revenues produced by displaced persons is less than the government
expenditures spent on them, then their protection would be a net fiscal negative for the state and
would constitute a threat to its fiscal security. The below findings are that over the long-term
there is little evidence to substantiate assertions that displaced persons constitute a threat to the
United States’ fiscal security.
For the purposes of empirically examining the impact of displaced persons on fiscal
security in the United States, the most significant sources of tax revenue collected from displaced
persons include the following: (1) Federal Income Taxes (after credits); (2) State Income Taxes
(after credits); (3) Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) Contributions (including Medicare
and Social Security employee contributions; (4) Property Taxes; and (5) Sales Taxes. Federal
Income Taxes and FICA taxes accounted for approximately 86 percent of the federal tax
revenues collected in 2018 according the US Office of Budget Management.285 Similarly, state
income, property, and sales taxes accounted for approximately 70.5 percent of state tax revenues
in 2019 according to the US Census Bureau.286 Thus, while perhaps an underestimation of the
total tax revenues contributed by displaced persons, these categories represent the largest sources
of tax contributions in the United States and so likely capture most of the taxes that they
contribute to government revenues.

285

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From?, 20 August
2012, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics_WhereDoFederalTaxRevsComeFrom_0820-12.pdf.
286
United States Census Bureau, Quarterly Summary of State and Local Government Tax Revenue for Fourth
Quarter 2019, 2019, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/econ/g19-qtax4.pdf.

105

The specific data points utilized to calculate government expenditures are: (1) Social
Security; (2) Public Assistance/Welfare; (3) Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program
(SNAP) benefits; (4) Supplemental Security Income (SSI); (5) Housing Assistance; (6) Energy
Subsidies; (7) School Lunch Assistance; (8) Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) benefits; (9) Medicare; (10) Medicaid; (11) Education
costs; and (12) Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA).
An attempt is made to estimate the expenditures associated with RMA, which is made
available to all refugees for the first eight months of their residence in the United States. Another
refugee-specific program considered as part of government expenditure calculations in the
United States is Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), which is only provided to refugees temporarily
when they have virtually no income whatsoever, with that assistance expiring after eight months
as well.287 The methods and qualifications for RCA vary somewhat by locality since the program
is federally-funded, but locally administered, but most refugees do not receive RCA unless they
have no initial employment whatsoever.288
Since the US data utilized does not distinguish between newly arrived refugees and those
who have been present for up to three years, RMA and RCA estimates are made by simply
assuming that one-third of the refugees arriving between 2016 and 2019 received them. The
government expenditure on RMA and RCA is estimated as the grant amount allotted by the
federal government as of Fiscal Year 2017, the most up-to-date figures available. Although the
total grant issued was $2,075 per refugee, only $1,125 was allotted for the direct support of
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refugees, and so this latter figure is utilized. Although RCA and RMA make up a relatively small
portion of the total government expenditures associated with refugees—even those within the
first eight months of their arrival—they are included since they are refugee-specific costs.
As discussed previously, there are two primary categories of displaced persons receiving
protection in the United States. The first are refugees accepted via the US Refugee Admission
Program (USRAP). The second are those who receive asylum after their arrival and are
consequently given the title of “asylee.” For all intents and purposes fiscally-speaking, however,
“asylees” are refugees. They are considered as such for the purposes of fiscal impact analysis in
the United States. While individuals were not labelled as refugees in the US census dataset
utilized for this analysis, their status was triangulated based on the year of arrival in the United
States and the top 10 refugee and asylum seeker countries of origin for that year.
The tax revenues and government expenditures associated with their presence in the
United States are used to determine their net fiscal impact on the country. Net fiscal impact is
used as a proxy for the financial cost or benefit that states must accept concomitantly with their
offering of protection to refugees. Due to the way that the available data was reported, net fiscal
impact is noted for displaced persons according to the five-year periods in which they arrived
rather than the exact year. However, the year of arrival for the refugees who have been in US
longest is broken out to demonstrate the trend toward rapidly falling costs associated with
international protection the longer a displaced person is present in the United States. As noted
below, the data perhaps even points to a positive fiscal impact for displaced persons arriving
before 2002, though more data and analysis would be needed to verify this with certainty.
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Fiscal Impact Analysis of Displaced Persons in the United States
As detailed in Figure 3.1, there is a clear upward trend in the tax revenues collected from
refugees the longer those displaced persons have been present in the United States. This is true
for each of the tax revenue categories surveyed. Displaced persons arriving between the years
2002 and 2003 generated the highest per capita tax contributions in regard to FICA, state income
taxes (after credits), property taxes, and sales taxes. In fact, there is only one data point for which
the refugees arriving in the 2002-2003 band did not have the highest contributions—federal
income tax (after credits)—and even then, their contributions were only slightly below those of
the refugees arriving between 2004 and 2005, who took the top spot in this category.

2018 Per Capita Taxes Paid (After-Credits) By Year of Arrival in the United States
Arrival Year
# of Taxpayers
FICA
2002-2003
195 $ 2,363.56
2004-2005
190 $ 2,254.55
2006-2007
277 $ 1,944.56
2008-2009
308 $ 2,054.72
2010-2011
286 $ 2,116.88
2012-2013
349 $ 1,634.08
2014-2015
667 $ 1,410.01
2016-2019
1190 $ 1,388.46
Averages: 2002-2019
432.75 $ 1,895.85

Fed Tax AC
$ 2,834.25
$ 2,874.27
$ 954.06
$ 2,529.55
$ 2,082.06
$ 1,028.17
$ 1,713.39
$ 1,206.89
$ 1,902.83

State Tax AC Property Taxes
$ 1,057.23 $
1,444.15
$ 945.48 $
1,342.47
$ 707.61 $
1,162.02
$ 712.76 $
1,289.85
$ 855.28 $
1,373.23
$ 553.55 $
1,053.80
$ 715.02 $
945.72
$ 590.83 $
832.50
$ 767.22 $
1,180.47

Sales Taxes
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

406.21
377.61
326.85
362.81
386.26
296.41
266.01
234.17
332.04

Total Per Capita Taxes (2018)
$
8,105.39
$
7,794.38
$
5,095.10
$
6,949.68
$
6,813.70
$
4,566.01
$
5,050.14
$
4,252.85
$
6,078.41

2018 Per Capita Taxes Paid (After-Credits) By Year of Arrival in the United States, Figure 3.1
As detailed in Figure 3.2, while government expenditures are greatest in regard to
displaced persons when they are first accepted for protection, there does not appear to be a clear
downward or upward trend in those expenditures over time in the periods following their initial
admittance. Moreover, unlike the calculations of tax revenues, not all of the expenditures
associated with displaced persons are taken directly from the survey data. Rather, estimates had
to be made for three categories of expenditures because the exact figures were not included in the
data, i.e. the costs of providing Medicaid, education (primary school through high school), and
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Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance (RCA and RMA, respectively). However, these categories
of expenses were readily estimable.

2018 Per Capita Government Expenditures By Year of Arrival in the United States
Arrival Year # of Taxpayers Social Security
2002-2003
194 $ 1,093.01
2004-2005
190 $ 966.30
2006-2007
277 $ 591.49
2008-2009
308 $ 475.39
2010-2011
286 $ 425.40
2012-2013
349 $ 596.27
2014-2015
667 $ 343.55
2016-2019
1190 $ 350.63
Avg.: 2002-2019
432.63 $ 605.26

Public Assist./Welfare
$
$
$
0.69
$
55.36
$
27.97
$
6.19
$
44.06
$
$
16.78

SNAP
$ 210.30
$ 238.29
$ 366.12
$ 315.31
$ 467.04
$ 596.99
$ 698.03
$ 443.84
$ 416.99

SSI
$ 178.83
$ 398.83
$ 80.19
$ 322.39
$ 124.87
$ 59.36
$ 151.95
$ 68.59
$ 173.13

Housing Assistance
$
686.77
$
690.31
$
693.89
$
697.50
$
701.15
$
561.27
$
564.24
$
567.24
$
645.30

Energy Subsidy School Lunch WIC
$
3.18 $ 198.82 $ 7.57
$
18.95 $ 202.41 $ 36.23
$
10.40 $ 292.52 $ 44.38
$
21.59 $ 292.02 $ 15.96
$
13.39 $ 260.88 $ 53.29
$
18.34 $ 282.52 $ 59.17
$
10.57 $ 516.26 $ 97.30
$
6.57 $ 357.49 $ 55.78
$
12.87 $ 300.36 $ 46.21

Medicare
$ 4,523.91
$ 4,089.99
$ 3,890.05
$ 3,687.64
$ 3,964.81
$ 3,456.14
$ 2,408.52
$ 3,005.34
$ 3,628.30

Medicaid
$ 199.57
$ 409.64
$ 354.57
$ 421.17
$ 395.25
$ 499.12
$ 525.10
$ 425.13
$ 403.69

Education (PS-HS) RCA & RMA Total Per Capita (2018)
$
1,065.15
$
8,167.11
$
1,457.58
$
8,508.52
$
1,649.64
$
7,973.94
$
1,708.40
$
8,012.72
$
1,258.82
$
7,692.86
$
2,142.52
$
8,277.87
$
3,010.22
$
8,369.81
$
3,374.48 $ 281.25 $
8,936.34
$
1,958.35
$
8,242.40

2018 Per Capita Government Expenditures in the United States, Figure 3.2
While the survey data did not address the cost of providing Medicaid to respondents, it
did indicate whether the respondents had received Medicaid. Per capita Medicaid expenditures
were estimated to be approximately $1,853.13 for 2018 by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, and so this figure was assumed to be the cost of providing Medicaid to any displaced
person responding that they received Medicaid for the year 2018. In the case of primary through
high school education, the survey does not indicate educational costs for respondents, but it does
indicate their age. The National Center for Education Statistics estimated the national average
cost per public school student to be $13,847 (in constant 2017-18 dollars), and so any respondent
age 18 or younger was assumed to have cause the government to have incurred this expenditure.
In the case of RCA and RMA, these expenditures are not indicated anywhere on the
survey data, nor is there any notation regarding whether respondents received them at all. These
costs are estimated by taking the per-refugee grant allotted by the federal government as of
Fiscal Year 2017 and attempting to estimate the number of refugees likely to have received it
(i.e. refugees within the first 8 months of arrival who, in the case of RCA, have virtually no
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income). Since only those in the first 8 months of their arrival would even be eligible for these
benefits, the per capita figure calculated is very likely an overestimation of the actual cost.
The per refugee grant in FY2017 was $2,075, but only $1,125 of that was for direct
support of refugees, and so the latter figure is utilized in the calculation. The FY2017 figure is
used because data is not yet available regarding what this figure was for FY 2018. Moreover, this
grant amount has historically remained constant for long periods of time, and so it is not
unreasonable to assume that the figure was the same for FY2018. The $1,125 used for direct
support of refugees was divided by four to reflect that the not all refugees arriving between 2016
and 2019 were eligible to receive RCA or RMA if they arrived more than eight months before
the end of 2019. Moreover, many of those arriving within those eight months were likely
ineligible for RCA in any case if they were able to find employment. Thus, the presumed RCA
and RMA expenditures are likely an overestimate.
According to this study, the costs associated with displaced persons protected by the
United States progressively decreased over the course of the eighteen-year period considered
(see Figure 3.3). In the initial five-year period (2019-2014) following their arrival, the net cost of
displaced persons to the United States is an average of approximately $4,193.63 per year.
However, by the following five-year period (2013-2008) that figure halves to a cost of
approximately $1,987.59. By the final year of the study (2003-2002) the figure decreases to
approximately $61.72. Thus, after an eighteen-year period, this study finds that displaced persons
in the United States contributed almost as much in tax revenue as they cost the government in
expenditures. If the analysis were to be extended into a future five-year period, it is possible that
displaced persons would actually be found to have a net positive fiscal impact.
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2018 Net Fiscal Impact By Year of Arrival in the United States
Arrival Year
# of Taxpayers
2002-2003*
2002-2007
2008-2013
2014-2019
Average: 2002-2019

194
969
943
1857
942.25

Net Fiscal Impact
$
$
$
$
$

(61.72)
(1,313.22)
(1,987.59)
(4,193.63)
(2,904.31)

2018 Net Fiscal Impact in the United States, Figure 3.3
There have also been a number of studies detailing the positive economic and fiscal
effects of displaced persons in the United States, albeit in less granular detail. A 1994 study from
the Urban Institute found that refugees were much less likely to receive government benefits,
such as welfare, and that within ten years of arrival their tax contributions actually exceed, on
average, those of native-born citizens.289 A subsequent study put the average overall positive
fiscal impact of refugees at between $20,000 and $80,000.290 Another 2017 study from New
American Economy used American Community Survey data to estimate that in the year 2015
refugees earned roughly $77 billion in income and paid about $21 billion in taxes. While this
study did not attempt to estimate the benefits these refugees received, it did argue that the $56
billion in income earned above the taxes paid helped to stimulate local economies through
consumer behavior and entrepreneurship, ultimately creating jobs and generating additional tax
revenue indirectly.291
A June 2017 study from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that within six
years of arrival displaced persons work at higher rates than the American native-born population.
Within 20 years the study estimates that the average refugee pays $21,000 more in taxes than is
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Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight (Washington DC: The
Urban Institute, 1994).
290
Stephen Moore, A Fiscal Portrait of the Newest Americans, (Washington DC: The Cato Institute, 1998).
291
New American Economy, From Struggle to Resilience The Economic Impact of Refugees in America, June 2017,
http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/NAE_Refugees_V6.pdf.
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received in government benefits during that period.292 Moreover, the US Health and Human
Service study ordered by the Trump Administration in 2017 and leaked by the New York Times
after its publication was withheld found refugees to have a generally positive net fiscal impact
over a long time horizon.
There have also been a series of analyses of the fiscal and economic impacts of refugee
arriving through resettlement programs on states and local communities within the United States,
many of which were conducted by state and local governments themselves. A 2012 study
analyzing separately the effects of displaced persons on the finances of the state of Ohio,
Cuyahoga County, and the city of Cleveland found that they were a net benefit both
economically and fiscally. It found that despite $4.8 million in annual costs (predominantly
funded through federal programs), refugees generated more than $48 million in economic
activity and $2.8 million in taxes to local and state authorities.293 A follow-up report in Central
Ohio funded by the city of Columbus made similar findings regarding the positive fiscal impacts
of displaced persons in those areas.294 A 2013 study from the Fiscal Review Committee of the
Tennessee General Assembly also found that over the period of 1990-2012, the state collected
over $634 million more in tax revenue from refugees than it incurred in state expenditures
related to them or their descendants.295 A series of other report in other regions of the central
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William Evans and Daniel Fitzgerald, The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States:
Evidence from the ACS, NBER Working Paper No. 23498 (June 2017).
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Refugee Services Collaborative of Greater Cleveland, Economic Impact of Refugees in the Cleveland Area
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CRP Partner Organizations, Impact of Refugees in Central Ohio: 2015 Report (2015),
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United States, such as Akron, OH and Southeastern Michigan, have confirmed the generally
positive fiscal impact that displaced persons have on state and local communities.296
In sum, the findings of this analysis that over a two-decade period displaced persons have
an at least neutral fiscal impact on the United States is buttressed by similar findings by various
non-partisan organizations and state and local governments. Although there have been some
studies countering these results, as discussed at the beginning of this section, on balance such
studies tend to focus on the government expenditures associated with displaced persons over
short, initial periods following their arrival in the United States, when such costs are highest and
tax revenue generated are lowest. Thus, they give a skewed view of the long-term impact on
fiscal security of the United States’ engagement with international. The present study conducted
in this section as well as those listed above, on the other hand, take account of the impact of
displaced persons over longer periods (generally 10-20 years) and note that while short-term
costs tend to be high, long-term fiscal impacts are generally positive.

Public, Economic, and Labor Security
The evidence in regard to public, economic, and labor security also do not support the
characterization of displaced persons as a security threat to the United States. Public security
involves the safeguarding of a state’s citizens, residents, and other persons, organizations, and
institutions against harm. Key metrics are examined briefly below that correspond to each
category of security. Specifically, metrics regarding terrorism are examined to test whether

New American Economy, Welcome to Akron: How Immigrants and Refugees are Contributing to Akron’s
Economic Growth, 30 June 2016, http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Welcometo-Akron_Partnership-for-a-New-American-Economy_June-2016.pdf; see also, Global Detroit, The Economic
Impact of Refugees in Southeast Michigan, 2017, https://globaldetroitmi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/GlobalDetroit_TheEconomicImpactofRefugeesinSEMich.pdf.
296
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displaced persons constitute a public security threat since, as noted in Chapter 2, the public
securitization of international protection has centered around the characterization of displaced
persons as a terrorist threat.
To measure this association, comparisons are drawn longitudinally during the period
2000-2018 along three metrics: (1) number of terrorist attacks; (2) number of injuries and
fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks; and (3) number of terrorist attacks carried out by
displaced persons accepted for protection. All data used for this empirical analysis are drawn
from the Global Terrorism Database, which is compiled by the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
In regard to terrorist activity, the empirical evidence does not support the assertion of
displaced persons as a public security threat. As shown in Figure 3.4, there is virtually no
relationship between the number of displaced persons that the United States accepted and the
number of terrorist attacks or the number of fatalities or injuries resulting from terrorist attacks in
any given year. In the case of all three variables, there is only a weak correlation between the
United States’ share of the global displaced person “burden.” Moreover, the number of refugees
and asylees that the United States accepted in a given year displays virtually no statistical
explanatory power vis-à-vis the incidence of terrorist attacks or resulting injuries or fatalities in
any given year.
The final three years of the analysis (2016-2018) encompassed the period during which
the United States accepted its smallest share of the global population of displaced persons
accepted for international protection. This period also saw a flurry of burden-sharing agreements
between the United States and Latin American countries and policies curtailing the availability to
asylum and refugee resettlement to displaced persons. However, it was during this same period
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that the country experienced its greatest number of terrorist attacks since 9/11. There was also no
other three-year period during the first two decades of the twenty-first century in which more
people in the United States were killed or injured by terrorist attacks.
United States: Terrorism
Year Refugees Asylees
Displaced Persons % of Global Accepted DPs Terrorist Attacks Terrorist Fatalities Terrorist Injuries
2000 72,165
32,542
104,707
26.51%
42
8
10
2001
68,920
39,179
108,099
31.75%
47
3014
21894
2002
26,785
36,977
63,762
23.32%
23
5
11
2003
28,286
28,791
57,077
22.78%
33
0
0
2004
52,840
27,426
80,266
30.47%
9
0
0
2005
53,738
25,349
79,087
27.82%
21
0
0
2006
41,094
26,398
67,492
25.67%
6
1
14
2007
48,218
25,334
73,552
25.90%
8
0
0
2008 60,107
23,026
83,133
26.98%
18
2
13
2009
74,602
22,314
96,916
24.77%
12
22
50
2010
73,293
19,772
93,065
29.03%
17
4
17
2011 56,384
23,572
79,956
27.10%
10
0
2
2012 58,179
27,951
86,130
24.63%
20
7
7
2013
69,909
25,014
94,923
24.75%
20
23
436
2014
69,975
23,371
93,346
12.98%
29
26
19
2015
69,920
26,015
95,935
12.19%
38
54
58
2016
84,988
20,362
105,350
9.83%
67
68
143
2017 53,691
26,509
80,200
9.62%
66
97
946
2018 22,405
38,687
61,092
10.33%
67
45
61
Correlation
17.59%
38.62%
38.03%
R-Squared
3.09%
14.91%
14.46%

United States: Terrorism, Figure 3.4297
According to the classification system of the Global Terrorism Database, the groups
responsible for the greatest percentage of terrorist attacks in the United States during this period
were: White Supremacists (11 percent); Pro-Trump Extremists (8 percent); Anti-Muslim
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All displaced person population data in this figure is drawn from US Department of Homeland Security, 2018
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2018; all terrorism
statistics are from: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism
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Extremists (8 percent); and Anti-Semitic/Neo-Nazi Extremists (5.5 percent). Among these
groups, not one refugee or asylee was found to have perpetrated an act of terrorism. This finding
is confirmed by other studies, which likewise indicate the remarkable lack of terrorist activity
perpetrated by displaced persons even compared to other segments of the US population. One
such study examining the issue over a 41-year period found that the odds of an American being
killed in a terrorist attack conducted by a refugee were 1 in 3.64 billion per year.298 In sum, there
is virtually no evidence based on the above metrics used to support an association between the
United States’ reduction in its share of the global international protection burden and
improvements to public security utilizing the metric of terrorism.
There is also little association between international protection and economic security.
Economic security involves safeguarding the conditions necessary for economic prosperity and
growth. Two economic indicators that are indicative of economic security are GDP Per Capita
and Net National Income Per Capita. These indicators help to understand whether a state’s
economy and the income of its people are growing relative to its population.
As Figure 3.5 indicates, neither of these indicators support the assertion of displaced
persons as an economic security threat. There is virtually no correlation between the number of
displaced persons that the United States accepted and the growth of US GDP or national income
per capita in any given year. In the case of both variables, there is little indication of a statistical
relationship between the number or percentage share of global displaced persons that the United
States accepts and the country’s economic security.

298
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Year
Displaced Persons
2000
104,707
2001
108,099
2002
63,762
2003
57,077
2004
80,266
2005
79,087
2006
67,492
2007
73,552
2008
83,133
2009
96,916
2010
93,065
2011
79,956
2012
86,130
2013
94,923
2014
93,346
2015
95,935
2016
105,350
2017
80,200
2018
61,092
Correlation
R-Squared

United States: Economic Indicators
% of Global Accepted DPs GDP Per Capita Net National Income Per Capita
26.51%
36300
31419
31.75%
37100
32060
23.32%
37980
32631
22.78%
39430
33759
30.47%
41650
35777
27.82%
44040
37834
25.67%
46230
39987
25.90%
47900
40738
26.98%
48310
40473
24.77%
47030
39146
29.03%
48400
41112
27.10%
49810
42809
24.63%
51540
44851
24.75%
53050
45808
12.98%
54990
47824
12.19%
56770
49179
9.83%
57880
49653
9.62%
59980
51347
10.33%
62850
53586
1.83%
2.68%
0.03%
0.07%

United States: Economic Indicators, Figure 3.5
Finally, indicators related to labor security also do not demonstrate an association with
the protection of displaced persons. Labor security, also referred to as labor market security,
involves a country’s balance of supply and demand of workers, and as the International Labor
Organization has noted, “the basic outcome indicator of labour [sic] market security is the
unemployment rate.”299 In order to measure the association between international protection and
labor security, comparisons are drawn longitudinally during the period 2000-2018 along two
metrics: (1) the unemployment rate; and (2) the youth unemployment rate. All data used for this

299

International Labor Organization, Labour Market Security Index,
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empirical analysis are drawn from datasets compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
As Figure 3.6 indicates, there is little correlation or implication of a causal relationship
between the number of displaced persons accepted for protection by the United States and its
rates of unemployment or youth unemployment. Beyond these statistics, a number of studies
regarding the effects of displaced persons on labor markets in the United States have similarly
found these variables to have little or no relationship at all. For example, two studies Cuban
refugees in the Miami labor market found that even large influxes of refugees had virtually no
effect on unemployment or wages.300 The US Labor Department also did not find any significant
labor market impacts of refugees in the long-term. In 2017 the department concluded, “our
results provide robust causal evidence that there is no adverse long-run impact of refugees on the
U.S. labor market.”301
Moreover, in a wide range of countries including Jordan, Turkey, Israel, France, and the
EU as a whole this general lack of relationship over a multi-year timeframe was similarly
observed.302 The Indiana state government has even noted some positive impacts of displaced
persons on labor markets, stating that “refugees often enter economic sectors currently unable to
supply adequate numbers of native workers. Refugees and immigrants also create jobs for U.S.
workers because they have a high propensity to start new businesses.”303

Michael Clemens and Jennifer Hunt, “The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: Reconciling Conflicting
Results,” CEP Discussion Paper No 1491 (July 2017), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1491.pdf; and David
Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” ILR Review 43, no. 2 (1990): 245-257.
301
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302
Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang, and Jimmy Graham, “The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees
Formal Labor Market Access,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 496 (October 2018),
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Indiana State Department of Health, Myths about Refugees, https://www.in.gov/isdh/24670.htm, accessed 15
August 2020.
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United States: Unemployment
Year
Refugees
Asylees Displaced Persons % of Global Accepted DPs Unemployment Rate Youth Unemployment Rate
2000
72,165
32,542
104,707
26.51%
3.99%
9.72%
2001
68,920 39,179
108,099
31.75%
4.73%
11.43%
2002
26,785 36,977
63,762
23.32%
5.78%
12.84%
2003
28,286 28,791
57,077
22.78%
5.99%
13.34%
2004
52,840 27,426
80,266
30.47%
5.53%
12.66%
2005
53,738 25,349
79,087
27.82%
5.07%
12.39%
2006
41,094 26,398
67,492
25.67%
4.62%
11.24%
2007
48,218 25,334
73,552
25.90%
4.62%
11.54%
2008
60,107
23,026
83,133
26.98%
5.78%
14.34%
2009
74,602 22,314
96,916
24.77%
9.27%
20.14%
2010
73,293 19,772
93,065
29.03%
9.62%
20.84%
2011
56,384 23,572
79,956
27.10%
8.95%
18.75%
2012
58,179
27,951
86,130
24.63%
8.07%
17.63%
2013
69,909 25,014
94,923
24.75%
7.38%
17.01%
2014
69,975 23,371
93,346
12.98%
6.17%
14.53%
2015
69,920 26,015
95,935
12.19%
5.29%
12.78%
2016
84,988 20,362
105,350
9.83%
4.87%
11.43%
2017
53,691
26,509
80,200
9.62%
4.35%
10.32%
2018
22,405
38,687
61,092
10.33%
3.90%
9.49%
Correlation
16.66%
20.19%
R-Squared
2.78%
4.08%

United States: Unemployment, Figure 3.6304
In sum, the evidence regarding the labor impact of displaced persons does not support a
negative association between displaced persons and unemployment. There is little correlation
between the number of displaced persons that the United States accepted and its unemployment
rate or youth unemployment rate. In the case of both variables, there is little indication of a
statistical relationship between the number or percentage share of global displaced persons that
the United States accepts and the country’s labor security.
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The Securitization of International Protection
The legislative, procedural, and policy reforms instituted in the United States for the
purposes of spreading the “burden” of international protection around to the country’s global
neighbors is rooted in the securitization of displaced persons along the lines of public, economic
and labor, and fiscal security. Each of these areas of securitization have relatively different
origins, however. While the fiscal securitization of displaced persons is a more recent
phenomenon in the United States, their securitization in the area of public safety began in earnest
in following the 11 September terrorist attacks and their economic and labor securitization is
rooted in the arrival of Haitian asylum seekers in the 1970s and 80s. Each of these developments
will be addressed in turn.
While the United States has long based international protection policies in part of fears
that displaced persons posed a potential threat to American jobs or public safety, the narrative
that admission should be restricted on the basis that they pose a high fiscal cost is relatively new.
It has appeared in earnest with the refugee crisis beginning in 2015 and the election of Donald
Trump. Within the first year of his presidency, Trump ordered his State Department to conduct a
series of studies to investigate the fiscal costs of international protection in the United States.
These reports were to include “the estimated long-term costs of the United States Refugee
Admissions Program at the Federal, State, and local levels, along with recommendations about
how to curtail those costs.”305
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Sources," Reuters, 21 June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-refugees/white-house-pressuresstate-department-over-refugee-costs-sources-idUSKBN19C2JB.

120

In 2017, Trump pointed to a report by the Center for Immigration Studies from two years
earlier on the high costs of resettling Middle Eastern Refugees306 as justification for lowering the
caps on US refugee resettlement for that year.307 A 2018 report by the Federation for American
Immigration Reform has also been cited by US policymakers. The report followed up on these
finding of high refugee costs by studying the fiscal impact of refugees. However, it did so over
only the first five years of refugees’ residence in the United States and focused in much more
detail on their fiscal costs than their tax contributions.308 Department of Homeland Security
personnel noted that there were discussions within the Trump administration regarding
conducting a “skills” test in order to screen refugees according to their presumed ability to
support themselves after their acceptance.309
Perhaps the clearest indications of the fiscal securitization of international protection in
the United States are the proposed budget cuts to various programs related to refugee
resettlement and asylum. In 2018, the United States dramatically cut funding for refugee and
emergency assistance programs while also allowing a critical refugee emergency fund to be
drawn down and not replenished.310 In 2020, the Trump Administration went as far as to propose
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accepting no refugees for resettlement at all through the USRAP program for the first time since
the program’s establishment in 1975.311
While the fiscal securitization of displaced persons is more of a recent development in the
United States, their public securitization dates back at least to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States began to increase efforts to
combat terrorism dramatically. Only five days following the attack, President George W. Bush
declared a “war on terrorism.”312 While President Bush did not reference immigrants, asylum
seekers, or refugees in his speech, within days of his speech his administration’s Justice
Department amended the Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations to allow for precharge detentions of greater than 48 hours in “emergency or other extraordinary”
circumstances.313
Weeks later, US Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that any immigrant
overstaying a visa by even one day would be arrested.314 Regarding displaced persons, the 2003
reorganization of the United States asylum system under the Department of Homeland Security
by the Bush Administration was perhaps the most singularly important securitizing action in
regard to US international protection efforts in the twenty-first century.315 This action
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reconstituted US asylum and refugee resettlement procedures within the framework of national
security on the basis of combatting terrorist threats.316
Prior to this reconstitution, asylum seekers applied for protection through US
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), an agency founded in 1933 housed under the
organizational direction of the US Department of Justice. In November 2002, however, the
Homeland Security Act was passed in order to help combat terrorism by enhancing coordination
between the agencies tasked with maintaining border security.317 This resulted in the March 2003
dissolution of INS and the establishment of three new agencies in its place—US Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP). These agencies were established under the direction of the newly created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate more effectively efforts to combat
terrorist threats.318
It is telling that asylum seekers and refugees in the United States are processed under the
direction of a department the official mission of which is “to prevent attacks and protect
Americans.”319 Despite somewhat of a relaxation during the Obama Administration (2008-2016),
such apprehension on the part of the United States seems only to have increased under the Trump
Administration, as the amending of the USCIS mission statement in 2018 makes clear:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation's lawful
immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly
adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans,
securing the homeland, and honoring our values [Italics added for emphasis].320
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This is a clear contrast from the agency’s previous mission statement:
USCIS secures America's promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate
and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship
benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring
the integrity of our immigration system [Italics added for emphasis].321
As this change in mission makes clear, over the past two decades USCIS has been transformed
from an agency tasked with providing information and administering benefits to immigrants to one
tasked with protecting the American homeland from would be foreign invaders entering via the
US immigration, asylum, and refugee resettlement systems.
The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and its renewal with the USA
FREEDOM Act in 2015 also significantly expanded the basis for a finding of inadmissibility that
could result in expedited removal for asylum seekers based on suspicions of “terrorist
activity.”322 That is, an asylum seekers may be deemed inadmissible for committing an act that
he or she knew or should have known afforded “material support” to a “terrorist organization” or
to “terrorist activity.” The expansive definitions given to each of these terms by through
amendments of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is incorporated into the United
States Code and is the most comprehensive and important piece of immigration legislation in the
United States.323
For example, “terrorist activity” is constituted by “intent to endanger…one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property,”324 and “terrorist organizations” may be
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considered undesignated “Tier III” groups if they consist of “two or more individuals, whether
organized or not” engaging in “terrorist activity.”325 “Material Support” can consist of providing
housing, transportation, or a range of other types of support to a person engaged in a terrorist
activity even without intending to do so.326 Beyond the fact that refugees can easily find
themselves engaging in acts fitting the exceedingly broad definition of “terrorist activity” in
order simply to survive, they could easily have provided “material support” to others engaging in
such activity unbeknownst to themselves.
The Real ID Act of 2015 also imposed requirements for asylum seekers to document their
persecution in order to corroborate their testimony and required that asylum claims based on
membership in a “particular social group” be restricted groups maintaining adequate levels of
“social visibility.” In other words, an asylum seeker’s membership in a persecuted social group
must be generally recognized by others in the local community. Obviously, refugees who are
members of a persecuted social group are likely to want to maintain a low profile, making social
group claims particularly difficult to establish.327
Only one month after the signing of the Homeland Security Act, which repositioned the
US asylum and refugee resettlement system under the direction of USCIS within the Department
of Homeland Security, the United States also concluded its first formal safe third country
agreement with Canada in December 2002. This agreement was part of the Smart Border Action
Plan, the goal of which was to improve border security. One way in which it purported to do so
was by returning asylum applicants who attempt to move from one country to another through
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formal ports of entry and subsequently apply for refugee status upon their arrival.328 The
deportation of asylum seekers under this arrangement was made easier in November 2002 by the
expanded scope of expedited removal procedures as well as the introduction of the “credible
fear” procedure for screening applicants deemed unlikely to qualify for asylum.329 While no
similar agreements were concluded for more than 15 years following this pact with Canada, the
Trump Administration concluded a series of “Asylum Cooperative Agreements,” with
Guatemala,330 El Salvador,331 and Honduras.332
The Trump Administration also instituted a number of bureaucratic policy changes
through executive action that resulted in the Migration Protection Protocol (MPP, better known
as the “Remain in Mexico” policy) in January 2019. Justifying the policy under Section 235 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act,333 the MPP allows border patrol authorities to return any
individual arriving via the US-Mexico border without proper documentation to Mexico to await
any further immigration proceedings, including asylum proceedings.334 Such policies have
served as particularly cumbersome measures for individuals claiming asylum originating from
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Mexico or one of the countries with whom the United States has concluded Asylum Cooperative
Agreements.
The Republican Party in the United States has been particularly supportive of securitizing
displaced persons and instituting burden-sharing measures in the twenty-first century in the case
of public security. The passage of the Homeland Security Act and conclusion of the 2002 safe
third country agreement with Canada both occurred directly after the congressional midterm
elections that same year. In fact, the 2004 Republic Party platform refers to the newly created
agencies under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security—USCIS among them—as
“preparedness agencies” in the War on Terror and touts the party’s 2002 midterm electoral
victories as instrumental in the legislation that made this reorganization possible.335
The official party platforms of both the Democratic and Republic parties make numerous
references to the United States’ commitment to protect refugees and other displaced persons in
2000, 2004, and 2008. However, the Republican Party gradually began to refer to refugees
specifically in non-humanitarian terms beginning with its 2008 Party Platform, in which it
suggested that refugees seek protection in the United States merely to improve their
“lifestyle.”336 By 2012, the Republican Party made only a single passing reference to refugees at
all,337 and after gaining control of both houses of Congress the party voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the USA FREEDOM and REAL ID Acts in 2015. These acts drastically curtailed
eligibility for asylum in the United States with the practical consequence that successful asylum
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claims decreased by more than 20 percent in the following year.338 The USA FREEDOM Act
significantly expanded the basis for a finding of inadmissibility, resulting in expedited removal,
for asylum seekers based on extraordinarily expansive definitions of “terrorist activity,” as noted
in Chapter 2.339 Additionally, the REAL ID Act of 2015 made it almost impossible for asylum
seekers to successfully be identified as refugees based on claims of membership in a “particular
social group” because it required that that group have an adequate level of “social visibility.”
In 2016, the Republican Party platform referred to refugees repeatedly and almost
exclusively in the context of threats to public security.340 It noted that “it is not possible to vet
fully all potential refugees. To ensure our national security, refugees who cannot be carefully
vetted cannot be admitted to the country, especially those whose homelands have been the
breeding grounds for terrorism.” The document continues that “our nation's immigration and
refugee policies are placing Americans at risk. To keep our people safe, we must secure our
borders…and properly screen refugees and other immigrants entering from any country.”341
Following the Republican Party’s electoral victories in both houses of Congress as well as the
Presidency in 2016, it is unsurprising that the government engaged in a series of burden-sharing
initiatives meant to combat the perceived public security threat presented by the acceptance of
large numbers of displaced persons.
Amid the Coronavirus pandemic, such border policing activity was extended and all
displaced persons were turned away without even being given the opportunity to lodge and
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application for asylum beginning in March 2020.342 It is tempting to believe that this was due to
public health concerns. However, the series of public security-related justifications given for
burden-sharing initiatives carried out over the preceding three years of the Trump Administration
suggest that the coronavirus pandemic may have instead merely constituted an excuse to execute
public security-based international protection policy.343
Such a trend toward increased border policing as an impediment to displaced person
arrivals is also in keeping with general trends during the early twenty-first century in the United
States as well as other developed countries.344 UNHCR has referred these burden-sharing
initiatives as violations of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol on the basis that
they result in the refouling of refugees.345 However, such policies would not constitute a
violation of the Convention or its Protocol if those refugees were refouled on the basis that they
represent a threat to public security. That is, states may deny protection from refoulement to
individuals who pose a “danger to the security of the country in which” they are located or
“who… constitute a danger to the community of that country.”346
The longest securitization tradition of the three discussed in this chapter, however, is that
of economic and labor securitization. The US government’s introduction and reinforcement of a
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narrative that refugees, asylum seekers, and other displaced persons arriving in the United States
are really just economic migrants seeking to cheat the legal immigration system and steal jobs
from Americans has a long history going back at least to the 1970s. During this period, there was
a growing fear among policymakers that instability and oppression throughout Latin America
would give rise to “sustained, and possibly increased, flow of poor and relatively unskilled
people who were less assimilable into the domestic labor market.”347
As Haitian asylum seekers fled the despotic rule of the Duvalier dictatorship beginning in
the mid-1970s, the US State Department announced on 6 September 1977 that it had repatriated
97 Haitians who were rescued while attempting to sail to the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba to seek asylum. However, it did so without allowing them to lodge a formal asylum
application. In the words of the State Department, “to grant them political asylum…[posed] a
problem of relations between the United States and the Haitian government, and to admit them as
refugees from deteriorating economic conditions might encourage still more to flee” to the
United States.348 As still more Haitians flooded into the United States, the US asylum agency—
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)—responded by cancelling their work
authorization, detaining applicants, and expediting deportation hearings while also sending the
US Navy to patrol the seas outside Haiti to intercept Haitians attempting to flee.349
Several lawsuits were filed on behalf of Haitian asylum seekers, with important
ramifications for those seeking international protection in the United States. In the 1979 decision
in National Council of Churches v. Egan, the judge refuted claims by the US government that
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Haitian asylum seekers could be denied the right to work authorization while their asylum
applications were pending in part to protect American jobs.350 In the 1980 case Haitian Refugee
Center v. Civiletti, the court denied the validity of the government’s argument that all Haitians
were economic migrants and therefore could be quickly placed in expedited deportation
proceedings without fear of refoulement.351
However, the US government continually attempted to deny work authorization to
asylum seekers on various grounds in the name of protecting American labor markets. In Diaz v.
INS (1986), a US District Court judge ruled against INS for attempting to consider the manner in
which an asylum seeker had entered the country or whether or not the asylum seeker had
dependents to care for in denying work authorization.352 In 1989, a court decision in Ramos v.
Thornburgh found against the INS for denying work authorization for asylum seekers as a means
of deterring them from lodging asylum applications.353
Thus, there has been a persistent narrative in the United States closely associating
displaced persons and asylum seekers with economic migrants seeking employment and
threatening Americans’ jobs. Despite repeated challenges within its own court system, the US
government has repeatedly pursued policies seeking to reduce the number of applications for
international protection that it receives by impeding the ability of asylum seekers to work in the
United States. Such policies persist into the present, with the US Department of Homeland
Security issuing a rule in November 2019 (effective as of August 25, 2020) curtailing work
authorization for asylum applicants if they: (1) entered or attempted to enter the United States
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without inspection at a port of entry; or (2) failed to apply for asylum within one year of their
arrival in the United States.354
Thus, while their histories are of varying lengths, international protection has been
securitized along public, economic and labor, and fiscal lines in the United States.
Concomitantly, the United States government has instituted various burden-sharing initiatives
intended to make the United States a less hospitable destination to asylum seekers.
Unfortunately, these trends continue into the present. In June 2020, the Trump administration
proposed procedural changes to asylum, withholding of removal, credible fear, and reasonable
fear that would essentially expand these safe third country concepts by allowing immigration
judges to throw out asylum cases before holding a hear if they think that there are flaws in the
application. These changes would also impose more restrictive standards for asylum seeker
qualification on the basis of “political opinion” and membership in a “particular social group.”
Finally, the proposed changes include increasing restrictions for asylum qualification for
displaced persons who travelled through at least one other country before arriving in the United
States without seeking refuge there, which would be particularly cumbersome for victims of
human trafficking.355
Finally, in order to reduce the number of refugees admitted into the United States more
directly, between 2017 and 2019 the United States rapidly decreased the annual ceiling for
refugee resettlement through USRAP. Whereas the official annual ceiling approved by US
administrations fluctuated between 70,000 and 85,000 from 2002 to 2016, that figure was
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decreased to 50,000 in 2017, 45,000 in 2018, and 30,000 in 2019. All three of these decreases
represent record lows since USRAP’s inception in 1980.356 Moreover, whereas the United States
primarily restricted the eligibility of refugees who had applied for asylum from 2002-2016, the
period from 2017 to 2020 is marked by more direct attempts on the part of the United States’ to
block the admittance even of pre-screened, recognized refugees. This is despite the fact that, as
described earlier in this chapter, there is little evidence to substantiate the securitized view of
displaced persons as a public, economic, labor, or fiscal security threat to the United States.

Conclusion
The findings in this chapter are largely in keeping with the literature on the securitization
of migration and displaced persons discussed in Chapter 2. There was an intense securitization of
displaced persons in the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the advent of
procedural and admissibility changes greatly impacting the eligibility of asylum seekers to pursue
international protection within US borders. In particular, the United States has drawn linkages
between refugees and terrorism and increasingly expanded the scope of what constitutes terrorism,
leveraging exclusions contained in the Refugee Convention to deny protection.
There has also been a long history in the United States of attempts to limit the employment
opportunities of asylum seekers as a tool of discouraging applications for protection. Such
economic and labor securitization of displaced persons as job-stealers seeking to deprive US
citizens of income has existed since at least the latter-twentieth century. This has not improved
since the advent of the 2008 financial crisis. Since the election of the Trump administration, added
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to this narrative has also been a persistent concern regarding the budgetary cost of providing
international protection.
Yet there is little evidence to support such securitization. Indeed, as the analysis in this
chapter suggests, in the long-term the fiscal costs of displaced persons are negligible. Similarly,
there is virtually no association whatsoever between displaced persons and terrorism, economic,
or labor indicators. Thus, the burden-sharing initiatives pursued by the United States are not
supported or justified by the empirical evidence presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: ITALY
This chapter begins by discussing the particular structure of international protection in Italy as well
as the general burden-sharing mechanisms available to the state. It then addresses the second
research question introduced at the outset of the dissertation: to what extent and how is
international protection a burden to developed states? To do this, it examines various metrics used
as indicators of public, economic and labor, and fiscal security in the case of Italy.
After establishing that international protection does not represent much of a burden to Italy
based on these data points, the chapter then turns to address the dissertation’s third research
question. It does so by answering the question of how Italy engages in burden-sharing behavior in
regard to international protection despite the fact that displaced persons are not actually a burden.
In answer to this question, the chapter discusses the various burden-sharing initiatives that Italy
has pursued by describing the restrictive measures that it has introduced vis-à-vis displaced
persons. The chapter concludes that such measures, in combination with the sharp rhetoric
concomitantly surrounding displaced persons and the dearth of evidence to substantiate displaced
persons as a burden, are in keeping with the expectations of the securitization approach to
analyzing migration phenomena.

The Structure of International Protection and Burden Sharing
Italy is a member state of the European Union (EU), and as such it is subject to the
definitions and policies outlined in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The CEAS
is composed of three directives and two regulations: (1) the revised Asylum Procedures
Directive, which outlines the general processes necessary for a state to make asylum decisions;
(2) the revised Reception Conditions Directive, which articulates minimum material reception
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conditions and fundamental rights for asylum seekers across the EU; (3) the revised
Qualification Directive, which clarifies the grounds on which international protection should be
granted; (4) the revised Dublin Regulation, which serves as a kind of responsibility
apportionment mechanism for asylum seekers; and (5) the revised EURODAC Regulation,
which allows for a shared EU database of asylum seeker fingerprints.357
Italy’s qualification criteria mirror those outlined in the CEAS in regard to determinations
of refugee and subsidiary protection status, the latter of which encompasses a number of the
types of complementary protection offered in the United States. However, there is a third major
type of protection offered by Italy under its national laws that falls outside the scope of the
definitions and regulations contained in the CEAS: Humanitarian Protection (protezione
umanitaria). Moreover, while Italy adheres to the dictates of the EU’s revised Procedures and
Qualification Directives, the provisions contained in both of these procedures are somewhat
general in nature and leave much to the interpretation of states since, ultimately, each state must
implement them on their own. Thus, the legal processes that Italy utilizes to determine
qualification for these three international protection statuses as well as the benefits accorded to
those granted them are largely unique to that country.
In the case of Italy, all decisions on asylum seeker applications are decided by an agency
of the country’s Ministry of the Interior, La Commissione Nazionale per il Diritto di Asilo (“The
National Commission for the Right to Asylum”). The agency is subdivided into regional
“Territorial Commissions” throughout the country which are staffed by committee members
whose job it is to make determinations regarding the approval, denial, or revocation of
international protection status for those seeking asylum in the country. As of 2020, there were 30
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such territorial commissions and there are three potential categorizations of displaced persons
into which an individual might fall if they receive a positive status determination: (1) refugee
status; (2) subsidiary protection status; and (3) humanitarian protection status. However, as
discussed later in the chapter, the latter ceased to exist as of 2018 following a government
decree, indicating the withholding of protection as an important burden-sharing mechanism
possessed by the state. In any case, all three of these categories of protection existed in Italy
during the period of the empirical analysis measuring the country’s displaced person “burden,”
and so each is discussed briefly in turn below.

Refugee Status
The EU’s revised Qualification Directive defines a “refugee” in essentially the same
manner as the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it describes “refugee status” as “the recognition by
a Member State of a third-country national or a stateless person as a refugee.”358 Those
recognized as refugees are entitled to a renewable residence permit of at least 3 years, travel
documents, access to education for minors, employment, healthcare, and social welfare programs
equivalent to such access enjoyed by citizens. They are also entitled to equal opportunity
accommodations, freedom of movement, and access to integration facilities equivalent to such
assess enjoyed by other legally resident third-country nationals in particular countries. They are
also guaranteed protection against refoulement, the maintenance of family unity, access to
voluntary repatriation assistance, and information on the rights and obligations relating to their
status as refugees.359
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Subsidiary Protection
Those eligible for subsidiary protection in the EU are those for whom “substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her
country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual
residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm… and is unable, or, owing to such
risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.”360 Those recognized
as refugees are entitled to a residence permit of at least 1 year, renewable for at least 2 years as
well as travel documents if they are unable to obtain a national passport. They must also be
granted access to education for minors and employment, and healthcare equivalent to such access
enjoyed by citizens, although social welfare may be limited to the core benefits allotted to
citizens. They are also entitled to equal opportunity accommodations, freedom of movement, and
access to integration facilities equivalent to such assess enjoyed by other legally resident thirdcountry nationals in particular countries. Finally, they are also guaranteed protection against
refoulement, the maintenance of family unity, access to voluntary repatriation assistance, and
information on the rights and obligations relating to their status as refugees.361

Humanitarian Protection
EU countries are permitted to retain their own laws regarding international protection for
those who do not qualify under the Common European Asylum System framework for either
Refugee Status or Subsidiary Protection. Humanitarian protection (protezione umanitaria) is a
form of complementary protection in Italy available to displaced persons who do not qualify for
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refugee or subsidiary protection status, but who also cannot be deported without risk of their
refoulement.362
Following a negative finding by Italy’s Territorial Commission, which conducts
interviews of applicants for international protection, the Commission may deem the applicant
nevertheless to have a serious danger (“gravi motivi”) of harm preventing their removal from the
country. Such “gravi motivi” include political instability, episodic violence, insufficient respect
for human rights, famine, environmental, or natural disasters in a displaced person’s country of
origin. Upon the recommendation of the Territorial Commission, the Questura may grant, on a
discretionary basis, a two-year “permesso di soggiorno per motivi umanitari” (humanitarian
residence permit) which can be renewed until a change of circumstances allows for
repatriation.363 While humanitarian protection was an important category for granting protection
to displaced persons during the term of this analysis through 2018, as noted above the
availability of humanitarian protection in Italy was rescinded by a September 2018 decree from
the country’s Ministry of the Interior.364
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Burden-Sharing
Contrary to the United States, Italy participates in a number of regional burden-sharing
mechanisms established by the EU and also maintains a basic lexicon of terminology and
concepts through the Asylum Procedures Directive that are consistent with other EU members.
The principal mechanism is the Dublin System. While Italy also participates in refugee
resettlement through UNHCR referrals, this represents a very modest portion of its international
protection efforts. Similarly, while Italy participates in asylum seeker transfers to Turkey via the
EU-Turkey Statement, this agreement has proven much more significant to EU countries in the
Balkans than to Italy. Italy did, however, get substantial relief through the Emergency Relocation
Scheme devised by the EU in order to help lighten Italy’s caseload of asylum seekers, who
frequently arrived on the shores of Italy, even if that country wasn’t their ultimate intended
destination.
Among the most important concepts utilized by Italy for the purposes of determining the
eligibility of an asylum seeker even to lodge their application with Italian authorities are
“inadmissibility” and “safe country of origin.” These terms are outlined in Sections II and III of
the EU’s Asylum Procedures Directive and have also been transposed into Italy’s national body
of law.365 Inadmissibility and safe country of origin are among the primary reasons that Italy’s
Territorial Commission may reject an asylum seekers application.
Article 29 of Italy’s Procedure Decree, including its subsequent modifications,
establishes the legal grounds for inadmissibility.366 According to these procedures, Italy’s
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Territorial Commission may find an asylum seeker’s application inadmissible if the applicant:
(1) has already been recognized as a refugee by a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention
and is still able to enjoy the protection granted thereof; (2) has already received a decision from
the Territorial Commission and is reapplying without presenting materially important new
evidence to support their claim; or (3) has filed a subsequent application during the execution of
a removal order, the implication being that the application is being filed for the sole purpose of
delaying removal.367 It has been stipulated by Italian courts that this latter ground for
inadmissibility, which was only introduced in 2018,368 violates Italy’s legal obligations under
Article 40 of the EU’s recast Asylum Procedures Directive because it does not require the
Territorial Commission to conduct an assessment of admissibility even if new evidence is
presented.369
Italy also maintains a list of countries that it considers to be “safe countries of origin,”
which must be updated and filed with the European commission periodically according to the
country’s Procedural Decree.370 If an asylum seeker whose country of origin is on this list of safe
countries of origin applies for protection in Italy, their application may be immediately rejected
as manifestly unfounded. As of October 2019, this list includes 13 countries, specifically
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kosovo, North Macedonia,
Morocco, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia and Ukraine.
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However, Italian courts have held that despite the inclusion of these countries on Italy’s
safe countries of origin list, particular regions within these countries may still be deemed unsafe.
For example, the Tribunal of Florence found in January 2020 that the region of Casamance in
Senegal should be excluded from Senegal’s designation as a safe country of origin. Asylum
applicants claiming to be from this region have thereby been granted the ability to apply for
protection in Italy without having their applications immediately deemed manifestly unfounded
and therefore inadmissible.371 While inadmissibility as a matter of procedure is constantly
evolving due to court challenges, Italy has increasingly attempted to expand the grounds upon
which an application may receive a finding of inadmissibility.
The Dublin Regulation was established in 1990 at the Convention Determining the State
Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the
European Communities in 1997.372 The Dublin Regulation was signed for two reasons. The first
was to reduce the administrative burdens on EU member states by prevent asylum seekers from
engaging in “asylum-shopping.”373 The second was to prevent member states from looking the
other way as asylum seekers transited their territory en route to their preferred destination
elsewhere in the EU. Instead, under the Dublin Regulation the first member state in which
asylum seekers arrived would be responsible for adjudicating their application for protection.
Thus, the original goal of the first iteration of the Dublin Regulation was not so much to share
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the presumed burden of protecting displaced persons as it was to provide a framework for
assigning responsibility for processing a given asylum application to a single member state.374
In order to assign responsibility to member states, the Dublin Regulation established a
hierarchy of considerations for determining the jurisdiction in which an asylum seeker’s
application should be considered admissible. The first applicable condition among the following
hierarchy determines the member state responsible for a given asylum seeker: (1) the member
state has granted international protection to an immediate family member of the asylum
applicant; (2) the applicant has previously held a residence permit or visa in a member state; (3)
the applicant has passed through a member state in which the need for him or her to have a visa
is waived; (4) the applicant transited through a member state when initially entering the EU
irregularly; and finally, if no other conditions apply, (5) the applicant has lodged an application
for international protection with a member state.375
While the original Dublin Regulation was a first step toward coordinated policy on
international protection within the EU, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam established asylum as an
area of supranational competence and thereby laid the groundwork for a Common European
Asylum System.376 This led to the adoption of the Dublin II Regulation in 2003, which reiterated
the principles of Dublin I while expanding the criteria on which admissibility was to be based.377
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It was Dublin II that helped to usher the concept of burden-sharing into the lexicon of EU asylum
policy.
The European Commission issued guidance on the Regulation in 2007 stating that “the
Dublin System may de facto result in additional burdens on Member States that have limited
reception and absorption capacities and that find themselves under particular migratory pressures
because of their geographical location.”378 One such border state to which the Commission was
referring is Italy. Thus, while Dublin II was nominally an agreement meant to clarify the legal
responsibilities of member states toward particular asylum seekers, in practice it represented an
attempt by member states in the EU’s interior to shift responsibility for international protection
to states on the EU’s periphery. The result was a system in which member states routinely argued
against their responsibility for displaced persons, creating a population of “refugees in orbit”
who are “shuttled from one country to another in a constant search for asylum.”379
The most recent iteration of the Dublin Regulation—Dublin III—was signed in 2013 in
order to try to address this asylum seeker redistribution problem for states while also improving
protections for displaced persons. However, in practice it has done little to improve either one.
Not only is the current Dublin system essentially a cost inefficient means of reshuffling asylum
seekers, but it gives no mind to the ability of the states to which those asylum seekers are sent to
provide them protection. That is, many member states have “net transfers close to zero, meaning
that the number of refugees or asylum-seekers they transfer is nearly identical to the number they
receive,” and “the hierarchy of criteria for the allocation of responsibility does not take into
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consideration Member States’ capacity to provide protection.”380 The Dublin system that exists
today ultimately perpetuates the free-riding behavior of states in regard to protecting displaced
persons without actually offering an efficient framework for redistributing them.381
Notwithstanding the system for determining responsibility for asylum application on the
basis of the Dublin Regulation and its subsequent iterations, the Council of the European Union
adopted two emergency relocation schemes within a week of each other in 2015 that overrode
the Dublin Procedures. The justification given was that the massive influx of asylum seekers into
the EU resulting from the Syrian Civil War has threatened to overwhelm the Italian and Greek
asylum systems, since those two states were the primary countries of origin.
The first of these emergency relocation schemes was adopted on September 14, 2015. It
provided for the relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece, where asylum
seekers were primarily arriving at the EU’s border by sea.382 The second was adopted on
September 22, 2015 provided for the temporary relocation of a further 120,000 asylum
seekers.383 These measures were instituted because more than 548,000 of the 660,000 asylum
seeker who had arrived in Europe in the first nine months of 2015 arrived on the shores of Italy
and Greece.384
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Although these emergency relocation measures were an apparent attempt at burdensharing, they ultimately failed to redistribute asylum applicants effectively. This failure was in
part because the number of asylum seekers far outstripped the redistribution quotas in each of
these schemes, but more importantly it was because other member states were uncooperative in
accepting asylum seekers for transfer. In April 2017 the EU Commissioner for Migration, Home
Affairs, and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos criticized the willingness of member states to
fulfill their commitments under these relocation schemes, calling on “those Member States who
have systematically failed to deliver on their obligations to start doing so at once.”385 These
emergency relocation scheme therefore represent yet another attempt at failed burden-sharing
among destination countries for displaced persons. This left asylum seekers to suffer for years
awaiting decisions on their applications for protection because they could not move on to apply
in other EU countries under the terms of the Dublin Regulation.
Italy has also engaged in multiple bilateral agreements with non-EU countries such as
Libya and Sudan for the purposes of joint action to repatriate asylum seekers venturing to Italy
via irregular routes, such as crossing the Mediterranean. In the case of Sudan, such cooperation
has been in the form of information-sharing and joint police coordination. In the case of Libya,
the mandate has been much more expansive, including joint operations between the Italian and
Libyan navy to tow boats originally launched from Libya’s coastal waters back to Libya to
prevent their arrivals in Italy.
In sum, the Italian government has a number of burden-sharing levers that it can pull.
While EU regulations regarding asylum qualification criteria and procedures do create a
framework within which Italy must confine its policies, in practice EU member states have large
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amounts of latitude to institute operationalize their own national asylum policies. In particular,
Italy has the ability to restrict admissibility on the basis that an asylum seeker originated from a
safe third country—the criteria for which are arbitrarily designated by the Italian government and
not publicly disclosed—or that they previously passed through another European state party to
the Dublin Regulation. Italy is also able to engage bilaterally with non-EU states to coordinate
police and naval actions intended to prevent the arrival of those seeking international protection.
Moreover, as is the case with any state, Italy retains the right to alter its domestic regulations in
regard to the benefits afforded to asylum seekers and displaced persons through means of
legislative and executive action. The specifics of the nexus of Italy’s various methods of burdensharing behavior with the securitization of displaced persons will be discussed after establishing
whether displaced persons are, in fact, a burden in the following section.

Are Displaced Persons a “Burden?”
Perhaps the most direct means of assessing whether displaced persons actually constitute
a burden to Italy is to assess their efficacy as a fiscal security burden. Fiscal security involves the
soundness of a state’s budget and the balancing of tax revenues with government expenditures.
While this does not necessarily require a balanced budget, it does require keeping budget deficits
within reasonable limits as to safeguard the long-term fiscal well-being of the state. Fiscal
security is also closely linked to other types of national security insofar as high national debt
levels imperil social safety nets and other essential programs.386
To ascertain whether displaced persons represent a fiscal security burden in the context of
Italy, this section begins by investigating whether accepting displaced persons is significantly
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associated with negative effects on the state’s fiscal well-being. It attempts to do so by measuring
the tax revenues and government expenditures attributable to displaced persons. The fiscal
impact analysis used for this comparison is done longitudinally during the period 2000-2018. It
discusses the various categories of tax revenues and government expenditures that constitute the
components of the comparative fiscal impact analysis performed for displaced persons in Italy.
The calculation of tax revenues and government expenditures generated as a result of refugee
protection are determined based upon the most significant sources of government revenues and
expenditures generated by Italian residents. The tax revenues examined generally fall into the
categories of income, social welfare, property, and wealth taxes. The government expenditures
generally fall into the categories of education, healthcare, social welfare, pension or old-age
benefits, and housing assistance.
If the tax revenues produced by displaced persons is greater than the government
expenditures spent on them, then their protection would be a net fiscal positive for the state. If,
however, the tax revenues produced by displaced persons is less than the government
expenditures spent on them, then their protection would be a net fiscal negative for the state and
would constitute a threat to its fiscal security. The below findings are that over the long-term
there is little evidence to substantiate assertions that displaced persons constitute a threat to
Italy’s fiscal security.
For the purposes of empirically examining the impact of displaced persons on fiscal
security in Italy, the major tax revenue categories include the following: (1) Wealth Taxes; and
(2) Income Taxes and Social Welfare Contributions (after refunds). Wealth and income taxes
combined with social welfare contributions accounted for approximately 62 percent of gross
revenues as of 2017. Two major omission are Value-Added Tax (VAT) and property taxes,
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which accounted for 14.8 percent and 6.2 percent respectively of total Italian government
revenues in the same year and were not available as data points at the individual or household
level for displaced persons.387 Therefore, while almost certainly an underestimation of the total
tax revenues contributed by refugees in Italy, these categories represent the largest recorded
sources of the country’s tax revenues for the purposes of this fiscal impact analysis.
In the case of Italy, no cash assistance is provided to refugees specifically, unlike in the
United States, although there is limited funding of €35 per day provided to asylum seekers being
housed by the state while their applications are pending.388 Since space in such facilities is
extremely limited and this funding is only available to those who have not yet been recognized as
refugees, it is unlikely that most refugees ever receive such cash assistance. Regardless, it is
unlikely that most of the displaced persons considered in Italy’s fiscal impact analysis ever
received such funding. Moreover, those receiving refugee status largely rely on the same social
welfare system as other residents of Italy, and so the assistance that they generally receive is
subsumed under the other expenditure categories considered in this analysis.
The specific data points utilized to calculate government expenditures are: (1) Public
Healthcare; (2) Old-Age/Public Pension Benefits; (3) Education; (4) Disability Benefits; (5)
Sickness Benefits; (6) Survivor Benefits; (7) Unemployment Benefits; (8) Housing Allowances;
and (7) Family-based Benefits; and (8) Education-related Benefits.
There are two primary channels through which Italy accepts displaced persons for
protection. The first, and by far the most significant, is the asylum procedure.389 After arriving in
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Italy, those seeking international protection declare their intention to apply for asylum either to
the border police or at a police station, where they have their name, place and date of birth,
nationality, fingerprints, and picture recorded. They then fill out registration forms to file their
formal application and wait for their interview with Italy’s Territorial Commission, whose job it
is to determine whether the applicant qualifies for refugee status or any other form of
international protection. Those not receiving a positive outcome then have between 15 and 30
days to file an appeal depending on the reason for the negative finding and are given free legal
assistance to aid them in doing so.390
The second channel through which Italy accepts displaced persons for protection is the
Dublin Regulation, which exists to prevent asylum seekers arriving initially in one EU member
state (plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) from applying for international protection in
another state that is a signatory of the regulation. An asylum seeker may be required to file their
application for protection in Italy rather than another signatory state if they initially entered the
EU by transiting through Italy or if they arrived via another member state but have immediate
family in Italy.391 However, the number of net Dublin transfers that Italy receives has historically
been limited by the Emergency Relocation Schemes implemented by the EU to relieve pressure
on Italy and Greece, which receive a disproportionate share of asylum seeker arrivals. Thus,
most of those ultimately receiving refugee protection have their applications granted via the
asylum procedure directly rather than as a Dublin transfer.
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Despite the fact that three major forms of international protections are available in Italy
(refugee, subsidiary, and humanitarian protection), all of those receiving a positive international
protection finding are considered as displaced persons for the purposes of this section’s analysis.
The reasons for this are two-fold. First, because this is a cross-sectional analysis of displaced
persons currently present in Italy in 2018, the vast majority of those included in the study have
lived in Italy far longer than would have been allowed had they received a form of international
protection other than refugee status, arriving between 1999 and 2013. Even if they had received
another form of protection, the repeated extension of their subsidiary or humanitarian protectionbased residency permits would suggest that they possess a fear of returning to their country of
origin that is similar to that of a refugee.
Second, many of those that have been granted forms of protection other than refugee
status in the most recent period of the study (i.e. 2014-2018) by Italian authorities are likely to
become long-term residents of Italy due to the protracted nature of the conflicts that occasioned
their applications for asylum. Consequently, their fiscal impact on the Italian government is
likely to be virtually identical to that of those receiving refugee status, making their inclusion in
the analysis alongside refugees essential for an accurate picture of fiscal impact.
The method of identifying displaced persons present in Italy differed from the method
used to identify displaced persons present in the United States. Unlike the United States census
data, Italy’s household survey data does not identify the specific country from which an
individual emigrated before arriving in Italy even though it is intended to do so according to its
methodological guidelines.392 Rather, respondents to the survey identified as foreign-born were
simply identified as having emigrated from either another EU country or from a non-EU country.
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Those likely to be displaced persons therefore had to be triangulated through a two-step process
by identifying the non-EU foreign-born population and conducting a simple random sample
corresponding to the ratio of displaced persons to total foreign-born immigration to Italy during
each of the surveyed periods.
The tax revenues and government expenditures associated with their presence in Italy are
used to determine their net fiscal impact on the country. Net fiscal impact is used as a proxy for
the financial cost or benefit that states must accept concomitantly with their offering of
protection to refugees. Due to the way that the available data was reported, net fiscal impact is
noted for displaced persons according to the five-year periods in which they arrived rather than
the exact year. As noted below, the data points to a positive fiscal impact for displaced persons
arriving before the year 2008, though more detailed data and a larger sample size would be
needed to confirm these results with a high degree of certainty.

Fiscal Impact Analysis of Displaced Persons in Italy
As detailed in Figure 4.1, there is a clear upward trend in the tax contributions made by
displaced persons in Italy the longer they have been present in the country. The available data for
tax contributions aggregates individuals into “households,” with the breadwinners of those
households being the primary tax contributors. The individual members of these households are
then disaggregated for the purposes of government expenditure calculations.
Although there were three general categories of tax contributions surveyed—wealth
taxes, income taxes and social welfare contributions, and tax refunds—by far the most
significant source of government revenues was that of income taxes and social welfare
contributions. On a per household basis, there is a clear upward trend in total tax contributions
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the longer that displaced person’s household was present in Italy, with a nearly 70 percent
increase in displaced person tax contributions from the most recently arrived refugees (20142018) to those arriving longest ago (1999-2003).

2018 Per Household Taxes Paid (After-Credits) By Arrival Period in Italy (in 2018 USD)
Year of Immigration # of Households Wealth Taxes
1999-2003
56 $
14.45
2004-2008
36 $
116.01
2009-2013
26 $
2014-2018
42 $
38.40
Average: 2002-2019
40 $
41.24

Income Tax/Social Welfare Contributions
$
6,798.18
$
5,990.65
$
3,598.59
$
4,077.18
$
5,382.29

Tax Refund (Negative) Per Household Total
$
(138.39) $
6,674.23
$
(283.54) $
5,823.12
$
(35.90) $
3,562.69
$
(183.68) $
3,931.90
$
(166.28) $
5,257.24

2018 Per Household Taxes Paid in Italy, Figure 4.1
As detailed in Figure 4.2, there is not a clear trend in the government expenditures
required to sustain displaced persons in the longer-term versus the shorter-term, although
expenditures do appear higher for those present in Italy the longest. The data on government
expenditures is detailed at the individual level, examining the expenditures required to sustain
each member of the displaced person households surveyed for the purposes of tax contribution
calculations. It is perhaps unexpected that displaced persons present in the country for longer
periods appear to make more regular usage of benefits such as old age, survivor, disability, and
education benefits.

2018 Per Capita Government Expenditures By Arrival Period in Italy (in 2018 USD)
Year of Immigration # of Individuals Family-Related
1999-2003
71 $
78.44
2004-2008
47 $ 268.81
2009-2013
31 $
87.88
2014-2018
47 $ 136.64
Average: 2002-2019
49 $ 139.54

Social Exclusions Housing
$
- $ $
- $ $
- $ $
- $ $
- $ -

Unemployment Old-Age
$ 756.08 $ 147.96
$ 452.28 $ 235.45
$ 1,185.25 $ $ 478.14 $ 120.65
$ 684.46 $ 138.99

Survivor
$ 795.22
$ $ $ 224.84
$ 341.98

Sickness Disability
$ - $ 149.24
$ - $ 94.76
$ - $ $ - $ 284.29
$ - $ 144.96

Education Allowances
$
177.71
$
$
$
$
64.37

Public Health
$ 2,545.00
$ 2,545.00
$ 2,545.00
$ 2,545.00
$ 2,545.00

Education
$ 661.21
$ 599.31
$ $ 998.85
$ 622.75

Per Capita Totals
$ 5,310.85
$ 4,195.60
$ 3,818.13
$ 4,788.42
$ 4,682.05

2018 Per Capita Government Expenditures in Italy, Figure 4.2
Regardless of the period under consideration per capita public health spending is by far
the greatest government expenditure associated with displaced persons. The per capital public
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health spending is assumed to be roughly equal for all respondents because Italy has one of the
most comprehensive public health care systems in the EU. Consequently, the costs associated
with maintaining Italy’s public health system are borne across the population. While it would be
informative to have access to the relative additional expenditures incurred by displaced persons
individually, a major study of the impact of Italy’s foreign-born population on its National
Health System found that Italy’s foreign-born population utilizes fewer health resources on a per
capita basis that does Italy’s native-born population, including having lower hospitalization
rates.393 Therefore, it is not expected that refugees would necessarily have higher healthcare
costs than the average Italian citizen. The figure used in lieu of more specific data is the per
capita public healthcare spending by the Italian government in 2018.
According to this study, the net costs associated with displaced persons protected by Italy
progressively decreased over the course of the twenty-year period considered (see Figure 4.3). In
the initial five-year period (2018-2014) following their arrival, the net cost of displaced persons
to Italy was, on average, approximately $856.52 per year. However, by the following five-year
period (2013-2009) that figure decreases by approximately 70 percent to a net cost of only
$255.44. By the following five-year period (2008-2004) as well as the final five-year period
(2003-1999), Italy sees a fiscal benefit, with net gains of $1,627.52 and $1,363.39 respectively.
Over a twenty-year period, this study finds that within 10 years of their arrival displaced persons
in Italy begin to contribute more in tax contributions than they cost the Italian government in
expenditures. Thus, while in the shot-term displaced persons represent a negative fiscal drag on
the Italian budget, they more than make up for those costs once they establish themselves in the
country.

Laura Cacciani, et al., “Hospitalization Among Immigrants in Italy,” Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 3, no. 4
(2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1475860/.
393
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2018 Net Fiscal Impact By Year of Arrival in Italy
Arrival Year
Net Fiscal Impact
1999-2003
$
1,483.33
2004-2008
$
1,627.52
2009-2013
$
(255.44)
2014-2018
$
(856.52)
Average: 2002-2019 $
249.86
2018 Net Fiscal Impact in Italy, Figure 4.3
In sum, the findings of this analysis are that over a two-decade period in the twenty-first
century displaced persons have a positive fiscal impact on Italy. The following section also
makes similar findings in regard to metrics related to the public, economic, and labor security
effects associated with displaced persons.

Public, Economic, and Labor Security
The evidence in regard to public, economic, and labor security also do not support the
characterization of displaced persons as a security threat to Italy. Public security involves the
safeguarding of a state’s citizens, residents, and other persons, organizations, and institutions
against harm. The same key metrics that were used in the context of the United States in the
previous chapter are examined briefly below in order to observe any associations between the
protection of displaced persons and the data points corresponding to different categories of
security. There is one additional metric that is also included in the Italian analysis of public
security, however, in recognition of the fact that in Italy displaced persons and migrants
generally also tend to be securitized as “criminals” in addition to as “terrorists.” This additional
metric is the annual homicide rate.
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The empirical evidence does not clearly support an association between international
protection and terrorist activity. As shown in Figure 4.4, there is virtually no relationship
between the number of displaced persons that Italy accepted and the number of terrorist attacks
or the number of fatalities or injuries resulting from terrorist attacks in any given year. Notably,
the definition of “terrorism” utilized for the purposes of the Global Terrorism Database dataset
used in this analysis encompasses some of the “criminal activity” to which Italian politicians
have referred in constructing anti-migration policies.
In the case of all three variables, there is only a weak correlation between Italy’s share of
the global displaced person “burden” and incidences of terrorist attacks, injuries, or fatalities.
Moreover, the number of refugees and asylees that Italy accepted in a given year displays
virtually no statistical explanatory power vis-à-vis the incidence of terrorist attacks or resulting
injuries or fatalities in any given year.
Italy: Terrorism
Year Refugees
2000
0
2001
0
2002
0
2003
0
2004
0
2005
0
2006
0
2007
0
2008
70
2009
160
2010
55
2011
0
2012
0
2013
0
2014
0
2015
95
2016
1045
2017
1515
2018
1180
Correlation
R-Squared

"Asylee"
No data
No data
1255
No data
No data
940
880
No data
1805
2250
1615
1805
2050
3080
3640
3575
4800
5895
6490

Subsidiary Protection
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
6310
5335
1465
2265
4495
5565
7625
10270
12090
6385
4205

Humanitarian Protection Displaced Persons Italy % of Total Terrorist Attacks Terrorist Fatalities Terrorist Injuries Homicide Rate (per 100,000
No data
0
No data
8
0
3
1.3
No data
0
No data
11
0
4
1.2
No data
1255
0.78%
7
1
0
1.1
No data
0
No data
15
0
51
1.2
No data
0
No data
3
1
0
1.2
4355
5295
0.62%
6
1
7
1.0
4340
5220
0.63%
4
0
2
1.1
No data
0
No data
0
0
0
1.1
1620
9805
1.16%
2
0
0
1.0
1475
9220
0.98%
4
0
2
1.0
1220
4355
0.93%
10
0
3
0.9
3075
7145
1.05%
5
2
5
0.9
15480
22025
0.98%
10
0
1
0.9
5750
14395
1.45%
7
0
4
0.8
9315
20580
1.31%
7
0
3
0.8
15770
29710
0.81%
5
0
1
0.8
18515
36450
0.85%
11
1
1
0.7
19515
33310
1.22%
8
0
8
0.6
19970
31845
1.85%
13
0
8
0.6
27.10%
-11.56%
-15.54%
-90.14%
7.34%
1.34%
2.41%
81.25%

Italy: Terrorism, Figure 4.4394
394

All displaced person population data in this figure is drawn from Eurostat, Asylum and Managed Migration,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database, accessed 15 August 2020; all
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In fact, aside from the relative lack of terrorist activity in Italy overall during the period
2000-2018, there is also virtually no observable relationship between the number and global
share of displaced persons that Italy accepted and incidences of terrorist attack, fatalities, or
injuries. During this period there was also a precipitous drop in crime as represented by the
homicide rate. In fact, there is even a strong negative correlation between increases in the
number and global share of displaced persons that Italy accepted and a decline in the homicide
rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the country. Moreover, while Italy has deported hundreds of
displaced persons due to terrorism concerns and prosecuted a number of Italian citizens who
acted as foreign terrorist fighters in Syria with the Islamic State terrorist organization, there have
been few cases of displaced persons being convicted for engaging in terrorist activity while in
Italy.395
In regard to the association of displaced persons with criminal activity, as seen in Figure
4.4 there is a strong negative correlation between the number of displaced persons protected by
Italy and the homicide rate. This indicates that there has been a precipitous drop in Italy’s
homicide rate even as there has been a drastic increase in the number of displaced persons that it
has accepted for protection. Thus, far from being associated with increased criminal activity, if
anything this data points to positive developments in the area of public security.

terrorism statistics are from: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global
Terrorism Database (GTD),
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearo
nly=2000&end_yearonly=2018&dtp2=all&success=yes&country=98&region=8&ob=GTDID&od=asc&page=1&co
unt=100#results-table, accessed 14 August 2020; all crime data is in Homicides per 100,000 persons as is based on
data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics Database,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?end=2016&locations=IT&start=2000, accessed 15 August
2020.
395
Department of State: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Italy,
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/italy/.
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Year Refugees
2000
0
2001
0
2002
0
2003
0
2004
0
2005
0
2006
0
2007
0
2008
70
2009
160
2010
55
2011
0
2012
0
2013
0
2014
0
2015
95
2016
1045
2017
1515
2018
1180
Correlation
R-Squared

"Asylee" Subsidiary Protection
No data
N/A
No data
N/A
1255
N/A
No data
N/A
No data
N/A
940
N/A
880
N/A
No data
N/A
1805
6310
2250
5335
1615
1465
1805
2265
2050
4495
3080
5565
3640
7625
3575
10270
4800
12090
5895
6385
6490
4205

Italy: Unemployment
Humanitarian Protection Displaced Persons Italy % of Total Unemployment Rate Youth Unemployment Rate
No data
0 No data
10.05%
No data
0 No data
9.01%
No data
1255
0.78%
8.47%
No data
0 No data
8.43%
No data
0 No data
8.00%
20.63%
4355
5295
0.62%
7.71%
21.60%
4340
5220
0.63%
6.79%
19.25%
No data
0 No data
6.08%
18.38%
1620
9805
1.16%
6.71%
18.88%
1475
9220
0.98%
7.75%
23.18%
1220
4355
0.93%
8.35%
26.82%
3075
7145
1.05%
8.35%
27.02%
15480
22025
0.98%
10.64%
33.75%
5750
14395
1.45%
12.13%
39.00%
9315
20580
1.31%
12.65%
41.30%
15770
29710
0.81%
11.89%
38.80%
18515
36450
0.85%
11.68%
36.48%
19515
33310
1.22%
11.22%
33.02%
19970
31845
1.85%
10.62%
30.40%
44.85%
36.10%
20.11%
13.03%

Italy: Unemployment, Figure 4.5396
Italy is far from alone among its EU neighbors in drawing supposed connections between
displaced persons, terrorism, and crime. The Council of Europe has also echoes this sentiment,
asserting in 2018 that there may be “infiltration of terrorists among refugees and migrants,” and
that “there is a real danger of radicalization…in refugee camps and detention centers.”397
However, there is relatively little empirical research on any connection between increased
acceptance of displaced persons and an uptick in terrorist activity, and most research that has
been conducted has similarly found little connection between international protection and
terrorism.398 Moreover, state policies making assumptions regarding public security and
396

The unemployment and youth unemployment data are drawn from the following datasets: OECD, Unmployment
Rate (indicator), (doi: 10.1787/52570002-en), https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart,
accessed on 19 August 2020; and OECD, Youth Unemployment Rate (indicator), (doi: 10.1787/c3634df7-en),
https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart, accessed on 19 August 2020.
397
Sahiba Gafarova, Radicalization of Migrants and Diaspora Communities in Europe, (Doc. 14625), 25 September
2018, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-en.asp?FileID=25054&lang=en.
398
Amanda Ekey, “The Effect of the Refugee Experience on Terrorist Activity,” Journal of Politics & International
Affairs 4 (2008):13–29; see also, Ali Khan, “A Legal Theory of International Terrorism,” Connecticut Law Review
19, no. 4 (1987): 945–972.
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international protection may even eventually become self-fulfilling prophecies. In 2016 Ben
Emmerson, then-UN Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, presented a report to the UN suggesting
that in the European context “migration policies which are restrictive or violate fundamental
human rights may in fact create conditions conducive to terrorism.”399
The results are similar in regard to the evidence of the presumed threat of displaced
persons to Italy’s economy and the jobs of its citizens. Indeed, the labor market in Italy actually
improved incrementally despite the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers arriving on its
shores and the tens of thousands of displaced persons it accepted annually. As Figure 4.5
demonstrates, the unemployment and youth unemployment rates improved in each year since
2014 despite displaced person arrivals and Italy’s share of the overall newly displaced population
being at record levels during that period. Even if one looks at more general economic indicators,
there appears to be no association between the levels of international protection provided and the
health of the Italian economy. If anything, increases in the number of displaced persons protected
is associated with economic growth and an increase in the per capita national income (see Figure
4.6).
The analysis in this chapter regarding the economic and labor effects of displaced persons
is also mirrored by studies of such effects in the context of other countries. Findings from those
studies have included increased trade activity, cheap labor, and more active entrepreneurial
activity that is a boon to certain sectors of the labor market.400 Among higher-income countries,
“Perception That Refugees Are More Prone to Radicalization Wrong and Dangerous – UN Rights Expert,” UN
News, 24 October 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/10/543592-perception-refugees-are-more-proneradicalization-wrong-and-dangerous-un-rights; see also, UN General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, (A/71/384), 13 September 2016,
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/285/61/PDF/N1628561.pdf?OpenElement.
400
See, e.g., Isabel Ruiz and Carlos Vargas-Silva, “The Labor Market Impacts of Forced Migration,” American
Economic Review 105, no. 5 (2015): 581-586.
399
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studies by organizations such as the OECD have pointed to limited impact of displaced persons
on unemployment.401

Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Correlation
R-Squared

Displaced Persons
0
0
1255
0
0
5295
5220
0
9805
9220
4355
7145
22025
14395
20580
29710
36450
33310
31845

Italy: Economic Indicators
% of Global Accepted DPs GDP Per Capita
No data $
27,080.00
No data $
28,040.00
0.78% $
28,720.00
No data $
29,110.00
No data $
29,450.00
0.62% $
30,020.00
0.63% $
32,260.00
No data $
33,900.00
1.16% $
35,270.00
0.98% $
34,360.00
0.93% $
34,860.00
1.05% $
36,180.00
0.98% $
36,000.00
1.45% $
36,070.00
1.31% $
36,200.00
0.81% $
36,900.00
0.85% $
39,920.00
1.22% $
41,790.00
1.85% $
42,790.00
88%
77%

Net National Income
$
22,991.00
$
23,813.00
$
24,251.00
$
24,546.00
$
24,873.00
$
25,364.00
$
27,289.00
$
28,530.00
$
29,162.00
$
28,367.00
$
28,671.00
$
29,697.00
$
29,384.00
$
29,399.00
$
29,611.00
$
29,965.00
$
32,959.00
$
34,655.00
$
35,736.00
87%
75%

Italy: Economic Indicators, Figure 4.6402
In sum, there is virtually no evidence to support an association between the number of
displaced persons to which Italy provided protection or its global share of accepted displaced
persons in a given year and its levels of terrorist activity, unemployment, or economic health.

401

OECD, Assessing the Contribution of Refugees to the Development of their Host Countries, (DEV/DOC(2017)1),
28 September 2017,
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC(2017)1&docLanguage=En;
see also, OECD (2013), “The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries”, in International Migration Outlook
2013, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-6-en.
402
The GDP Per Capita and Net National Income data are drawn from the following datasets: OECD, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) (indicator), (doi: 10.1787/dc2f7aec-en), accessed on 19 August 2020; and OECD, Net
National Income (indicator), (doi: 10.1787/af9be38a-en), https://data.oecd.org/natincome/net-national-income.htm,
accessed on 19 August 2020.
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The Securitization of International Protection
The legislative, procedural, and policy reforms instituted in Italy for the purposes of
spreading the “burden” of international protection around to the country’s global neighbors is
rooted in the securitization of displaced persons along the lines of public, economic and labor,
and fiscal security. In the Italian context, the fiscal securitization of displaced persons is a more
recent phenomenon. However, their public, economic, and labor securitization lines occurred
along roughly similar timelines largely due to the equation of displaced persons with “economic”
and “illegal” migrants in immigration legislation since at least the 1990s.
The disposition of Italian politics toward viewing all migrants as potential terrorists or
criminals until proven otherwise is reinforced by the rhetoric of political leaders throughout the
first two decades of the twenty-first century. In 2006, the Berlusconi-led government submitted a
response to the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance in
which it referred to all irregular migrants, including asylum seekers and displaced persons, as
being “easily involved in criminal activities.”403 However, one party in particular in Italy has
long been the most vocal regarding displaced persons as a threat to public security: Lega Nord
per l'Indipendenza della Padania (more popularly known as “Lega Nord” or simply as “La
Lega”). In fact, Lega Nord has long had at the center of its party platform the issue of curbing
irregular immigration, the category into which it lumps displaced persons seeking international
protection in Italy. The history of international protection in Italy is bookended by initiatives on
the part of La Lega.

403

Italian Remarks on the Draft Third Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(adopted on 16 December 2005) in European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Italy, p.
48, http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC-eng/ITA-CbC-III-2006-19-ENG.pdf, accessed
15 August 2020.
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While Italy has generally had net positive immigration since 1974 according to the UN
World Population Prospects survey, it was not until the twenty-first century that Italy had
sustained, multiple-decades long net positive immigration.404 Consequently, prior to the late
1990s and early 2000s Italy did not have a particularly robust set of immigration or asylum laws,
institutions, or procedures. Among the first of such laws was the 1998 Procedures Decree, which
created the legal grounds for a finding of inadmissibility for asylum seeker applications,
essentially disqualifying displaced persons from even seeking international protection in Italy.405
In part because early discussions of instituting such laws, institutions, and procedures were
wrapped up in debates on immigration more generally, from the early 2000s the topic of refugees
and asylum seekers was closely associated with that of “clandestine” (i.e. illegal) immigration. In
fact, such irregular immigration was not even criminalized until the passage of the so-called
“Bossi-Fini” law in July 2002.406 A brief history of the passage of this law itself helps to shed
light on the initial disposition of the Italian government toward asylum seekers and displaced
persons.
The Bossi-Fini law was originally proposed by then-leader of the Lega Nord party and
Minister for Institutional Reforms and Devolution Umberto Bossi in July of 2001.407 However, a
series of boat arrivals by asylum seekers in March 2002 prompted support for criminalizing such
“irregular” migration. First, on March 8, 2001 a ship carrying 50 asylum seekers sank off the

404

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Dynamics, 2019 Revision of World Population
Prospects, https://population.un.org/wpp/, accessed 14 August 2020.
405
Consolidated Act of Provisions Concerning Regulations on Immigration and Rules about the Conditions of
Aliens (aka the Procedure Decree), (Legislative Decree no. 286), 25 July 1998, Article 29,
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/58c2aa5e4.pdf,.
406
Legislative Decree no. 286/1998 “Consolidated Act on Provisions Concerning the Immigration Regulations and
Foreign National Conditions Norms,” amended by Law no. 189/2002 “Concerning Amendments on Immigration
and Asylum Laws.”
407
Claire O'Neill, “Chronology of Italian Political Events, 2001: The Return of Berlusconi,” Italian Politics 17
(2001): 1-27.

162

coast of Lampedusa—the now infamous asylum seeker destination. This was followed less than
two weeks later by the arrival of more than one thousand asylum seekers in Sicily’s second
largest city, Catania, after which a state of emergency was declared.408 Following criticism of the
government’s immigration policies, the Italian government’s passage of the July 2002 Bossi-Fini
law allowed most non-EU migrants to remain in Italy only if they had a contract of employment.
It also established Italy’s first institutions dedicated to the adjudication of asylum applications—
the “Territorial Commission”—the goal of which was to manage more carefully the flows of
asylum seekers arriving by land and sea.409 In 2018, this law was modified to stipulate that an
asylum seeker application may be found inadmissible if it was filed during the execution of a
removal order, the implication being that the application is being filed for the sole purpose of
delaying removal.410 This modification to the law was principally sponsored by Lega Nord leader
and then-Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, whose party
had recently found its way into the ruling coalition government with the second-most seats in
parliament.
Following the early days of Italy’s development of international protection regulations, it
began to participate in a number of regional burden-sharing mechanisms established by the EU
under the Dublin Regulation and Asylum Procedures Directive, the latter of which reinforced the
concept of “inadmissibility” in Italian law and introduced that of “safe country of origin.”411
Inadmissibility and safe country of origin now serve as the primary reasons that Italy’s
Territorial Commission uses to justify rejecting an asylum seekers application.
Fabio Serrichio and Elisa Craveri, “Chronology of Italian Political Events, 2002: The Second Berlusconi
Government,” Italian Politics 18 (2002): 1-18.
409
Law no. 189/2002 “Concerning Amendments on Immigration and Asylum Laws,” Article 10.
410
Procedure Decree, Article 29-bis.
411
Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/32/Eu Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 26
June 2013 On Common Procedures For Granting And Withdrawing International Protection (Recast), (Official
Journal of Legislation 180/60-180/95; 29.6.2013, 2013/32/EU), 29 June 2013.
408
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Italy now maintains a list of countries that it considers to be “safe countries of origin,”
which must be updated and filed with the European commission periodically according to the
country’s Procedure Decree.412 If an asylum seeker whose country of origin is on this list of safe
countries of origin applies for protection in Italy, their application may be immediately rejected
as manifestly unfounded. As of October 2019, this list includes 13 countries, specifically
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kosovo, North Macedonia,
Morocco, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia and Ukraine.
Italy has maintained a series of foreign policy measures throughout the first two decades
of the twenty-first century that have drastically impinged upon the ability of refugees to arrive
and seek asylum within its borders. Beyond the Dublin System, relocation schemes, and EUTurkey Statement described in Chapter 2, Italy has had a long-standing history of cooperation
with Libya dating back at least to the year 2000. The goal of that relationship was, at base, to
reduce sea arrivals of asylum seekers and other migrants launching crafts from along the Libyan
border to combat terrorist activity as well as illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, and
organized crime. However, despite having ratified the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and
providing for the right to asylum in Article 10 of its 2011 interim Constitutional Declaration,
Libya had no formal asylum laws or procedures for granting asylum in its country during any
point of the period 1999-2018.413 Thus, the return of asylum seekers to Libya is of questionable
legality given the possibility of refoulement that could result.

412

Procedure Decree, Article 2-bis(1).
Libya Constitutional Declaration (2011), Article 11, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b645f5d4.html; see also:
Amnesty International, Libya's Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-bound Refugees and Migrants,
December 2017, p. 7, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2fa1cb4.html.
413
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Many of these early agreements with Libya remain unpublished,414 so their exact contents
are not known with certainty, but the first of these agreements signed in December 2000
obligated each country to assist the others in preventing “irregular immigration” to Italy and the
second in 2003 set out operational guidelines for that arrangement.415 Further agreements in 2006
and 2007 elaborated that Libya patrolled its coastline and nearby international waters using ships
loaned to them by the Italian Navy.416 A further agreement in 2008 emphasized commitments of
each country to prevent irregular migration while also implementing a satellite detection system
financed by Italy intended to prevent migrants from reaching Libya’s coast and boarding vessels
in the first place.417 Italy has been repeatedly censured by UNHCR for expelling and repatriating
asylum seekers arriving by boat without properly adjudicating their applications for protection.418
While the migration restriction arrangements were suspended in 2012 due to the civil war
in Libya and a European Court of Human Rights judgement ordering an end to migrant returns to
Libya,”419 an agreement was signed in 2017 with the newly established Libyan government that
renewed commitments to preventing irregular migration.420 The 2017 Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) is the most recent iteration of the irregular migration agreements instituted

Mariagiulia Giuffré, “State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for Italy’s Push Backs to Libya?,”
International Journal of Refugee Law 24, no. 4 (2012): 692-734.
415
Accordo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista per la
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between Italy and Libya. The 2017 MoU, as well as the agreements that preceded it, makes no
distinction whatsoever between refugees and any other category of migrants. Rather, the Libyan
authorities attempt to prevent all those attempting to reach Italy from doing so without
ascertaining their asylum status.421 One could perhaps assert that refugees have merely been
caught in the crossfire during attempts by Italy to curb illegal migration. However, given that
more than 30 percent of all migrants to Italy during the period 2014-2018 were refugees, it is not
unreasonable to assume that Italy specifically hoped to block the arrival of refugees in order to
avoid being obligated to protect them.
Italy also signed a 2016 Memorandum of Understanding with Sudan that is still in effect
and has similar goals to those concluded with Libya, although it appears to have gone farther in
regard to implementation. However, this MoU is an agreement made between the DirectorsGeneral of Italy and Sudan’s respective police forces, Franco Gabrielli and Hashim Osman el
Hussein.422 Unlike the MoU with Libya, this agreement allowed for the deportation of Sudanese
nationals already present in Italy that had migrated irregularly without affording them the
opportunity to apply for asylum.423
In 2018, Italy’s Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini also issued a “Safety Decree,”
known colloquially as the “Salvini Decree,” which introduced several new provisions that made
it more difficult for refugees to receive protection in Italy. These include not paying the legal
fees of applicants filing appeals that are ultimately deemed inadmissible, a broad expansion of
bars to receiving political asylum for “terrorist activity,” stricter identification requirements, and,
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most importantly, the elimination of an entire category of protection for those granted asylum
known as “Humanitarian Protection.”424 The elimination of humanitarian protection is a
particularly devastating blow to displaced persons seeking international protection given that in
the first two decades of the twenty-first century nearly one-half of all those granted protection in
Italy were approved under humanitarian protection provisions.425
Thus, since the initial introduction of robust legal institutions for addressing immigration
generally as well as international protection, Italy has long maintained only a thin line between
asylum seeker and illegal immigrant. It has routinely passed legislation that viewed asylum
seekers in a sinister light as potential terrorists or human traffickers rather than potential
refugees. It regularly sought to reduce its share of the burden of providing international
protection by instituting a series of regulations making itself inhospitable to displaced persons.
These included stipulating a list of “safe” countries from which it would not accept asylum
applications, retaining agreements allowing for the return of asylum seekers to countries such as
Libya and Sudan, participating in EU burden-sharing programs such as the Dublin System,
emergency relocation schemes, and the EU-Turkey deal, maintaining wide latitude on the part of
its Territorial Commission to find applications for protection inadmissible.
Beyond the securitization of displaced persons as potential terrorists and criminals, there
has also historically been little distinction made politically between so-called “economic
migrants” illegally seeking employment in Italy and displaced persons seeking protection.
Indeed, early reforms to the Italian migration system drew virtually no distinction in this regard,
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simply referring to those arriving without a visa as “clandestine immigrants” seeking to sneak
into the country.426
Perhaps this is not surprising given that political asylum was not a status available to
most displaced persons in Italy until the passage of the 1989 Martelli Law.427 The surges in the
number of displaced person arrivals from Eastern Europe and Somalia that followed during the
1990s led to a redefinition of immigration in general as an emergency issue requiring the
restriction of new arrivals.428 The passage of the Turco-Napolitano Act in 1998 eventually
established Italy’s first administrative immigration detention regime, the purpose of which was,
among other things, to help sort those entitled to international protection from those migrating
strictly to seek unauthorized employment.429 Thus, by the beginning of the twenty-first century
Italy had only relatively recently begun to distinguish between economic migrants and those in
need of asylum.
The media coverage that the issue of displaced person arrivals received in Italy did little
to bolster public awareness of these individuals’ need for protection. UNHCR has noted Italy’s
history of media-driven employment-based framing of displaced persons,430 and one scholar’s
media analysis of Italy found that displaced persons, especially those originating from the
African continent, have historically been characterized by Italian media as “a tidal wave of
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desperate people fleeing poverty and warfare at home trying to enter the elusive European El
Dorado.”431 Media analyses of the Italian public demonstrate a degree of audience acceptance
insofar as those described as originating from the African continent are most often labelled as
“economic migrants” rather than “refugees” or some other category of displaced person absent
any evidence to substantiate their motives for migrating.432 Several studies have also documented
the legitimation of anti-immigrant hostility predicated on the economic exclusion of Italian
citizens resulting from migrant arrivals by political elites.433 Among the most significant among
those political elites has been the political party Lega Nord per L’Indipendenza della Padania,
usually referred to simply as “Lega Nord” or “La Lega.”
As Lega Nord rose to prominence and eventually electoral success in 2018, it did so on a
wave of far-right nationalist sentiment predicated on protecting Italy from the mass influxes of
boat migrants originating from along the North African coast. To some extent, this nationalist
message conflating economic migrants with displaced persons was conditioned by Lega Nord’s
complicated history as a party. Although the party rebranded itself unofficially as “Lega” in the
runup to the 2018 elections, it still retained its original full name, which included the moniker
“per L’Indipendenza della Padania.” The reason for this name is that the party’s founder,
Umberto Bossi, had as his original goal to protect the more economically prosperous northern
portion of Italy (named “Padania” by Lega) from immigration from Italy’s less prosperous
southern regions. Therefore, to protect jobs and maintain prosperity in the north of Italy from
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floods of southern low-skill workers, Lega proposed that Padania become administratively and
financially autonomous from the Italian state.434
Decades later, as Lega Nord rose to prominence in Italy’s ruling coalition government in
2018, the locus of its concern with labor migration has shifted largely to North Africa. Just as
Lega made no distinction between its own countrymen from the south and foreign “economic
migrants” previously, there is a similar lack of distinction made between those migrating to Italy
from the African continent strictly for employment reasons and those doing so to seek
international protection. While the nationality of the immigrant group at which Lega has directed
its ire has oscillated throughout its three-decade long history, it has rarely drawn distinctions
among them regarding their actual motives for migrating. It is unsurprising, therefore, that
Lega’s entry into Italy’s ruling coalition government in 2018—and the insertion of its leader,
Matteo Salvini, as the head of Italy’s Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for processing
asylum seeker claims—occasioned a series of burden-sharing initiatives that verged on violations
of Italy’s international protection obligations.
The most important of the initiatives was the issuance of a safety decree in 2018, which
introduced several new provisions that made it more difficult for refugees to receive protection in
Italy principally by eliminating an entire category of complementary protection called
“Humanitarian Protection.”435 In the first two decades of the twenty-first century nearly one-half
of all those granted protection in Italy were approved under humanitarian protection
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provisions.436 In practice, this means that asylum seekers would be required to qualify for
protection under the provisions of either “refugee status” or “subsidiary protection status,” the
requirements for which are detailed in Chapter 2.
This is made practically impossible for certain displaced persons depending on the
country from which they originate, especially following the adoption of a subsequent decree by
Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio on 4 October 2019 designating a list of thirteen countries
as “safe.”437 These supposedly safe countries include Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cape Verde, Ghana, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Morocco, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia
and Ukraine. However, the decree does not offer any indication regarding the reasoning or
followed determining which countries should be considered “safe.”438 Moreover, Italy’s
Commissione Nazionale per il Diritto di Asilo, which directs and guides the country’s Territorial
Commission, issued instructions on 28 and 31 October 2019 indicating that any asylum seeker
originating from one of the countries on the list would automatically be assumed to be migrating
to Italy for reasons other than being in need of international protection.439
This process has turned the asylum process into an “illegality factory” of sorts, deeming
even those who are truly displaced as irregular migrants, the presumption being that they are
really economic migrants, not asylum seekers.440 Aside from potentially violating international
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legal obligations under the Refugee Convention regarding non-foulement, this also implies that
one’s point of origin determines eligibility for international protection, creating a condition
where “‘deserving’ migrants from Syria, for instance (a very small proportion of the migrants
arriving in Italy), and not those that were supposedly only arriving for economic opportunity, or
the ‘undeserving’ migrants coming in via Libya” had even the possibility of protection.441
Aside from procedural rule changes and the introduction of legal provisions intended to
tighten national restrictions on asylum, Italy has also engaged in burden-sharing intended to
prevent putative “economic migrants” from landing on its shores in a more direct fashion—
physically blocking their arrival. In one prominent instance, Italy’s Ministry of the Interior
engaged in a two-week standoff with a German rescue ship off the coast of the Italian port city
and immigration “hotspot” of Lampedusa. The ship had rescued 53 individuals who were
stranded on an inflatable raft in the middle of the Mediterranean in June 2019 and attempted to
drop them in Lampedusa.
However, Salvini implemented a “closed port” policy and refused to allow their entry
unless other EU countries agreed to adjudicate the applications of the asylum seekers on
board.442 Although this standoff ended when five EU countries—Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and Portugal—agreed to accept the asylum seekers, the Italian government cited
this as an example of successful burden-sharing.443 Indeed, two months later in August 2019
similar events unfolded when Salvini refused to let a Spanish rescue ship with over 150
individuals on board who had been rescued at sea, tweeting “why doesn’t the Open Arms go to
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Spain.”444 In an effort to give a retroactive legal bases to such bans on entry at Italian ports, the
Italian government later passed Legislative Decree 53/2019 on 14 June 2019, which imposed
fines on ship captains disembarking rescued migrants and asylum seekers without authorization
in sums between €150,000 to €1,000,000.445
Although the narrative oscillated under Salvini between referring to asylum seekers
arriving by sea as “non-refugees”446 and wanting to save Italy from economic damage resulting
from being the “refugee camp of Europe,”447 the economic security mandate that he appeared to
possess in pursuing burden-sharing Italian burden-sharing clearly demonstrates international
protection as a securitized issue in Italy.
It is only in the relatively recent past following the 2015 Refugee crisis and the rise of the
Lega Nord party that intense scrutiny of the fiscal impact of refugees and other displaced persons
became a popular matter of national concern. Indeed, for much of the twenty-first century Italy
underwent a dramatic expansion of the benefits available to displaced persons at the expense of
Italian taxpayers. As it sought to implement and comply with the EU’s Common European
Asylum System, Italy passed laws guaranteeing means-tested benefits such as legal assistance,
monthly financial allowances, housing, daily pocket money, and even pre-paid phone cards.448
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However, reductions in benefits in the name of fiscal security began in earnest in October
2018, with the passage of a decree amending the previous financial assistance packages.449 This
decree reduced the amount that the Italian state was willing to pay to reception centers for
refugees from €35 to €21. This amount is meant to pay for food, shelter, integration education,
and social work for asylum seekers housed at those facilities. Such reductions in payment have
caused the contractors providing housing to reduce the quality of accommodations as well as to
cut staff.450 This has also had the practical effect of making conditions less hospitable for asylum
seekers, who are regularly reshuffled to more economical facilities.451
Italy has also pursued EU-wide attempts at burden-sharing. In 2016, with the support of
Italy Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, the European Commission proposed a reform of the Dublin
Regulation, the EU’s primary burden-sharing legislation. The proposal involved establishing a
quota system with a mandatory monetary penalty—a €250,000 “solidarity contribution”—for
each asylum applicant that a state refused to accept below its minimum required quota. The goal
behind the plan was to get states that were not primary recipients of displaced persons to help
offset the fiscal costs associated with them for states that were, such as Italy.452
A second proposal was also advanced by the European Commission with the initial
support of the Italian government in 2019, although Italy later scorned the proposal due to the
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low levels of fiscal support being offered. The proposal suggested that each EU member state
receive a fixed monetary payment of €6,000 for each displaced person that is agreed to accept.453
The hope was that each of these proposed schemes would serve to incentivize the participation of
the member states by offering the prospect of a private good (i.e. the avoidance of monetary
penalties or the prospect of monetary gains, respectively). Regardless, neither of these proposals
ultimately materialized as binding burden-sharing schemes. As a practical consequence of such
lack of fiscal cooperation among EU members on international protection, there remains
persistent popular perception and media fixation on the idea that displaced persons are simply
too fiscally burdensome the Italian state to manage.454

Conclusion
The findings in this chapter are largely in keeping with the literature on the securitization
of migration and displaced persons discussed in Chapter 2. There has long been a kind of “politics
of unease” surrounding displaced persons insofar as they have frequently been lumped together
with other categories of migrants and associated with various threats deemed to be posed by those
groups as well. More specifically, criminal activity and economic and labor migration have long
been presumed to be associated displaced persons largely because the legislation regulating
immigration in Italy often fails to distinguish between displaced persons and other migrants.
Displaced persons also tend to travel to Italy alongside non-forced migrants along similar routes,
which reinforces this lack of distinction.
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Persistent unemployment and large budget deficits in Italy for most of the second decade
of the twenty-first century have also brought increasing relevance to the far-right La Lega party,
which has long championed an anti-immigration platform. The party’s brief stints in the ruling
coalition have, unsurprisingly, been accompanied by significant increases in the securitization of
displaced persons and the institution of various burden-sharing initiatives.
Yet there is little evidence to support such securitization. Indeed, as the analysis in this
chapter suggests, in the long-term the fiscal costs of displaced persons are negligible. Similarly,
there is virtually little association whatsoever between displaced persons and terrorism, economic,
or labor indicators. Thus, the burden-sharing initiatives pursued by Italy are not supported or
justified by the empirical evidence presented in this chapter.
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CONCLUSION
The above chapters sought to answer three primary research questions: (1) what is burdensharing, where does it come from, and how has it evolved over time?; (2) To what extent and
how is international protection a burden to developed states?; and (3) how and why do states
such as the United States and Italy practice burden-sharing? In answering these questions, the
dissertation’s purpose was ultimately to evaluate possible justifications for state burden-sharing
initiatives in regard to the protection of displaced persons. In doing so, it evaluated the claim that
providing international protection to displaced persons is contrary to the public, economic and
labor, and fiscal security interests of developed states by examining the cases of the United
States and Italy. Having found that the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 and 4 does not
support state burden-sharing policies on the basis that displaced persons really are “burdens” in
the case of both countries, the dissertation proposed an alternative explanation for why states
engage in burden-sharing behavior—the social construction of international protection as a threat
to state security interests.
The first chapter addresses the origins and evolution of burden-sharing in order to attempt
to answer the first research question. It describes the ideational development of international
protection of displaced persons from the mid-seventeenth century to the twenty-first and notes
the early associations of the notion of burden-sharing with that of international protection by
states. The notion of burden-sharing is perceptible even in the language of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, which is the foundational agreement on which all modern international protection
institutions and policies are predicated. Finally, the chapter describes the transposition of the
international protection and burden-sharing concepts into various regional and global agreements
and some of the different practices and terminology that emerged. The chapter concludes by
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noting that despite the various obligations to which states have agreed, the perception by states
that they have an interest in burden-sharing has greatly impeded the protection of displaced
persons. The chapter concludes by describing the disjointed relationship between global and
national international protection institutions, which facilitates state assertions of sovereignty and,
ultimately, allows for burden-sharing behavior.
The second chapter discussed the theory and methods relevant to the empirical
examination of claims regarding international protection and state security interests. It lays the
groundwork for the theoretical perspective taken throughout the empirical sections of the
dissertation in Chapters 3 and 4. The theory portion of the chapter focuses on securitization
theory, which serves as the principal logic of the dissertation for the purposes of trying to explain
state burden-sharing behavior. This section argues that states construct their perceptions of
security intersubjectively, and consequently the issue of migration generally and displaced
persons more specifically is not inherently security-related. Rather, what constitutes a state’s
security interest is socially constructed through a securitizing process, and state burden-sharing
initiatives are pursued on the basis of addressing those securitized interests.
The chapter also discusses the methods and research design used in Chapters 3 and 4 to
tests these arguments is also elaborated upon in this chapter. These include process tracing and
fiscal impact analysis. Fiscal impact analysis is used to examine Italy and the United States’
fiscal security interests as they related to international protection by comparing the tax revenues
and government expenditures generated by displaced persons in each country. Process tracing,
on the other hand, is used more generally as a means of understanding the process by which
states construct the security concerns upon which their burden-sharing initiatives are predicated.
Congruence analysis is proposed as the mode by which to compare the analyses of the United
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States and Italy in order to determine if the results in each case are sufficiently similar as to
suggest some degree of generalizability among similar cases. This allows for at least a nascent
degree of theory-building regarding why developed states engage in burden-sharing.
The third and fourth chapters examine the second and third research questions. They each
begin by presenting structural elements of international protection and burden-sharing in the
United States and Italy to help clarify the means by which each state has and can engage with the
securitization of displaced persons and facilitate burden-sharing initiatives.
For example, the structure and functioning of the USRAP program through which the
United States accepts refugees for resettlement in coordination with UNHCR is essential for
understanding why it is one of the more direct means by which the United States has engaged in
burden-sharing. That is, because the cap on the maximum number of refugees that will be
accepted through the USRAP program is determined on a yearly, ad hoc basis by the President,
lowering the refugee resettlement cap is a burden-sharing policy that newly-elected governments
may engage in with relative ease. Attempting to lower the number of asylees accepted through
applications with USCIS must be done more indirectly, however, since many of the standards on
which asylum is based are established by law. This is important for understanding the discussion
in Chapter 3 regarding the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations’ INS rule changes that
denied work permits to certain classes of asylum seekers as a means of encouraging them to seek
asylum elsewhere. These administrations could not simply instruct INS to deny more
applications, since in practice asylum interviews are conducted on a case-by-case basis and the
legality of instituting a cap on asylees is highly questionable.
Similarly, in Italy the relatively nascent nature of international protection legislation and
institutions as well as the plethora of EU burden-sharing institutions with which Italy is actively
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engaged condition the means by which the Italian government has generally pursued burdensharing initiatives. For example, the periodic influence of the La Lega party and the
concentration of authority in Italy’s Ministry of the Interior related to the construction of asylum
and refugee policy allowed for swift legislative and executive action on the part of Lega’s
political leaders when finding themselves in positions of power.
Each chapter also addresses the second and third research questions directly and provide
relatively congruent answers to each. In answer to the question of to what extent and how
international protection is a burden to developed states, both the United States and Italy find that
it is in fact not much of a burden at all. Examining the impact of displaced persons from the
perspective of public security, economic and labor security, and fiscal security, neither state
found a strong association between their protection and negative security consequences.
Despite these findings, both states demonstrably practice burden-sharing as regular facets
of their national policies on international protection. Thus, in answer to the question of how and
why states such as the United States and Italy practice burden-sharing, the specific answer varies
somewhat due to structural differences in each country, but in both cases the securitization of
international protection along public, economic and labor, and fiscal lines is evident.
The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 indicates that displaced persons are found to engage in
terrorist activity at lower rates even than each state’s native-born population. They also do not
appear to have a clear negative impact on either state’s economy or on its unemployment or
youth unemployment rates. Finally, displaced persons are found to contribute taxes equal to or in
excess of the government benefits that they receive over the long-term. Over a two-decade
period, the United States was shown in Chapter 3 essentially to break-even regarding the costs
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association with displaced persons, and in Chapter 4 Italy appears to turn a significant profit.
And yet states persist in engaging in burden-sharing initiatives.
In the United States, the denial of work authorization for asylum seekers, the initiation of
bilateral safe third country agreements (albeit with states that even the United States government
does not consider particularly “safe), and the lowering of caps on refugee resettlement in order to
allow for better “vetting” or “screening” and to prevent the admission of terrorists are examples
of burden-sharing policies predicated on securitized notions of displaced persons as terrorists,
job-stealers, and basket-cases. Likewise in Italy, the framing of displaced persons as
“clandestine” economic migrants and human traffickers have been used to justify a variety of
burden-sharing policies. These have included the Italian government’s refusal to help migrants
stranded at sea for fear of having to adjudicate their asylum applications, actively refouling
asylum seekers and refugees to the Libyan coast, pushing for emergency relocations of displaced
persons to other EU states, and sometimes even delivering displaced persons into the custody of
the Sudanese police based on secret agreements.
In sum, the empirical analyses in this dissertation suggest that Italy and the United States
represent relatively congruent cases of developed states that pursue burden-sharing initiatives
related to international protection predicate on securitized notions of displaced persons despite a
lack of evidence to substantiate them as security threats. However, the issue of international
protection need not be securitized, and states need not engage in burden-sharing. Just as
displaced persons have been securitized through a process of social construction, so they may be
“de-securitized” through a process of social deconstruction. The recharacterization of an issue in
a security context is generally a negative development because it often represents a failure on the
part of domestic or international society to deal with issues through a normal political process.
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That is, ideally routine policy issues that states must regularly address—including international
protection—ought to be dealt with via normal societal procedures. When an issue is securitized,
it is couched in the language of “threats.” This allows it to be addressed with a pre-political
immediacy that erodes the types of oversight and debate that check the taking of perceptiondriven extreme measures even when they run contrary to state interests.
On certain issues, securitization is perhaps unavoidable, as is the case when states face
existential military threats to their survival. However, as Buzan et al. argue, “desecuritization is
the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as ‘threats against which
we have countermeasures’ but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the
ordinary public sphere.”455 It is never too late to bring a securitized issue back into the realm of
normal politics and recalibrate policymakers’ disposition toward it.456
This is particularly true in the case of providing international protection.457 Despite
displaced persons’ construction as security threats, they do not represent an inherent hazard to
state security given the dearth of evidence to support this notion. The choice to view displaced
persons as a threat to public safety, jobs, and budgets is only one of many potential alternative
framings. States can choose to focus on the positive effects that international protection has on
the human beings they are protecting rather than fixate on the chimerical security ramifications
of accepting refugees. To equate the threat posed by those displaced from their homes who
traverse thousands of miles in search of sanctuary with an existential threat to the state on par
with a military invasion is merely a tortured analogy, not a reasonable comparison. By
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reconstituting the act of international protection as one of humanitarianism rather than one of
security, it is possible to shift the locus of attention from burden-sharing to its rightful place—
protecting displaced persons. It is only then that practical reforms may be implemented to
improve international protection.

The Global Compact on Refugees as a Gateway for Reform?
When such de-securitized space does exist for reforming international protection in a
post-burden-sharing focused world, a practical blueprint for reform has already been proposed
that, with some modifications, would greatly improve the protection of displace persons. The
Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was developed by UNHCR and affirmed by a resolution the
UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018.458 It is the most significant instrument for the
reform of international policy on displaced persons in decades, albeit a greatly imperfect one.
Beyond being primarily aspirational in nature (given its non-binding status) and lacking
mechanisms to encourage compliance, the GCR is heavily concentrated on burden-sharing,
making 19 separate references to the concept in the document.459
The GCR also focuses almost entirely on refugees (implicitly those meeting the 1951
Refugee Convention definition) while making virtually no reference to complementary,
subsidiary, or other types of temporary protection.460 This is a significant omission given that a
far greater number of displaced persons fall into these categories than meet the 1951 Refugee
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Convention definition. Finally, while the GCR was affirmed by nearly all states in the UN
General Assembly, it also suffers from a lack of support by the world’s largest refugee
recipient—the United States—which voted against it.461
However, the GCR does call for the development of a three-year strategy the objective of
which is to “increase the pool of resettlement places, including countries not already
participating in global resettlement efforts; as well as to consolidate emerging resettlement
programmes [sic].”462 Consequently, the Global Compact’s affirmation by 181 states formed the
foundation for practical reform proposals from UNHCR—which was the body that had produced
the text of the GCR.463 UNHCR’s June 2019 Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement
and Complementary Pathways (hereafter “the Strategy”) is intended as a blueprint for boosting
the number of state resettlement programs and improving the availability and predictability of
complementary pathways for protection. With some additions, the Strategy forms the basis for a
durable and readily actionable plan for the reform of international protection, especially since it
leverages existing global institutions and calls for the expansion and enhancement of formal
programs that already exist.464
The Strategy focuses on three principal goals: (1) an enormous scaling up of existing
resettlement programs and adding more states to the roster of resettlement countries; (2)
improving “complementary pathways” for refugees to access protection more swiftly; and (3)
promoting cultures of inclusiveness in host states to enhance refugees’ ability to integrate
successfully into their new societies.465 The third of these objectives is related to the
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identification of securitization processes in the preceding chapters. Only when the image of
displaced persons as threatening invaders in host countries is replaced with the more accurate
vision of them as functional participants in their host society can any durable, practical reforms
be achieved.
Beyond increasing acceptance of refugees and other displaced persons, the first of the
goals identified above is essential. As discussed in previous chapters, refugee resettlement as it
exists today is insufficient to address the scale and immediacy of refugee protection needs. As of
2018, only 27 countries had established resettlement programs and the United States was
historically responsible for nearly one-fourth of all refugees resettled.466 The addition of states—
both in the developed and developing world—to UNHCR’s resettlement roster and the modelling
of new programs on existing ones would allow for rapid adoption and enhanced resettlement
capabilities.
That said, as noted in the case of the United States in Chapter 3, allowing states to set
their own annual caps unnecessarily politicizes the issues of refugee resettlement. It allows
incoming national administrations hostile to migration to shift course abruptly by suddenly
reducing the number of refugees they are willing to accept for resettlement in any given year.
Thus, a key addition to resettlement program expansion would be the negotiation of a global
quota system allocating percentages of yearly refugee resettlement needs to receiving states on
an impartial, technocratic basis. This would be exceedingly preferable compared to the status
quo of leaving such decisions to the participating states themselves, which ultimately is a
contributing factor to the relative paucity of refugees currently resettled annually. Given the
findings in this dissertation that displaced persons are not as burdensome as they have generally

466

UNHCR, Information on UNHCR Resettlement, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/information-on-unhcrresettlement.html, accessed 20 November 2020.

185

been characterized to be, removing such decisions from the calculus of national governments
would enhance refugee protection without harming states’ security interests.
Finally, enhancing complementary pathways to international protection is perhaps the
lynchpin of these reform goals. While UNHCR’s Strategy focuses on expanding such pathways
for refugees specifically—e.g. streamlining family reunification, allowing for community
sponsorship, and other opportunities467—it would be much more impactful to enhance the
availability of complementary pathways for displaced persons not necessarily meeting the 1951
Convention definition of a refugee.
This would mean expanding the scope of UNHCR’s refugee status determinations
(RSDs) to include evaluations of eligibility for displaced persons in need of complementary
and/or temporary forms of protection (e.g. subsidiary or humanitarian protection in the EU; or
Temporary Protected Status in the US). By doing so, officials conducting RSDs would be able to
consider asylum seekers for any form of protection for which they might be eligible. Moreover,
achieving the first goal of greatly expanding the number of states participating in refugee
resettlement programs would allow UNHCR to use RSDs to adjudicate qualification for various
regional and national forms of protection in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas that are not
contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention. This would facilitate the efficient placement of
displaced persons in states whose protection offerings correspond to their own protection needs.
This greatly contrasts with the global status quo which requires displaced persons to
traverse the world in search of states whose asylum qualification criteria correspond to the
reasons for which they have fled their respective homelands. Moreover, such a reformed system
of RSD would allow for the organized regionalization of temporary protection, allowing for
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more rapid repatriation of temporarily displaced persons when conditions in their countries of
origin improve. Given that national asylum systems generally conduct their own RSDs in a
similar manner by considering applicants for a range of national protective statuses, the reform
of UNHCR’s RSD process to include evaluating qualification for a wide range of international,
regional, and national protections would effectively constitute merely a consolidation of dozens
of national asylum procedures into a single process. This would, however, require an enormous
expansion UNHCR’s funding as well as its mandate, since at present the organization only has
the authority to make international protection findings based on the Refugee Convention.
Ultimately, expanding the scope of formalized refugee resettlement programs to include
all regions of the world as well as taking the refugee, complementary, and temporary protection
evaluation processes out of states’ hands would enhance international protection. These reforms
would allow costs savings for states, which would no longer need to maintain robust asylum
apparatuses. They would also increase access to protection for displaced persons while achieving
a more equitable distribution of those requiring temporary protection among the various states
and regions of the world. This would have the residual effect of allaying any lingering burdensharing concerns states may continue to have. These reforms would also defang one of the
greatest impetuses for states to engage in burden-sharing—the perception that other states aren’t
doing their fair share in terms of participating in the international protection process. Finally,
they would reinforce the de-securitization of displaced persons and enhance their access to
international protection. By turning international protection into a regularized international
bureaucratic process rather than a highly charged, regular political battle, these reforms would
allow for a world in which more than a mere 5 percent of displaced persons are able to receive
needed protections.
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APPENDIX: A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
The terminology associated with international protection and burden-sharing is often ill-defined
and can vary enormously in meaning across different states, regions, and jurisdictions.468 While
some of this confusion can be explained by non-experts discussing highly specialized forms of
law and policy, the role of states in administering international protection has also resulted in
certain terms having different meanings depending on the jurisdiction in which they are used.
While some terms are explicitly defined in international legal instruments, such as “refugee”,
many are not, such as “migrant.” Still other, such as “burden-sharing” can vary in meaning even
within the context of international protection depending on the context in which they are used.
Therefore, it is necessary to specify the exact meaning of certain terms used in this dissertation
for the sake of clarity. To do so is common for studies discussing international protection due to
the varying jurisdictions inevitably involved in such analyses and their particular lexical
distinctions.469
This dissertation uses as its case studies the United States and Italy, the latter of which is
a European Union (EU) member state. Both the United States and Italy have highly developed
policies and procedures relating to international protection. However, while both country’s use
certain similar terminology, those terms often have subtle but important differences in meanings.
Moreover, Italy has the complicating element that while it does retain certain terminology unique
to its own asylum system and refugee resettlement programs, it also borrows part of its
procedural lexicon directly from EU directives and statutes. Thus, this note seeks to define and
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clarify the specialized language used in this dissertation to avoid definitional misunderstandings,
especially as relates specifically to the cases of the United States and Italy.

Migrant
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there is no formal
international legal definition of a migrant despite the term’s frequent usage as an umbrella term
to describe all those in transit from one country to another.470 The United States’ definition of the
term reflects such broadness, describing a migrant as “a person who leaves his/her country of
origin to seek residence in another country.”471 Some international bodies have, however, offered
definitions. UNESCO defines a migrant broadly as “any person who lives temporarily or
permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social
ties to this country.”472
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
however, says that the term “migrant” should only be used to describe those for whom the
decision to migrate “is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal
convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor.”473 Thus, for example,
the migrant label is utilized in the term “migrant worker” to describe those working in a foreign
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state whose migration was voluntary and who could leave that country if they chose to do so
without fearing persecution or other serious harm.474
The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights has suggested three criteria
for a potential legal definition of “migrants,” describing them as those who are: (a) outside their
state of citizenship and not subject to its legal protection while present in the territory of another
State; (b) not enjoying the general legal recognition of rights accompanying the status of refugee,
naturalized person, or a similar status; and (c) not enjoying legal protection of their fundamental
rights by virtue of diplomatic agreements, visas, or other agreements.475 In short, while there is
no universal definition of who constitutes a migrant, a number of prominent definitions of the
term suggest that they are specifically not refugees or an otherwise forcibly displaced
individuals. Migrants freely choose to leave their country of origin to transit to another country;
they are not forced to do so.

Asylum Seeker
The term “asylum seeker” refers to any individual who has filed a request for some form
of international protection but who has not yet received a decision.476 The term consequently
includes both displaced persons as well as other categories of migrants filing applications for
international protection. Asylum seekers are not generally presumed to be entitled to
international protection simply by virtue of having applied for it. That said, the recognition of
eligibility for international protection is declaratory in nature, meaning that asylum seekers who
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do, in fact, constitute displaced persons, were already displaced before applying for asylum. The
grant of asylum merely formally recognizes them as having a status that they already possessed.
There have been instances during mass influxes of asylum seekers during which a prima
facie approach to the granting of certain forms of international protection has been used.477 That
is, when circumstances suggest that many members of a group may constitute displaced persons,
preliminary “group determinations” may be made without having conducted individual status
determinations. In such circumstances, asylum seeker in the group is considered eligible for
international protection prima facie (i.e. accepted as such until proven otherwise).478 Prima facie
determinations may only be positive, however, since rejected applications require individual
assessments.479 In sum, while asylum seekers cannot generally be assumed to be displaced
persons, neither can they be assumed not to be in the absence of clarifying evidence.

Displaced Person
While a “migrant” is an individual whose movement is voluntarily, international transit
of a “displaced person” is forced and involuntary, and is typically caused by armed conflict,
natural disaster, famine, development, or economic changes.480 Displaced persons may be
subdivided into three groups: (1) internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have fled their home
locality, but who remain within the borders of their country of origin; (2) refugees, who have fled
their country of origin in search of protection internationally and fit the formal Refugee

477

UNHCR, Guidelines on the Application in Mass Influx Situations of the Exclusion Clauses of Article 1F of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 February 2006,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f48c0b4.html.
478
UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, (HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3), December 2011,
para. 44.
479
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 11, (HCR/GIP/15/11), 24 June 2015.
480
UNESCO, Displaced Person/Displacement, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-humansciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/displaced-person-displacement/.

191

Convention definition of a “refugee;” and (3) those who have fled their country of origin in
search of (usually temporary) international protection, but who do not meet the formal definition
of a refugee.

Internally Displaced Person (IDP)
Although IDPs are not the focus of this dissertation, it is useful to understand who they
are to make clear which displaced persons are not considered as part of this dissertation’s
arguments. There is no formal definition of an “internally displaced person” (IDP), but UNHCR
has offered some guidance in this regard. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee, or leave, their homes
or places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, and habitual
violations of human rights, as well as natural or man-made disasters involving one or more of
these elements, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”481
Thus, IDPs are forced to flee the locales in which they live (i.e. they do not migrate
voluntarily), but they remain inside the borders of their home country rather than crossing an
international border. While they may be unable to avail themselves of the protection of their
home state, they remain within the sovereign purview of that state. More than 58 percent of all
displaced persons were IDPs in 2017.482 UNHCR does not have an explicit mandate for
protecting IDPs, and while Protocol III of the Geneva Conventions theoretically gives the ICRC
a mandate to protect IDPs in the territory of state parties, as of August 2020 Protocol III has only

481

UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109 ), 22 July 1998.
UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, 22 June 2018, p. 2,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2d1a867.html.
482

192

76 state parties, few of which are likely to be major producers of IDPs.483 The only major treaty
to establish state obligations for the protection of IDPs is the 2009 Kampala Convention.484

Refugee
There is some complexity to the term “refugee” since the original 1951 definition
contained a temporal and geographic restriction to which at least one states continues to adhere
(i.e. Turkey). However, in general, a displaced person who fits the criteria codified in the 1951
Refugee Convention—as amended by the 1967 Protocol—is considered a refugee. As is stated in
Article 1 of both agreements:
The term “refugee” shall apply to any person who…owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it. 485
Notably, refugee status determination is merely declaratory in nature—that is, “a person
is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he or she fulfills the criteria
contained in the refugee definition…a person does not become a refugee because of recognition,
but is recognized because he or she is a refugee.”486 Thus, a de facto refugee who has simply not
yet been recognized as such still cannot be legally turned away, or refouled, under Article 33 of
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the Convention. However, individuals are ineligible for refugee status if they have voluntarily
returned to and/or availed themselves of the protection of their country of origin, or if they have
obtained citizenship in a country from which they may receive protection.487 Countries such as
the United States also deny refugee status to those who have assisted in the persecution of others
or who are deemed to pose a threat to national safety or security.488
Notably, an individual may only be recognized as a refugee meeting the Convention
definition by either a sovereign state or UNHCR/UNRWA under their mandates. In the United
States, an individual is only recognized as a refugee if they were either accepted for resettlement
through the USRAP program or they were granted asylum by the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). Therefore, in the United States “refugees” have—by definition—
had their status conveyed upon them before their arrival in the country. In Italy, on the other
hand, a refugee must be granted their status by Italy’s Commissione Territoriale per il
Riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale (“Territorial Commission”). That is, in Italy
refugee status is conveyed after an asylum seeker’s arrival and there is no definitional distinction
made between refugees resettled in Italy in partnership with UNHCR and those granted asylum
and designated as refugees by the Territorial Commission.

Complementary Protection
Displaced persons not fitting the definition of an IDP or refugee may still be eligible for
“complementary” forms of protection, sometimes referred to as “temporary protection.”489 In the
United States and Italy, complementary forms of protection are primarily based on one or more
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of the following legal sources: (1) the 1951 Refugee Convention (on the basis of the “nonrefoulement” principle contained in the Convention, which applies even to non-refugees); (2) the
1984 UN Convention Against Torture (CAT);490 (3) various regional standards and agreements,
which set minimum standards on international protection for state parties; and (4) the statutes
and regulations unique to individual states.491
Technically such forms of protection are temporary in nature in the sense that they
guarantee protection only while circumstances prevent displaced persons from returning to their
countries of origin. In practice, however, such protections may persist for far longer and
essentially allow an individual to live in the destination country indefinitely, even if their status
makes their stay precarious. Even though many forms of complementary protection rely on
international instruments, the specific content of the protections offered and the exact terms of
eligibility for them are generally defined only at the regional- or state-levels. Therefore, the exact
terms and availability of complementary protection are unique to particular countries and
regions.

Refugee Status Determination
The process by which individuals are evaluated in order to ascertain whether they meet
the definition of a refugee is referred to as “refugee status determination” (RSD). RSD is “the
legal or administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person
seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national

490

UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85), 10 December 1984),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html.
491
Ruma Mandal, Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”), UNHCR
Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2005/02 (June 2005), https://www.unhcr.org/435df0aa2.pdf.

195

law.”492 States have the primary responsibility to conduct RSD, but UNHCR may do so when a
state is either not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or does not have adequate procedures in
place to conduct RSD. In practice, UNHCR conducts RSD in nearly one-third of all countries
annually, although the precise number fluctuates depending on the countries in which most
applications for refugee status are received from one year to another.493
While UNHCR outlines various methodologies for states regarding the procedures by
which RSD should be conducted,494 ultimately these processes are entirely determined by the
states themselves. For example, in the United States such determinations are conducted via oneon-one interviews with an Asylum Officer, whereas in Italy they are conducted by committees
composed of four officials from various governmental departments. Even in the European Union,
which is the only regional organization that outlines binding common procedures for determining
eligibility for international protection,495 member states retain certain unique processes by which
applicants have their refugee status determined.

Refoulement
The term “refoulement” refers to the forcible return of refugees (or asylum seekers whose
applications for asylum have not yet been adjudicated) to a country in which they could be
subjected to persecution. It is usually represented in the negative since the principle of nonrefoulement is foundational to international refugee law and is the cornerstone the concept of
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asylum.496 If a state were to forcibly return an individual attempting to seek asylum in their
jurisdiction before conducting a status determination, that would constitute refoulement
regardless of whether that person is, in fact, a bona fide displaced person. Additionally, UNHCR
has argued that international human rights law precludes any state from transferring any person,
whether a refugee, asylum seeker, or otherwise, to a territory where they might face serious
harm.497

Burden-Sharing
Perhaps the most important term in the context of this dissertation, “burden-sharing” has
been used in countless ways to describe sometimes juxtaposed behaviors. The greatest
distinction tends to be related to whether the term is being used to describe activities carried out
by high-income, developed countries or low- or middle-income countries, especially in the
Global South.
In the case of developing countries, especially those bordering major asylum seeker
countries of origin, burden-sharing is more akin to a plea for assistance from the developed
world to address the practical challenges associated with the mass influx of displaced persons
from neighboring regions. For developed countries, on the other hand, burden-sharing refers to a
state’s concern with its relative share of responsibility for asylum seekers and displaced persons
among other developed countries. In this context, a state is engaged in burden-sharing when it
takes an action—often through international or domestic administrative, legal, or procedural
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means—intended to dissuade displaced persons from seeking or receiving asylum within the
state’s jurisdiction. The implication is that another state would thereby be made to bear
responsibility for that displaced person. It is this latter definition of burden-sharing that is
utilized throughout this dissertation.
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